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ABSTRACT 
 
Although there is a growing body of literature on contrarian profits, currently no study exists 
that examines their relation to industrial strategies regarding environmental policies. Japan is a 
world leader in the implementation of ‘green’ policies. This thesis uses Japan as a case study to 
test whether announcements of green policies result in contrarian profit. To achieve this, I 
investigate the impact of 424 environmental regulation announcements during 2001 to 2012 
using event study methodology, contrarian portfolio strategies and seasonality models. I 
control for a number of factors, including trading volume, firm size, sales, profitability ratios, 
industry effect and owner structure. My results show that (1) contrarian behaviour exists 
related to announcements of environmental regulation, (2) fundamental factors affect 
contrarian profits and (3) corporate governance mechanisms (specifically, those related to 
major shareholders) are not effective for polluting firms. 
 
Keywords: environmental regulation, market anomaly, contrarian profits, corporate 
governance 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Japan is the fifth-largest polluter in the world after China, the US, India and Russia, according 
to the 2011 carbon dioxide emission ranking. Japan is also a leading nation regarding 
environmental regulation. While most countries have only embarked on relatively stringent 
environmental policies following the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change (in February 2005), 
Japan had already implemented 140 rigorous policies prior to this meeting. Nevertheless, the 
Kyoto Protocol instigated a significantly large number of new environmental regulations in 
Japan, with 284 announcements being made from February 2005 to July 2012. An analysis of 
these regulations indicates that Japan is fine-tuning its prior policies to achieve better 
outcomes; as such, Japan is viewed as a leader in this area. However, the consequences of these 
regulations on the stock market are currently unknown. Therefore, the main objective of this 
thesis is to study how stock returns reacted to these environmental regulation announcements. 
Emerging environmental finance literature suggests that abnormal returns (AR) (green effects) 
can be linked to environmental policy announcements. This thesis explores whether this 
hypothesis holds true in Japan. This thesis also explores trading strategies that can potentially 
take advantage of the stock market fluctuations resulting from environmental policies. Further, 
it evaluates profitable strategies in relation to firms’ characteristics, including keiretsu. 
 
1.2 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
Fine-tuning existing policies indicates that desired or expected results have not been achieved. 
Using Australian data, Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013) show that polluters have not been 
affected negatively by these policies, as affected firms managed to pass costs on to consumers. 
I have found that the side effects of implementing environmental regulation in Japan are not 
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documented; my study aims at bridging this gap. To differentiate from other research in this 
field, I study the behavioural aspects of investors around these announcements. Using event 
study methodology, momentum and contrarian strategies, I investigate whether investors 
over- or under-react to new legislation. I follow the hypothesis that stringent policies affect 
polluting firms negatively and environmentally friendly firms positively. A behavioural 
approach to this issue can explain the outcomes of environmental regulation on the stock 
market; I also use a fundamental analysis approach. I study whether firm characteristics such 
as size, profitability, leveraging, volume, sales, capital expenditure, seasonality and corporate 
governance mechanisms (crossholding in terms of keiretsu) provide additional explanatory 
power. 
 
Parties interested in this research include polluters, environmentally friendly firms, investors, 
environmental protection agencies, academics and policy makers (including government). 
Academics in various disciplines are studying the effects of climate change in their related 
fields, and here I contribute to this environmental regulation debate. From a finance 
perspective, investors are always interested in finding market anomalies that are good profit 
sources; ARs surrounding green policy announcements (green effects) are a relatively new 
form of market anomaly. According to corporate finance theory, listed companies (both 
polluters and non-polluters) seek to maximise their shareholders’ wealth: green policies have 
the potential to affect both a firm’s revenue and its costs. Hence, business will be interested in 
my research findings. More importantly, governments and the environmental market will be 
able to use my research to determine policy effectiveness. 
 
1.3 THESIS CONTRIBUTION 
The existing literature on green announcement affects focuses predominantly on Western 
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markets and is silent on the Japanese market. I fill this gap in the literature by investigating 
how Japanese firms have reacted to a significant increase in environmental regulation. 
 
Second, I test whether momentum or contrarian profits exist around these environmental 
regulation announcements. By studying the second wave of environmental regulation, I 
identify both successful and unsuccessful policies with implications for policy makers. Third, 
I consider corporate governance structure (in particular, crossholding characteristics) and its 
influence around the announcement of environmental regulations. Fourth, I attempt to explain 
‘green effects’. 
  
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 examines the literature on my research topic. 
Chapter 3 summarises green policies released in Japan over recent decades. Note that this 
chapter has been published in the Handbook of Environmental and Sustainable Finance 
(Ramiah, Gangemi & Liu, 2016). Chapter 4 explains the data and my research methodology. 
Chapter 5 explains green effects on the stock market. Chapter 6 reveals the contrarian profits 
associated with green policies. Chapter 7 explains how a crossholding corporate structure 
influences the stock market. Chapter 8 offers a conclusion. 
 
Chapter 2 determines the research questions for this thesis and describes the literature on 
environmental finance, market anomalies, behavioural finance, crossholding (keiretsu), 
environmental economics and environmental accounting. The three research questions 
identified are as follows. 
1. How do polluting industries and environmental friendly industries react to green policy 
announcements? 
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2. Do investors over-react or under-react to these green policies? 
3. Can green effects be explained by financial and seasonal factors? 
 
Chapter 3 documents and explains 424 environmental regulation announcements released by 
Japan’s Ministry of Environment (MoE). It discusses seven targeted areas of environmental 
policies, such as the global environment, waste and recycling, air and transportation, health 
and chemicals, and nature and parks. 
 
Chapter 4 explains the data and methodology used in this thesis. In particular, this chapter 
details the use of event study methodology to calculate green effects. It examines Lee and 
Swaminathan’s (2000) portfolio construction method to determine winner and loser’s 
performance, momentum, contrarian and buy-and-hold portfolios. The chapter also explains 
winners, losers, momentum, contrarian and buy-and-hold portfolios performance using 
fundamental characteristics such as size, profitability, leverage, volume, sales, capital 
expenditure, seasonality and corporate governance mechanism. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the first empirical findings. In this chapter, the overall result of green 
effects is presented. The results are broken down according to industries: environmentally 
friendly and polluting. Further, the impact of each environmental regulation is presented. 
 
Chapter 6 is the second empirical chapter. It (1) describes how environmental portfolios are 
constructed, (2) explains what drives winner portfolios, (3) refers to the ‘losers’ curse’, (4) 
explains momentum portfolios, (5) illustrates the effects associated with contrarian portfolios, 
(6) explains buy-and-hold portfolios and (7) shows the results of a green portfolio analysis. 
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Chapter 7 is the last empirical chapter. It (1) introduces keiretsu, (2) describes horizontal and 
vertical keiretsu, (3) illustrates the data and methodology used, (4) explains the green effects 
under a crossholding structure and (5) explains the green effects under a crossholding 
structure after controlling for firms’ voting rights. 
 
1.5 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
According to my analysis, the highlights of my findings are as follows: 
1. The green effects hypothesis holds, but varies across industries. 
2. Japanese environmental regulations are successful when applied to environmentally 
friendly businesses, but fail to achieve its expected results on polluters.  
3. The most significant piece of regulation is Eco-Action Point model whereby citizens 
are rewarded with redeemable points when they consume environmentally friendly 
products.  
4. Investors have a tendency to underreact to winner portfolios after announcements of 
environmental policies.  
5. An unusual behaviour is detected in the way investors approach loser portfolios. 
6. The momentum hypothesis does not hold.  
7. Contrarian behaviour produces the highest profit in the short term.  
8. Buy-and-hold strategy produces the highest profit in the long term. 
9. Size factor explain green effects. 
10. Regardless whether a firm is environmentally friendly or polluting firms, the major 
shareholders do not have explanatory power in terms of explaining the abnormal return.  
11. Shareholders voting rights do not have a major influence on green effects. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Environmental economics is a well-established discipline, environmental accounting is 
reaching its maturity stage and environmental finance is at its earliest stage. My thesis 
contributes to environmental finance. However, given the limited number of papers published 
in this area, it is important to look at other disciplines, such as economics and accounting. 
This chapter will present a literature review and determine the thesis’s research questions. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the environmental finance 
literature (including green effects, event study methodology and diamond risk). Section 2.3 
explains market anomalies. Section 2.4 examines the behavioural finance literature (including 
trading strategies, over-reaction and under-reaction, portfolio construction, fundamental 
analysis and seasonality). Section 2.5 reveals the keiretsu corporate structure. Section 2.6 
outlines the environmental economics literature. Section 2.7 describes the environmental 
accounting literature and Section 2.8 provides a conclusion. 
 
2.2 ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCE LITERATURE 
Academic literature on the effects of environmental and capital markets is non-existent. For 
instance, Stewart (1993) argues it costs less to do business in countries where regulations are 
either lax or are not enforced, as regulations are associated with fines, liabilities and 
administrative and legal actions against polluters. Stewart’s ‘polluting heaven’ hypothesis 
dictates that industries from countries with more environmental regulations will flow to 
countries with lax regulations. If applied to Japan, this hypothesis implies that Japanese firms 
should not operate Japan, as the Japanese market is heavily regulated. Japan has implemented 
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424 environmental policies in the past decade. The United States of America (US) has 
implemented 94 (see Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa 2015b), the United Kingdom (UK) 75 (see 
Ramiah et al. 2016), China 25 (see Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa 2015a) with Australia 
introducing 19 (see Ramiah, Martin and Moosa 2013). From my examination of this literature, 
I conclude that Japan is a heavily regulated market. For the pollution heaven hypothesis to 
hold, I would have had to observe an outflow of funds from Japan. However, Kirkpatrick and 
Shimamoto (2008) show that Japanese industries (including the top five polluting industries) 
tend not to operate their business in countries with lax environmental regulations. This 
indicates that corporate conscience exists; businesses prefer to operate in a well-regulated 
market to minimise the risk of environmental remediation. Dowell, Hart and Yeung (2000) 
document other benefits associated with adequate environmental regulations. For instance, 
Dowell et al. (2000) put forward several arguments in favor of environmental regulation 
which include and one argument suggest that some fringe benefits may be associated with 
adhering to high environmental standards such as heightened employee morale which in turn 
improves productivity as employees are proud to be working for socially responsible 
organizations. One key observation in the literature concerning the benefits of environmental 
regulation is that it fails to account for any potential benefits arising from the Japanese 
experience. In this study financial data series and financial models (as opposed to direct 
measures of emissions) are used to understand how individual firms react to announcements 
of environmental regulations. By working with the change in their stock market price, we 
implicitly assume that either their cost or revenue is affected by the regulation. The findings 
of this study may have implications for organizations. A classic example of such a practice is 
the national eco-action point model (see Chapters 3 & 5 on Announcement 328 regarding this) 
implemented by the MoE, whereby consumers collect points when they buy environmentally 
friendly products and can then redeem these points for other goods and services. 
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However, this study will focus on finance aspects, in particular risk and return. Dowell, Hart 
and Yeung (2000) argue that environmental standards tend to increase over time; with rising 
incomes, the market becomes more sensitive to environmental issues. Polluting firms are 
more exposed to fines, liabilities or legal actions (Stewart, 1993); these lead to cash flow 
fluctuations that imply an increase in business risk. Halkos and Sepetis (2007) argue that 
better environmental management leads to risk reduction. Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013) 
provide additional explanation regarding how industry (beta) risk fluctuates with 
environmental regulation. First, they argue that stringent environmental regulations tend to 
increase risk for polluters and decrease risk for environmentally friendly industries. Second, 
rejecting stringent policies leads to a decrease in risk for polluters and an increase in risk for 
environmentally friendly industries. They refer to this situation as the ‘diamond risk 
structure’. Using evidence from China and the US, Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa (2015a, 
2015b) show that polluters’ risks increased consistently beyond the Kyoto Protocol, while the 
risk for environmentally friendly industries decreased. 
 
When considering the literature on investors’ returns associated with environmental issues, I 
find mixed results. The literature identifies positive, negative and no ARs. Karpoff, Lott and 
Wehrly (2005) examine 478 environmental events from 1980 to 2000 in the US. They 
determine that violating environmental regulations lead to both statistically and economically 
significant decreases in common share values. Hamilton (1995) uses event study 
methodology to conclude that news about high levels of toxic emissions results in significant 
negative ARs. Average share value loss is $4.1 million for firms that release toxic emission 
statements (Hamilton 1995). Feldman, Soyka and Ameer (1996) investigate how 
environmental management affected the stock prices of 300 US firms. Their study shows that 
firms investing in environmental management experience a general increase in their stock 
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price. Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013), Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa (2015a, 2015b) and 
Ramiah et al. (2016) show that different industries react differently to environmental 
regulation. Their results show that the electricity industry (one of the largest polluters) has not 
been affected by recent environmental regulations, as electricity providers can pass on costs 
to consumers. Two conclusions can be drawn from the return and environmental issues 
literature. First, financial asset prices are sensitive to green policies and second, the literature 
is silent on how environmental regulation affects the Japanese stock market. 
 
2.2.1 Green Effects 
Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013) investigate the impact of 19 environmental events on 
equities listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). Using event study methodology, they 
assess whether ARs exist around announcements of environmental regulation. They conclude 
that the Australian market was particularly sensitive to the Australian government’s ‘White 
paper’ release, with a sector-to-sector difference. When ARs are associated with environmental 
issues, this is referred to as a ‘green effect’. Subsequent studies were conducted to review the 
validity of green effects. For instance, Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa (2015a, 2015b), Pham, 
Ramiah and Moosa (2015), Ramiah et al. (2016) study Europe, the US, China, France and the 
UK. Although not referred to as ‘green effects’, prior studies do associate ARs with 
environmental issues. For instance, Kahn and Knittel (2003) examine the effects of President 
George H. Bush’s Clean Air Act amendment proposal of June 1989 on publicly listed electric 
utility companies. Veith, Werner and Zimmermann (2009) study how European electricity 
industries pass on emission allowance costs successfully. Feldman, Soyka and Ameer (1996) 
show that stock prices increase with effective environmental management and performance. 
Hamilton (1995) states that stock prices decrease when reports of firm pollution are released to 
the market, and Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) conclude that positive stock returns occur 
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when positive environmental regulation news is released (such as environmental awards and 
improved environmental data). 
 
2.2.2 Event Study Methodology 
Brown and Warner (1985) examine the properties of daily stock returns and how the particular 
characteristics of these data affect event study methodologies for assessing the share price 
impact of firm-specific events. Their paper extends earlier work of Brown and Warner (1980) 
who investigated event study methodologies using monthly returns. Subsequently, Brown and 
Warner (1985) studied the statistical properties of both observed daily stock returns and of 
daily excess returns. They conclude that with randomly selected securities and event dates, no 
ARs should be observed. 
 
Brown and Warner (1985) warn that using daily data in event studies involves a number of 
potential problems, which can be summarised as follows: 
1. Non-normality: daily stock returns for an individual security exhibits substantial 
departures from normality that are not observed with monthly data. 
2. Non-synchronous trading and market model parameter estimation: when the return on 
a security and the return on the market index are each measured over a different 
trading interval, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of market model parameters 
are biased and inconsistent. 
3. Variance estimation: Brown and Warner (1985) investigate several variance 
issues—serial dependence and non-stationary—in daily variance. 
 
Brown and Warner (1985) observe that the results from simulations with daily data generally 
reinforce the conclusions of their previous work on monthly data: methodologies based on the 
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OLS market model and using standard parametric tests are well specified under a variety of 
conditions. They also observe that the characteristics of daily data present some difficulties in 
the context of event study methodologies. Further, Brown and Warner’s (1985) results indicate 
a striking similarity between the empirical power of event study procedures and the theoretical 
power implied by a few simple assumptions and ‘back of envelope’ calculations. This 
reinforces the view that using daily data is straightforward. Brown and Warner’s (1985) 
methodology is followed by many researchers when investigating how certain events affect the 
stock market. 
 
Hamilton (1995) provides an example of event study methodology applied to environmental 
events. This study investigates whether pollution data released by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) in the June 1989 ‘Toxics Release Inventory’ (TRI) comprised ‘news’ 
to journalists and investors. Their results indicate that when higher pollution figures (such as 
air emissions or offsite shipments of toxic waste) were published in firms’ TRI reports, 
journalists were more likely to report the firms’ toxic releases. Stockholders in firms reporting 
TRI pollution figures experienced negative, statistically significant ARs upon the first release 
of information. According to Hamilton’s (1995) estimates, these ARs translated into an 
average loss of $4.1 million in stock value for TRI firms on the day that pollution figures were 
first released. 
 
Cam and Ramiah (2014) adopt Brown and Warner’s event study methodology to calculate AR 
using terrorist attacks and subprime crisis events. Cam and Ramiah (2014) follow Brown and 
Warner’s (1985) methodology, adding CAPM and Fama and French’s three-factors model to 
their analysis. Cam and Ramiah (2014) also control for behavioural short-term phenomena by 
estimating the cumulated AR over five subsequent days after the event day. Cam and Ramiah 
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(2014) show that introducing these two factors has a significant effect on ARs; thus, the ARs 
from these three models differ. Another interesting finding from Cam and Ramiah (2014) is 
that this effect varies with the different classes of AR. In other words, the effects observed for 
negative ARs can differ from positive ARs. When econometrics adjustments are made to the 
CAPM and Fama and French 3-factor model, the authors observe a weak change in the AR, and 
the economic benefit of financial econometrics becomes questionable. Cam and Ramiah 
(2014) conclude that an analysis controlling for systematic risk factors usually detects fewer 
and smaller ARs than an evaluation based on Brown and Warner’s (1985) model. In some 
instances, studies using Brown and Warner’s (1985) approach detect twice as many ARs than 
studies using asset-pricing models. Cam and Ramiah (2014) determine that the results vary 
according to the technique chosen to estimate an expected return. 
 
Much scholarship has adopted event study methodology to investigate particular events;
1
 one 
example is the announcement of environmental regulations. Examples include Ramiah, Martin 
and Moosa (2013), Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa (2015a, 2015b), Pham, Ramiah and Moosa 
(2015) and Ramiah et al. (2016). Following these papers, I examine how the 424 environmental 
regulations affect the Japanese stock market; interestingly, the literature does not provide an 
answer to this question. Green effects in Japan are presented in Chapter 5. 
 
2.2.3 Diamond Risk 
According to Feldman, Soyka and Ameer (1996) and Halkos and Spetis (2007), enhanced 
environmental management tends to affect businesses’ systematic risk as measured by beta. 
Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013) study the time variation in beta after green policy 
announcements. Interestingly, they observe a diamond risk shape with beta changes, whereby 
                                                 
1
 Terrorist attacks: Ramiah et al. (2010), Graham & Ramiah (2012), Ramiah (2012), Ramiah & Graham (2013), 
and Ramiah et al. (2015); tsunamis Ramiah (2013), Ramiah, Regan-Beasley & Moosa (2016); and market 
technology Ramiah et al. (2015). 
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stringent policies increase polluters’ risk and increase the risk of environmentally friendly 
businesses. However, rejecting the same stringent environmental policies leads to a reversal of 
this risk. Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013), Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa (2015a, 2015b), 
Pham, Ramiah and Moosa (2015), and Ramiah et al. (2016) observe similar risk shifting 
patterns in Australia, the US, China, France and the UK. The following figures illustrate 
systematic risk shifting behaviour in Australia, the US, China, France and the UK, following 
environmental regulation announcements. 
Figure 2.1: Long-Term Change in Australian Systematic Risk 
 
 
Source: Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013) 
Figure 2.2: Long-Term Change in US Systematic Risk 
 
 
Source: Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa (2015b) 
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Figure 2.3: Long-Term Change Chinese Systematic Risk 
 
 
Source: Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa (2015a) 
 
Figure 2.4: Long-Term Change in French Systematic Risk 
 
 
Source: Pham, Ramiah and Moosa (2015) 
Figure 2.5: Long-Term Change in UK Systematic Risk 
 
 
Source: Ramiah et al. (2016) 
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2.3 MARKET ANOMALY  
A market anomaly is defined as an instance where ARs are observed consistently. Examples 
of such anomalies include the following: value effect (Lakonishok, Vishny and Shleifer 1994), 
small-cap effect (Fama and French 1992), low volatility (Jensen, Black and Scholes 1972), 
momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993), contrarian (De Bondt and Thaler 1985) and 
January effects (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993). The first studies on any anomaly identify the 
magnitude of ARs; subsequent studies explain why it happens. Researchers at RMIT and the 
University of South Australia refer to ARs around environmental regulation announcements 
as ‘green effects’. A review of the literature in fundamental firm characteristics, corporate 
governance mechanisms and behavioural finance theories reveals that no explanation has 
been provided for ‘green effects’. 
 
2.4 BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE LITERATURE 
Haugen (1999) describes the finance evolution as consisting of three periods: old, modern and 
new. ‘Old finance’ focused on financial statement analysis and the nature of financial claims 
(i.e., equity holders, dividend policy, interest and principals of debt instruments). ‘Modern 
finance’ focused on valuation, based on rational economic behaviour. Modern finance assumes 
that the market is always efficient and that a short-run deviation of fundamental values could 
occur; however, the market would approach its intrinsic value over the long term. Some 
research challenges modern finance; consequently, ‘new finance’ was born in the 1990s. This 
model explains that inefficient markets are driven by behavioural patterns. The behavioural 
finance discipline has grown significantly since the 1990s. Much research is now dedicated to 
this area. For instance, momentum and contrarian trading strategies were classified as 
behavioural finance concepts in the 1990s (but are now arguably considered part of traditional 
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finance) and many studies
2
 attempt to explain irrational phenomena using behavioural finance 
theory. The momentum and contrarian literature explains how market participants over- or 
under-react to news. However, the literature fails to provide an answer regarding whether 
market participants over- or under-react to environmental policy announcements. 
 
Behavioural finance can be defined as the application of psychology to explain market 
anomalies. Behavioural models allow for the fact that market participants can make mistakes in 
their valuations; the goal of behavioural finance is to help managers and policy makers 
recognise their own mistakes (and those of others), understand the reasons for such mistakes, 
and avoid future mistakes. The academic research in this area covers topics such as 
representativeness bias, over-confidence, self-serving bias, gambler’s fallacy, over-reaction, 
under-reaction, hindsight, panic, herding behaviour, status quo, survivorship bias, money 
illusion, loss aversion, attachment, disposition effect, recovery, familiarity, illusion of control, 
home bias, conservatism and even narcissism (Ramiah, Xu and Moosa, 2015). 
 
2.4.1 Trading Strategies 
Empirical evidence shows that extreme stock selection processes are profitable in numerous 
global markets. Research has been undertaken on: momentum strategies (Rouwenhorst 1998, 
Hestonet, Rouwenhorst and Wessels 1999, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998 and Lee and 
Swaminathan 2000), contrarian strategies (Ball, Kothari and Wasley 1995, Kryzanowshi and 
Zhang 1992, Chin, Prevost and Gottesman 2002, Galariotis 2012, Ramiah et al. 2011, Ramiah, 
Mugwagwa and Naughton 2011, Ramiah et al. 2016, Mugwagwa, Ramiah and Moosa 2014, 
Xu et al. 2016, Walters, Ramiah and Moosa 2016) and buy-and-hold strategies (Ritter 1991, 
                                                 
2
 See Ramiah and Davidson (2007), Ramiah et al. (2012), Mugwagwa, Ramiah, Naughton and Moosa (2012), 
Ramiah, Zhao, Graham and Moosa (2014), Ramiah et al. (2014), Mugwagwa, Ramiah and Moosa (2015), Xu, 
Ramiah, Moosa and Davidson (2016), Ramiah, Xu and Moosa (2015), Walters and Ramiah (2016) and Walters, 
Ramiah and Moosa (2016). 
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Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen 1995, Fama 1998, Mugwagwa, Ramiah and Naughton 
2012). Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) report the profitability of return continuations and show 
that arbitrageurs can take advantage of momentum strategies by buying well-performing stocks 
and selling poor-performing stocks. Following their research, more papers have documented 
momentum profitability; for instance, Rouwenhorst (1998), Heston, Rouwenhorst and Wessels 
(1999) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000). The momentum literature is restricted to price and 
earnings momentum, but fails to explore whether momentum effects exist around 
environmental regulations. 
 
In contrast, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) show that a contrarian strategy, whereby investors buy 
poor-performing stocks and sell high-performing stocks, can earn abnormal profits. They argue 
that under conditions of return reversal, prior ‘loser’ stocks generally outperform the market, 
while prior ‘winners’ tend to underperform. The contrarian approach is also noticeable in other 
research; for instance, Bowan and Iverson (1998), Atkins and Dyl (1990), Akhigbe, Gosnell 
and Harikumar (1998), Alonso and Rubbio (1990), Brailsford (1992), Clare and Thomas 
(1995), Chang et al (1995), Zarowin (1990), Chopra, Lakonishok, Ritter (1992), Ball et al. 
(1995), Hameed and Ting (2000), Otchere and Chan (2003) and Ramiah et al. (2011). Similar 
to the momentum literature, the contrarian literature fails to consider environmental regulation 
announcements. 
 
Additionally, the literature documents buy-and-hold as a profitable trading strategy. Ritter 
(1991) creates a buy-and-hold trading strategy to investigate stock price behaviour after a 
three-year holding period and finds investors are periodically over-optimistic about the earning 
potential of young growing companies. Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) examine 
long-run firm performance following open market share repurchase announcements in 1980 to 
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1990. They find that the average abnormal four-year buy-and-hold return measured after the 
initial announcement was 12.1%. The average return over the next four years for a 
buy-and-hold portfolio of these stocks was 45.3% above that of a control portfolio of similar 
size and book-to-market firms. Similar results were observed by Fama (1998). Another 
observable gap in this literature is the failure to study the buy-and-hold strategy performance 
associated with environmental policy announcements. 
 
2.4.2 Overreaction and Underreaction 
Research in experimental psychology suggests that ‘over-reaction’ occurs when traders give 
more weight to present information or less weight to past information. De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) are regarded as the leading researchers to examine the over-reaction hypothesis. De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) show that a contrarian strategy in which investors buy 
poor-performing stocks and sell high-performing stocks can earn abnormal profits. They argue 
that under conditions of return reversal, prior ‘loser’ stocks generally outperform the market, 
while prior ‘winners’ tend to underperform. Subsequent papers, such as that of Chopra et al. 
(1992) reinforce these findings in terms of over-reaction asymmetry, arguing that individuals 
over-react more than institutions. Further evidence has emerged to support the over-reaction 
hypothesis: Lakonishok et al. (1994), Dreman and Berry (1995), Lobe and Rieks (2011) and 
Farag (2014). However, the existing literature fails to answer whether investors over-react (or 
under-react) to green policy announcements. 
 
Similarly, Odean (1998) and Graham, Harvey and Huang (2009) use psychological factors to 
explain that overconfident investors over-rate their own beliefs; in turn, this leads to excessive 
trading. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny’s (1998) model examines the role of both over-reaction 
and under-reaction within the financial market, using Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) 
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representativeness bias results to explain over-reaction. Chen, Rui and Wang (2005) conclude 
that Chinese investors in a bullish market over-react to good news and under-react to bad news. 
The under-reaction hypothesis is used to explain momentum profits; it assumes that slow 
adjustment to new information leads to return continuations; that is, winners continue to be 
winners and losers continue to lose. Many researchers support the under-reaction hypothesis; 
for instance, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1991), Bernard and 
Thomas (1990), Freeman and Tse (1989), Wiggins (1991), Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), 
Rouwenhorst (1998), Heston, Rouwenhorst and Wessels (1999) and Lee and Swaminathan. 
 
2.4.3 Portfolio Construction 
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) examine all firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange and 
AMEX from January 1965 to December 1995. They show that past trading volumes provide an 
important link between ‘momentum’ and ‘value’ strategies. A stock is included in the sample 
only if it has available information on past returns, trading volume, market capitalisation and 
stock price. The authors ranked all firms by average turnover, which is defined as the average 
daily turnover in percentage during the portfolio formation period, and where daily turnover is 
the ratio of the number of shares traded each day to the number of shares outstanding at the end 
of the day. At the beginning of each month, from January 1965 to December 1995, they ranked 
all eligible stocks independently based on past returns and past trading volume. The stocks 
were then assigned to one of ten portfolios, based on returns over the previous J months and 
one of three portfolios based on the trading volume over the same period. The intersections 
resulting from the two independent rankings gave rise to 30 price momentum–volume 
portfolios. The authors focused on the monthly returns of extreme winner and loser deciles 
over the next K months (where K = 3, 6, 9 or 12) and over the next five years. 
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Similar to Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the monthly return for a K-month holding period is 
based on an equal-weighted average of portfolio returns from strategies implemented in the 
current month and the previous K-1 months. For example, the monthly return for a three-month 
holding period is based on an equal-weighted average of portfolio returns from this month’s 
strategy, last month’s strategy, and the strategy from two months ago. This is equivalent to 
revising the weights of approximately one-third of the portfolio each month and carrying over 
the rest from the previous month. The technique enables the use of simple t-statistics for 
monthly returns. 
 
Lee and Swaminathan’s (2000) portfolio construction method has been used extensively within 
momentum and contrarian studies, but has never been applied to environmental portfolios (i.e., 
looking at winners and losers from polluting and environmentally friendly perspective). This 
provides a foundation to use Lee and Swaminathan’s (2000) portfolio construction method to 
assess winner and loser performances in relation to environmental policy announcements. 
 
2.4.4 Fundamental Analysis 
Trading volume, firm size, profitability, sales, capital expenditure and leverage are the main 
finance variables
3
 used to explain extreme profits (winners, losers, momentum and 
contrarian), but the literature appears unsettled on those counts. In particular, there is no clear 
consensus regarding what variables explain extreme profits, nor whether the high or low level 
of any given variable affects profits. In most studies, empirical results demonstrate that high 
levels of these factors account for abnormal profits, but conflicting evidence exists regarding 
whether low levels of these variables also lead to abnormal profits. It is significant that the 
                                                 
3
 Ramiah, Zhao and Moosa (2014) and Madhou, Moosa and Ramiah (2015). 
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environmental finance literature ignores research on firms’ characteristics such as volume, 
size, profitability, sales, capital expenditure and leverage. 
 
Volume  
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) show past trading volume predicts both the magnitude and 
persistence of price momentum. Specifically, price momentum effects reverse over the next 
five years. Odean (1998) provides evidence that over-confidence increases trading volume and 
volatility, which leads to under-reaction. Considering trading volume alone, Conrad, Hameed 
and Niden (1994), Chordia and Swaminathan (2000), Bremer and Hiraki (1999) and Hameed 
and Ting (2000) argue that the returns of portfolios containing highly traded stocks outperform 
portfolios comprised of low-trading-volume stocks. Conversely, Campbell, Grossman and 
Wang (1993) find that trading volume and stock return autocorrelation are inversely related. 
Moreover, Lee et al. (2003) and Ramiah et al. (2011) postulate that these abnormal profits can 
be attributed to an illiquidity premium and are therefore neither contrarian, nor momentum 
profits. 
 
Profitability 
Ball and Brown (1968) develop the link between policy announcements and a firms’ 
profitability and investor expectations. Jones, Latane and Rendleman (1982) and Easton and 
Harris (1991) analyse profitability as an explanatory variable for stock returns. Other studies 
show a relationship between profitability and portfolio returns, such as Ramiah, Mugwagwa 
and Naughton (2011) and Ramiah et al. (2016). The literature in this area examines earnings, 
but as environmental finance is relatively new, I could not locate any research that links 
profitability and ARs from the winners and losers in relation to environmental regulation 
announcements. 
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Size  
The existing literature shows that firm size is related to stock return and could affect a firms’ 
value. Fama and French (1993) show that firm size is a factor in US market stock returns. Drew 
and Veeraraghavan (2001) extend this literature by revealing a relationship between firm size, 
book-to-market equity and average stock returns for several Asian markets. Gaunt, Gray and 
McIvor (2000) and Ramiah, Mugwagwa and Naughton (2011) show a size effect in the 
Australian and Hong Kong markets. Further, Drew, Naughton and Veeraraghavan (2003) show 
that small and growing firms generate superior returns compared to larger and more valuable 
firms. Lee et al. (2003) explain contrarian profits with factors such as measurement errors, 
seasonality, volume, firm size and transaction cost. Almost every paper in the momentum and 
contrarian field controls for the size factor; the implication for my study is that firm size cannot 
be ignored. 
 
Leverage 
Bowman (1980) shows owners’ equity is important when assessing financial leverage effects 
on risk. Ryan (1997) finds that systematic equity risk is positively associated with sources of 
financial leverage. Surprisingly, the leverage literature is minimal compared to studies of other 
factors such as volume and firm size. Ramiah, Mugwagwa and Naughton (2011) and Ramiah et 
al. (2016) explore the relationship between debt-to-equity ratio and contrarian profits, but fail 
to establish a relationship. It appears that this literature is undecided, as different researchers 
observe different effects; therefore, it is important to further test for the relationship between 
leverage and extreme profits. 
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Capital Expenditure (Capex) 
The findings from the CAPEX literature are mixed. Tsay, Alt and Gordon (1993) document 
that a lower capital expenditure has a positive effect on firms’ market value. Copeland, Dolgoff 
and Moel (2004) investigate the relationship between the total return of shareholders and 
capital expenditure, but fail to establish a link between these two variables. Ramiah et al. 
(2016) find that capital expenditure influences portfolio returns. They argue that, consistent 
with the corporate finance literature, low CAPEX levels provide early signs of firms in 
difficulty, which are good sources of contrarian profits. With the introduction of environmental 
policies, firms tend to invest in new environmentally friendly technologies; the outcomes for 
green effects are currently unexamined in the literature. I find this to be a major gap in the 
environmental finance literature, but it is partially addressed in the environmental economics 
literature (see Section 2.6.7). 
 
Sales  
Ramiah, Mugwagwa and Naughton (2011) and Ramiah et al. (2016) describe how firm sales 
can affect the firms’ return, especially for poorly performing firms. In turn, this affects 
winners, losers, momentum and contrarian profits. I assume that fundamentals investors 
incorporate a firm’s sales figures into their asset allocation decisions. Intuitively, any negative 
sales announcement would be expected to decrease a firm’s return. Although the sales variable 
is regarded as less susceptible to manipulation, it is used extensively by finance academics and 
is fertile for exploration. 
 
2.4.5 Seasonality 
‘Seasonal anomaly’ is not a new phenomenon within the finance literature and is described as a 
market anomaly whereby investors consistently and persistently earn higher ARs on certain 
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days of the week or months of the year. For instance in US equity markets, unusually high ARs 
are observed in January (the January-effect) and negative ARs are discerned on Mondays (the 
Monday-effect). However, these effects are country specific; for example, the Australian 
equity market displays a ‘July effect’, triggering international debate concerning this puzzle. 
Recently, researchers have shown that seasonal anomalies are not restricted to global equity 
markets, but are also present in other areas. These include electricity (Thomas, Ramiah, 
Heaney and Mitchell, 2011), contrarian profits (Ramiah, Mugwagwa, and Naughton, 2011), 
hybrid products in terms of the buy-write strategy (Mugwagwa, Ramiah, Naughton, and 
Moosa, 2012) and derivatives products such as financial options (Mugwagwa, Ramiah, and 
Moosa, 2015). 
 
Heston and Sadka (2008) examine the seasonal structure of momentum returns and observe 
January-, October- and December-effects in the US, while Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) 
argue that profitability is largely confined to January. Yalcin (2008) shows robust January 
seasonality effects in contrarian returns. Spyrou, Kassimatis and Galariotis (2007) detect a 
manifestation of the January-effect in under-reaction scenarios and show that market shocks 
predominantly occur on either Mondays or Fridays. In Australia, Lee et al. (2003) control for 
January and July calendar effects and report no seasonality for these two periods. Durand, 
Limkriangrai and Smith (2006), Ramiah, Mugwagwa and Naughton (2011), Ramiah et al. 
(2014) and Ramiah et al. (2016) observe weekly, monthly and yearly effects. 
 
Controlling for seasonality in return performance is not optional, but is a mandatory test for 
portfolio analysis. This implies a need to control for this effect in my analysis. 
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2.5 JAPANESE KEIRETSU STRUCTURE LITERATURE 
Keiretsu is defined as a group of companies with interlocking business relationships and 
shareholdings. They exist in two forms: vertical and horizontal (Lincoln and Shimotani, 2009). 
The ‘Japanese main bank system’ and ‘crossholding between manufactures and its suppliers’ 
are two types of crossholding known as keiretsu. Bohren and Michalsen (1994) show that the 
US crossholding ratio is 3%, with 16% in Norway and 47% in Japan. Given this significant 
portion, it is important to control for crossholding in my study. 
 
Guo and Yakura (2009) summarise the benefits and disadvantages of the crossholding 
structure. They indicate that crossholding between firms (1) strengthens the relationship 
between business entities, (2) reduces takeovers and enhances long-run development, (3) 
provides a stable source of funding for business entities and (4) enables firms to raise more 
capital in secondary offerings. In contrast, crossholding also (1) over-estimates capital and 
hinders outsiders from joining a group, (2) creates no new capital, (3) leads to corporate 
governance problems and (4) has negative effects on capital markets. 
 
The crossholding structure in Japan experienced a high growth period after World War II, 
reached its peak in the 1970s and underwent major restructuring in the 1990s. Ahmadjian 
(2003) and Lincoin and Shimotani (2009) document how companies changed their 
crossholding structure by reducing their board members after the 1990s. According to Tabeta 
and Rahman (1999), risk sharing behaviours change over time; firms with crossholding 
displayed risk aversion from 1973 to 1985 (compared to independent firms), while 
independent firms displayed more risk aversion from 1985 to 1994. McGuire and Dow 
(2009) argue that as the Japanese economy changed post-1992, the concept of crossholding 
emerged with horizontal keiretsu firms adopting vertical keiretsu and vice versa. As the 
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existing literature fails to link corporate governance, contrarian profits and green effects, one 
main contribution of this study is to establish such a link. Further, this literature mandates 
studies to consider keiretsu characteristics when dealing with Japanese organisations. 
 
2.6 ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 
2.6.1 Employment 
Morgenstein et al. (2002) observe that most previous attempts to measure net employment 
effects depend on aggregate industry data or anecdotal evidence. In their opinion, such 
approaches make it difficult to separate environmental regulation effects from other 
differences that exist across industries and changes that occur over time. Morgenstein et al. 
(2002) use detailed census data—with a six-year panel of data on plant-level prices, inputs 
(including labour), outputs, and environmental expenditures—to estimate the production 
structure and its dependence on environmental expenditures. Their approach differs from 
previous empirical work in this area as it couples a structural model of production (estimated 
with detailed plant-level data) with an aggregate demand model (estimated from industry-level 
time-series data). The detailed plant-level enable control of many potentially confounding 
variables, including any fixed either at a particular plant or in a particular year (using plant and 
time dummy variables). Morgenstein et al. (2002) conclude that, given the $4.9 billion increase 
in regulatory expense and the 632,000 job decrease in manufacturing employment from 1984 
to 1994, these estimates suggest that, at most, environmental regulation accounted for 2% of 
the observed decline in employment over this 10-year period. Similar results are evident in the 
work of Greenstone, List, and Syverson (2012), who argue that introducing environmental 
regulations could lead to higher levels of unemployment. 
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However, Repetto (1995) and Bezdek, Wendling and Di Perna (2008) establish a link 
between environmental protection, economic growth and job creation. The authors suggest 
that the aggregate effect on employment of investments in environmental regulations is 
positive. Further, Eberly (2011), Sinclair and Vesey (2012) and Moosa and Ramiah (2014) 
find no empirical evidence demonstrating that environmental regulations cause a decline in 
employment. 
 
According to this literature, employment levels are affected by environmental regulations, 
which in turn may affect the cost of labour and production. Employment levels can 
potentially affect product aggregate demand. In other words, the cost and revenue functions 
of firms are affected. This will then affect a firm’s profitability. Therefore, it is vital to study 
how firm profitability affects investor wealth. 
 
2.6.2 International Trade 
After the release of the environmental regulations, the increased cost on environmental 
protection has the potential to affect the cost of exporting and importing. However, the 
literature review on international trade fails to capture this effect. For instance, Tobey (1990),  
Pearson (1987) and Leonard (1988) find that exports are not influenced by the release of 
environmental regulations across different regions. In addition, by examining the relationship 
between importing activities and environmental costs, Grossman and Krueger (1993) and 
Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, and Stavins (1995) show that the small environmental costs caused 
by regulations tend not to influence on imports. Low and Yeats (1992) and Levy and 
Dinopoulos (2016) show environmental regulations have no negative impact on international 
trade except for manufacturing industries. It should be noted that manufacturing industries 
are usually classified as polluting industries, which may be excessively affected by the 
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environmental regulations.  
 
2.6.3 Competitiveness 
Jaffe et al. (1995) mention that environmental regulations are noticeable not only for the effects 
they have on international competitiveness, but also for the net positive driving force on firms. 
Porter (1991) argues that international competitiveness may be improved by environmental 
regulation. According to an EPA (1992) report, when environmental regulations are 
introduced, reductions in emissions reduction and overall business costs are achieved through 
more cost-effective processes. Esty and Porter (2002), Gardiner (1994) and Barbera and 
McConnell (1990) indicate that environmental regulations encourage companies to invest 
more in research activities to invent new, less polluting and more efficient producing 
techniques that will subsequently improve their competitiveness. Similarly, Ramiah and 
Moosa (2014) and Haveman and Christainsen (1981) argue that environmental regulation 
does not necessarily increase inflation and shrink competitiveness. The lessons learned from 
the competiveness/efficiency literature postulate that firms’ cost and revenue functions can be 
altered and affect profitability. However, this literature fails to look at industrial differences. 
 
2.6.4 Economic Growth  
Researchers link environmental regulations to economic growth. For instance, Jorgenson and 
Wilcoxen (1990) find that the US gross national product (GNP) exhibited a slight decrease 
caused by environmental regulations after investigating samples 1974 to 1985. Beckerman 
(1992) finds a positive relationship between environmental improvement and economic 
growth. Meyer (1992) examines the relationship between stringent environmental regulations 
and poor economic performance and finds that economic growth and development are 
encouraged by efforts to improve environmental quality. The economic growth literature has 
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major implications for asset-pricing models that use a market portfolio. As environmental 
regulations affect economic growth, the market portfolio of a country is affected. In turn, this 
affects companies’ systematic risk. Such findings are already been observed within the 
environmental finance literature (e.g., the diamond risk structure). 
 
2.6.5 Productivity 
The three most commonly used approaches to measure the effects of environmental 
regulations on productivity are the growth accounting, macroeconomic general equilibrium, 
and single-equation models (Denison, 1979, Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1990, Haveman and 
Christainsen, 1981). Denison (1979) applies the growth accounting model to estimate the 
incremental costs of environmental regulations and changes in productivity, documenting 
productivity loss resulting from environmental regulations. Similarly, Siegel (1979) reveals 
pollution abatement expenditure as a significant negative factor resulting in productivity 
decline. This is consistent with Gray (1987), Gollop and Roberts (1983) and Barbera and 
McConnel’s (1986, 1990) research. These authors argue that productivity slowdowns are 
caused by general regulations. However, this is inconsistent with Berman and Bui (1999) and 
Moosa and Ramiah’s (2014) findings, which indicate a positive relationship between 
environmental regulation and labour productivity. Productivity is related to a firm’s cost of 
production. Therefore, it affects the cost function, which in turn can influence shareholder 
wealth. 
 
2.6.6 Costs of Production 
Becker and Henderson (2001) claim that the costs of installing new equipment to meet strict 
lowest achievable emission rates (LAER) standards are not recognised in environmental 
protection. The authors question whether costs are reported to the Pollution Abatement Cost 
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and Expenditure (PACE). The US Census Bureau has been using the PACE survey to 
estimate environment protection costs to private industry since 1973. Berman and Bui (1999) 
indicate a growing concern about high gross costs as estimated by PACE and argue that the 
actual regulation costs may be under or over-estimated. 
 
Becker and Henderson (2001) use the analytical cost function approach to study the 
environmental regulation costs on firms across industries. They show that production in 
heavily regulated firms results in higher costs when compared to those of less-regulated 
firms. Further, they show that young firms are more affected by environmental regulations 
and claim that environmental cost estimations by PACE overlook a significant portion of 
environmental expenditure. Other studies, such as those of Oosterhuis (2006), Crain and 
Crain (2010) and Sinclair and Vesey (2012) demonstrate how production costs are affected 
by environmental regulation. 
 
The literature demonstrates that environmental regulations are associated with costs, which 
affects investor wealth. However, the literature fails to distinguish between the cost for 
polluters and for environmentally friendly businesses. As a result, it is necessary to test how 
the stock market reacts to polluters and environmentally friendly firms. 
 
2.6.7 Plant Location 
Henderson (1996) investigates the effects of US air quality regulations for ground-level ozone 
from 1977 to 1987. He investigates how differential local implementation of air quality 
regulations affects local air quality and economic resources allocation. This includes the extent 
to which polluting plants move to localities with weaker regulatory systems. Henderson (1996) 
concludes that polluting industries relocate over time to areas with a record of staying in 
 32 
 
attainment, presumably to reduce regulatory scrutiny (the pollution heaven hypothesis). Becker 
and Henderson (2000) investigate the effects of air quality regulation on plant location, births, 
firm size and investment pattern decisions in polluting industries and conclude that polluting 
industries relocate to less polluted regions to evade stringent environmental regulations. 
Similarly, Levinson and Taylor (2008) argue that firms from developed countries move their 
polluting businesses to developing countries to avoid stringent environmental regulations. 
This relocation enables reduced compliance costs and the benefits of cheap labour, which 
results in low production costs. Moosa and Ramiah (2014) claim that investors have a profit 
drive to make decisions on plant location and the time to enter a market. The implication of 
plant relocation for my study is that firms must spend on capital expenditure; therefore, 
capital expenditure is a variable worth investigating. 
 
2.7 ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING LITERATURE 
The importance of an organisation being socially responsible is noted by Feldman, Soyka and 
Ameer (1996), who find that firms experience less risk and higher returns when they adopt 
better environmental management and achieve higher environmental performance. 
Consequently, firms pay more attention to their social and environmental reports. However, 
Michelon, Pilonato, Ricceri and Roberts (2016) warn about the tactics used by some firms 
who attempt to cover up environmental disasters, corporate and financial frauds by 
publishing social and environmental reports. 
 
Patten (2002) studies the relationship between environmental disclosures and the 
environmental performance of US companies and shows that higher levels of toxic releases 
are associated with higher levels of environmental disclosure. In other words, firms release 
more environmental disclosures if they have negative environmental performance. This is 
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further reinforced by Bewley and Li (2000) and Hughes, Anderson and Golden (2001). 
Bewley and Li (2000) study a different market (Canadian manufacturing firms) using the 
Wiseman index, while Hughes et al. (2001) focus on US manufacturing firms. Freedman and 
Jaggi (2005) study the environmental disclosures of firms in countries committed to the 
Kyoto Protocol and find polluting firms have relatively more environmental disclosures. In 
addition, Cho and Patten (2007) (who examined 100 firms using a different environmental 
performance index) conclude that poorer environmental performance leads to higher levels of 
disclosure. The lesson that can be drawn from the environmental accounting literature
4
 is 
that environmental disclosure affects performance; in turn, this affects a firm’s value. 
According to this literature, it is important to look at environmental disclosure; unfortunately, 
environmental disclosure is not mandatory at the time of writing. In other words, it will not 
be possible or practical to examine this factor, as data is not available for firms listed in 
Japan. 
 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents a literature review of environmental regulations in finance, economics 
and accounting. It is clear that environmental finance is in its infancy, environmental 
accounting is more developed than environmental finance, but environmental accounting 
focuses on environmental disclosure. Environmental economics is the leading discipline 
among these three groups. The implications for the finance discipline include that it should 
adopt and adapt the concepts introduced in environmental economics and continue to monitor 
mandatory environmental disclosure progress. This will provide a rich data set for analysis. 
Another important conclusion from the environmental finance literature is the need to detect 
and explain green effects. 
                                                 
4
 It is important to have a discussion on the environmental accounting literature as the fundamental analysis in 
chapter 6 contains accounting variables such as CAPEX, sales, size, volume, leverage and profitability. 
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Following the behavioural finance literature, it is important to study the behaviour of winners 
and losers originating from green policy announcements to determine the best trading 
strategy. In other words, it is important to test which of the following strategies (momentum, 
contrarian or buy-and-hold) generates superior returns. Similar to studies done within the 
momentum and contrarian space, it is important to control for factors such as firm 
characteristics (trading volume, firm size, profitability, sales, capital expenditure and 
leverage), seasonality and crossholding (keiretsu for the Japanese market). 
 
Using this literature review, I developed three research questions: 
1. How do polluting industries and environmental friendly industries react to green 
policy announcements? 
2. Do investors over-react or under-react to these green policies? 
3. Can green effects be explained by financial and seasonal factors? 
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CHAPTER THREE: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Following introduction of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change in 2005 countries around the 
world have been changing their environmental policies in order to reduce carbon emissions. 
After implementation of these policies in Europe, Asia, the U.S., and Australia, a number of 
studies are emerging from these regions, yet little is known about the environmental policies of 
Japan. In this chapter I look at the main environmental agencies of Japan, the Ministry of the 
Environment (MoE) in Japan. I examine and analyze the major enacted laws of MoE that have 
been designed to achieve environmental protection, restoration, and preservation, and to 
protect human health and the health of flora and fauna. And I also discuss various initiatives 
implemented by the agency to protect local and global environment, such as those aimed at 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, global warming, and climate change, protection of air 
and water quality, removal of toxins from the environment, more efficient use of resources, and 
recycling, amongst others.     
 
I also look at environmental regulation and protection in Japan where the MoE (Ministry of 
Environment) plays a central role in the Japanese Government’s environmental protection 
and conservation policy. The official website of the MoE (www.env.go.jp) states that its main 
aim is to create a sustainable society by ensuring that each individual in Japanese society 
participates in action designed to solve environmental problems. The work of the MoE can be 
divided into three basic types: 1) work for which the Ministry is fully responsible 2) work for 
which the Ministry shares responsibility with another ministry and 3) work where the 
Ministry provides advice from the perspective of environmental conservation. And, again, 
according to its official website, in order to perform its work efficiently, the MoE cooperates 
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with environmental offices in different regions of Japan, as well as with other government 
organisations, such as the National Institute for Minimata Disease, a research organisation, 
the National Institute For Environmental Studies, and the Environmental Restoration And 
Conservation Agency, both of which are independent administrative institutions, and the 
Japan Environmental Safety Corporation, a special company wholly owned by the 
government.   
 
In order to achieve its objectives the MoE targets seven distinct areas of the environment, 
enacting laws, regulations, and procedures in each area to ensure protection and conservation 
of the environment. In Section 3.2 I take a look at the first of the MoE’s seven targeted areas 
with examination of its laws related to environmental policy, followed in Section 3.3 by 
discussion of the second key area of the global environment, then in Section 3.4 the focus is 
on the key area of waste and recycling. The fourth of the MoE’s key areas of air and 
transportation is discussed in Section 3.5, Section 3.6 focuses on key area of water, soil, and 
the ground environment, followed by discussion of health and chemicals in Section 3.7. 
Section 3.8 examines the seventh key area of nature and parks and finally Section 3.9 
concludes this chapter. 
 
3.2 JAPANESE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES  
3.2.1 Basic Environment Plan 
Japan’s Ministry of the Environment’s (MoE) Basic Environment Law (MoE 1) sets the 
general principles and directions for standard environmental policies in Japan. The principal 
goal of this law is to build an economically sustainable environment in order to ensure a 
healthy system for future generations, as well as allowing Japan to make a positive 
contribution to global environmental harmony. 
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The Basic Environment Law includes three long-term plans, and the First Basic Environment 
Plan was adopted on the 16
 
December 1994, the Second Basic Environment Plan was 
approved on the 22
 
December 2000, and the Third Basic Environment Plan was approved on 
the 7
 
April 2006. In each of the plans the environmental responsibilities of the national and 
local governments, citizens, businesses, and private institutions are specified, and each plan 
includes the framework for long-run environmental policies, specified to the mid-21
st
 century, 
that are necessary to respond to current environment problems.  
 
The First Basic Environment Plan sets out four long-term objectives, the first of which is a 
Sound Material Cycle, which aims to build an environmentally friendly, sound re-cycling 
system and to improve the environment by reducing the mass production, consumption and 
disposal of goods so as to minimize the environmental burden. The second long-term objective 
is referred to as Harmonious Coexistence, involving maintenance of the eco-system, 
restoration of the mass environment, and the building of a sustainable environment for present 
and future generations and a harmonious coexistence between nature and human beings. 
Thirdly, there is the objective defined as Participation, which aims to ensure achievement of 
environmental objectives by all parties in Japan, including national and local governments, 
citizens, businesses, and private organizations, with each party given responsibility for 
reducing the burden on the environment. Finally, there is the long-term objective defined as 
International Activities, the aim of which is to target international cooperation in order to 
protect and promote the global environment beyond Japan’s borders. 
 
The Second Basic Environment Plan focuses mainly on the effectiveness of environmental 
protection activities, with a strong emphasis on implementation of environmental regulations, 
as well as setting-out strategies in 11 areas, including on global warming and land pollution. 
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And the Third Basic Environment Plan raised the target on achievement of a virtuous cycle 
between the environment and the economy by increasing strategies and more clearly defining 
the roles of the various parties, as well as setting long-run environmental targets to 2050. 
 
3.2.2 Environment and Economy 
In May 2004 the Japanese government’s Central Environment Council made recommendations 
to the MoE regarding the establishment of a ‘Virtuous circle for the environment and economy 
of Japan, with the aim of building a healthy, rich, and beautiful environmentally-friendly 
country’ (MoE 2) in the belief that this will boost economic growth. In Japan steps have been 
taken to establish this virtuous circle, including (1) development and introduction of 
life-enhancing environmental techniques, (2) increase in efforts to reduce, reuse, and recycle 
waste and (3) searching for and developing substitute natural energy sources that are 
necessary due to the planet’s finite resources. The year 2025 has been set as the target to 
achieve the virtuous circle between Japan’s environment and economy, with the perfect in that 
year described as achieving creation of employment opportunities from 
environmentally-friendly technologies, with an environmentally-friendly market worth over 
100 trillion yen and creation of two million jobs in the sector, in conjunction with a more 
highly-efficient use of resources, which Japan has already started to achieve. For example, 
Japan has improved its resource productivity, measured as GDP divided by natural resources, 
to 390,000 yen per ton in 2010, an improvement of 40% compared to year 2000 levels (MoE 
3).  
 
Japan has released other guidelines to regulate the link between the environment and the 
economy, for example in the accounting and finance fields. For instance, in order to support 
and encourage businesses to introduce environmental accounting systems, the Environment 
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Accounting Guidelines 2005 (MoE 4) were published by the MoE, with the aim of improving 
users’ abilities regarding environmental accounting information. 
 
3.2.3 Environment and Taxation 
In order to encourage development of renewable energy sources and energy-saving activities, 
in October 2012 the Japanese Government introduced the Tax for Climate Change Mitigation 
(MoE 5). About 90% of GHG emissions in Japan are carbon dioxide-based and are generated 
from energy use, so-called energy-related CO2, through the using of fossil fuels, such as oil, 
natural gas, and coal. Hence, for realization of a low-carbon society, Japan has set a target for 
the cut-down of CO2 emissions of 80% by 2050. CO2 emissions in Japan is the major 
polluting emission and it comes from several industries in Japan, some industries produce 
CO2 emissions directly and indirectly. 
 
With the tax for climate change mitigation, Japanese industry is required to measure CO2 
emissions in use of fossil fuels and must pay an additional amount of JPY289 per ton of CO2 
emissions based on the current tax rate. And to ensure further reductions in GHG emissions, 
the extra tax rate levied on CO2 emissions is to be increased over three stages, with the tax 
first levied in October 2012, and to be increase every two years until April 2016. Also, as part 
of the tax households are now required to pay an additional JPY100 every month for average 
energy consumption, and revenue from the tax was estimated to be JPY39.1 billion for 
financial year (FY) 2012, the first year of its introduction, and is estimated to rise to 
JPY262.3 billion for each FY post-2016. 
 
Other measures have also been taken to promote a low-carbon society, such as encouraging 
drivers to stop idling their cars for five minutes each day, which could lead to a 39 kg 
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reduction in CO2 emissions per year per driver, as well as encouraging the purchase of 
energy-saving home appliances, such as more efficient LED lightening, and also encouraging 
the purchase of hybrid motor vehicles. 
 
3.2.4 Environment Assessment 
Many countries have established an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system 
following enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act in the US in 1969. In Japan, 
the EIA system was first introduced in 1972, was fully enacted in June 1997, and 
implemented in 1999 (MoE 6). 
 
Constructing roads and airports to improve transportation services, building dams to supply 
water, and establishing power plants to generate electricity are all necessary for citizens to 
have a comfortable life. However, these actions, obviously, generate negative environmental 
impacts. Consequently, the EIA system is necessary and important for the selection of 
environmentally responsible projects, and the EIA provides for the environmental impact of 
projects to be surveyed, forecasted and evaluated in the process of designing the project, with 
the results open to public opinion from local governments and citizens. In this way the 
projects are developed by all interested parties, which is a more effective way to build a 
sustainable environment.  
 
3.2.5 Environment and ESD (Education for Sustainable Development) 
To promote the importance of environmental conservation activities and encourage 
sustainable development by all parties in Japan, including corporations, citizens, and private 
bodies, the Japanese government has enacted the Law for Enhancing Motivation on 
Environment Conservation and Promoting of Environmental Education (MoE 7).The basic 
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goals of this policy are, firstly, that the concept of a sustainable society be realized through 
voluntary actions and environmental education, and, secondly, to provide direction for the 
measures necessary to support the required voluntary actions. As such, the Japanese 
government has undertaken measures to support environmental education, for instance, the 
human resources ability certification, which provides information and support systems for the 
general public, private organisation, and businesses to encourage the positive disclosure of 
environment-related information. The government of Japan has also instigated and promoted 
an environmental education ‘Anytime, Anywhere and Anyone’ program to educate people to 
feel the environment, think for it, and act for it. 
 
3.2.6 Environment and Research & Technology 
The MoE and the National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES) have jointly set up a 
website of Environmental Technology Information (NIES 1), and have begun to provide to the 
public information about environmental technology. Also, the Environmental Information 
Centre is operated by the MoE and NIES, and aims to disclosure more information about and 
promote technologies beneficial to the environment so as to improve public awareness, and 
includes information on environmental technologies as posted by developers and vendors of 
the technologies, updating of the latest environmental news, including announcement dates, 
provides easily understandable explanations and instructions of environmental technologies to 
attract public attention, and provides links to websites containing environmental technology 
information for those that are curious, and is an efficient way for individuals to retrieve 
environmental technology information they are searching for. 
 
3.3 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 
Japan’s MoE has passed a number of laws and bills designed to protect the global 
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environment, in addition to the Basic Environment Law and other laws and regulations 
discussed above. One of these laws is the Law Concerning the Promotion of Measures to 
Cope with Global Warming (MoE 8), which aims to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations 
in the Earth’s atmosphere at levels that will prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the planet’s climate system. The MoE has stated that it is crucial for all nations to tackle 
the problem of global warming voluntarily and actively. In this regard the MoE aims to 
promote measures to cope with global warming by defining the responsibilities and measures 
to be taken by the national and local governments, businesses, and citizens. By establishing a 
basic policy on measures to cope with global warming, the MoE contributes to ensuring 
healthy lives for current and future generations and to the welfare of all human beings. 
 
The MoE also aims to tackle global warming through enactment of a bill entitled the Bill on 
the Basic Act on Global Warming Countermeasures (MoE 9), which establishes a number of 
principles for global warming countermeasures. These counter measures include (1) creating 
a society that can reduce greenhouse gas emissions while realizing sustained economic 
growth in order to ensure the prosperous lives of the people and competitiveness of industry, 
consistent with the MoE’s establishment of a virtuous circle for the environment and economy 
of Japan discussed above, (2) engaging in active promotion of the countermeasures through 
international cooperation, and by bringing out knowledge, technology, and experience, (3) 
developing industries contributing to the mitigation of adaptation to climate change, and 
expanding opportunities for job creation in order to ensure stable employment, (4) ensuring a 
stable energy supply, coordinated with energy-related matters and (5) gaining a better 
understanding of the effects and impacts of global warming countermeasures on economic 
activities and people’s daily lives.  
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3.4 WASTE AND RECYCLING 
The Moe Has Made Significant Efforts in Terms of the reduction, handling, and recycling of 
waste. Central to Japan’s efforts in this regard is its 3Rs program, first begun in 1954 with the 
passing of the Public Cleansing law, that is designed to establish in Japan a sound 
material-cycle society. The 3Rs program is centered around Reduce, Reuse, and Recycle, 
meaning to reduce waste, and to reuse and recycle resources and products. In this regard, 
reducing means to choose to use things with care in order to reduce the amount of waste 
generated, while reusing involves repeated use of items or parts of items that still can be used, 
and recycling means the use of waste itself as a resource.  
 
In order to become a sound material-cycle society and to achieve its aims regarding the 3Rs, 
the MoE has passed a number of laws. These laws include the Law for the Promotion of 
Sorted Collection and Recycling of Containers and Packaging (MoE 10), which is designed 
to promote the 3Rs for container and packaging waste by ensuring collaboration amongst all 
stakeholders, including national and local governments, business operators, and citizens, by 
promoting awareness amongst consumers and introducing measures to promote waste 
reduction amongst business owners, including retailers. Additionally, other related laws that 
have been passed include the Law for the Promotion of Effective Utilization of Resources 
(MoE 11). This law is designed to enhance measures for recycling goods and resources by 
implementing collection and recycling of used products by business entities, reducing waste 
generation by promoting resource savings and ensuring longer life products, and 
implementing measures for the reusing of parts recovered from collected products and 
reducing industrial waste by accelerating reduction of by-products.  
 
Also, there is the End-of-Life (ELV) Vehicle Recycling Law (MoE 12), as there are 
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approximately four million ELVs in Japan every year, and the Construction Material 
Recycling Law (MoE 13), which is necessary as construction waste accounts for 20% of the 
total waste put into Japan’s landfill sites and for over 70% of illegally-dumped waste in the 
country.  
 
Another such law is the Law for the Recycling of Specified Kinds of Home Appliances 
(Home Appliance Recycling Law) (MoE 14). This law is necessary as almost half of the 
post-consumer use home appliances discharged by households are discarded at landfill sites 
without any treatment. And since post-consumer use home appliances contain useful 
resources such as iron, aluminum, and glass, and that the remaining capacity at landfill sites 
is getting smaller and smaller, reduction of waste has become and urgent issue, and reduction 
and recycling of these types of wastes is all the more urgent. 
 
Additionally, there is the Law for Promotion of Recycling and Related Activities for the 
Treatment of Cyclical Food Resources (Food Waste Recycling Law) (MoE 15).The need for 
this law has arisen because a large amount of food waste, namely dead stock and leftovers, is 
generated throughout the process of manufacturing, distribution and consumption of food, 
and the volume of food waste is said to be approximately 30% of the total discharge of 
municipal solid waste. The Food Waste Recycling Law stipulates the responsibilities of all 
stakeholders in terms of recycling of food resources and recycling activities that should be 
carried out by food-related business entities and that business entities and consumers are 
required to be positively involved in reduction of food waste. 
 
3.5 AIR AND TRANSPORTATION 
A number of laws have been enacted by the MoE aimed at improving air quality, the most 
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important of which is the Air Pollution Control Act (MoE 16).The aim of this act is to protect 
the health of citizens and the living environment from air pollution by controlling emissions 
of soot and smoke, volatile organic compounds, vehicle emissions, and particulates 
associated with business activities. Further, the Offensive Odor Control Law (MoE 17) has 
been enacted to regulate offensive odors emitted from businesses by designating regulated 
areas, establishing regulation standards, allowing for inspections and measurements of odors, 
and making recommendations and orders for improvements. The law also specifies legal 
penalties and promotes preventative measures against offensive odors in daily life by 
specifying the responsibilities of citizens, national and local governments, and business 
proprietors.  
 
The Noise Regulation Law (MoE 18) is another law related to air quality that aims to regulate 
noise generated by factories and other types of work, such as construction work, and by 
setting maximum permissible levels of motor vehicle noise, as well as specifying penalties 
for breaches of the law. 
 
Other similar laws include the Vibration Regulation Law (MoE 19) which is designed to 
preserve the living environment and people’s health by regulating vibrations generated by the 
operation of factories and other work and construction sites, and by road traffic. And finally, 
there is the law Concerning Special Measures for Total Emission Reduction of Nitrogen 
Oxides from Automobiles in Specified Areas (MoE 20). The aim of this law is to clarify the 
responsibilities of national and local governments, enterprises, and citizens towards 
preventing the problem of air pollution generated by nitrogen oxides emitted from 
automobiles. The law also specifies areas most adversely affected by such pollution 
fundamental policies and plans for reducing the total volume of vehicle-emitted nitrogen 
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oxide, establish nitrogen oxide emission standards for specific automobiles that are registered 
in those areas, and restricting the amount of nitrogen oxide emissions resulting from the use 
of automobiles for business activities. 
 
3.6 WATER, SOIL AND THE GROUND ENVIRONMENT 
The MoE has three main pieces of legislation related to water, soil, and the ground 
environment, the first of which is the Water Pollution Control Law (MoE 21).The purpose of 
this law is to prevent pollution of public water areas by regulating effluent discharge by 
factories or establishments in these areas, thereby protecting human health and preserving the 
living environment  
 
The second major piece of legislation in this area is the Law Concerning Special Measures 
for the Conservation of Lake Water Quality (MoE 22). This law  deals with fundamental 
issues concerning water quality for designated lakes, including conserving and contributing to 
water quality through regulations and other measures, as well as implementation of projects 
to conserve water quality. Additionally, the law specifies regulations to reduce pollutant loads 
in designated lakes, with pollutant load restrictions on newly-built or expanded factories and 
other business establishments, effluent regulations, and controls on the structure and 
operation of designated facilities such as livestock pens and the like. 
 
The Soil Contamination Countermeasures Act (MoE 23) is the third main piece of legislation 
in this area. The purpose of this law is to implement countermeasures against soil and ground 
contamination by formulating means to grasp the situation of soil contamination by 
designated hazardous substances and prevent harm to human health resulting from such 
contamination. The designated hazardous substances that the law is aimed at include lead, 
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arsenic, trichloroethylene, and similar substances that have harmful effects on human health 
when present in soil.  
 
3.7 HEALTH AND CHEMICALS 
To protect the health of humans and the living environment against the release of dangerous 
chemicals the MoE has enacted a number of laws, the first being the Law Concerning 
Reporting, etc. of Releases to the Environment of Specific Chemical Substances and 
Promoting Improvements in Their Management (MoE 24). This law is designed to promote 
the voluntary improvement of businesses’ management of specific chemical substances and 
to prevent any impediment of environmental protection by requiring businesses handling 
such substances to report the release to the environment of these substances and to provide 
technical information on the properties and handling of such substances. The law also states 
that due attention should be paid to trends in international cooperation on the management of 
chemical substances for environmental protection, as well as to scientific knowledge relating 
to chemical substances, and to the conditions relating to the manufacture, use, and other 
handling of chemical substances. The types of substances targeted by the law are chemical 
substances that may be hazardous to human health and/or may impair the life and growth of 
flora and fauna, including those which may form substances by naturally occurring chemical 
transformations or may deplete the ozone layer and increase the amount of solar ultraviolet 
radiation reaching the Earth. 
 
The MoE has also passed the Agricultural Chemicals Regulation Law (MoE 25). This law is 
designed to improve the quality of agricultural chemicals and to ensure their safe and proper 
use by introducing an agricultural chemical registration system. The agricultural chemicals 
covered by the law include fungicides, insecticides, and other substances used to control 
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fungi, nematodes, mites, insects, and rodents or other plants and animals that may damage 
crops, and substances and agents that promote or suppress the physiological functions of 
crops, etc. 
 
Additionally, the Act on the Evaluation of Chemical Substances and Regulation of Their 
Manufacture, etc. (MoE 26) has been passed and is designed to establish a system for 
evaluating the properties of new chemical substances before their manufacture or import in 
order to prevent environmental pollution by chemical substances that pose a risk of impairing 
human health or of interfering with the population and/or growth of flora and fauna. The 
MoE has also enacted the Law Concerning Special Measures against Dioxins (MoE 27), 
which is designed to consider the effects on human life and health caused by dioxins, and 
which specifies the basis of policies on dioxins and establishes regulations and measures 
relating to soil contamination to prevent and remove environmental pollution caused by 
dioxins.  
 
3.8 NATURE AND PARKS 
The MoE has enacted a number of pieces of legislation to protect Japan’s natural and park 
environments, the first of which is the Natural Park Act (MoE 28), which aims to protect 
places of natural scenic beauty and conserve and sustain biological diversity, and the health, 
recreation, and culture of the Japanese people. The Act sets out the responsibilities of the 
state in regards to national parks, quasi-national parks, and prefectural natural parks, 
including marine parks, the protection and utilization of these parks, ecosystem maintenance 
and recovery work, scenic landscape preservation, park management organization, and penal 
provisions for breaches of the regulations specified in the Act.   
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The Law for the Promotion of Nature Restoration (MoE 29) was enacted to protect and 
conserve nature and parks and it establishes the basic principles of nature restoration, defines 
the responsibilities of effecters, and stipulates necessary matters for the implementation of 
nature restoration, including establishment of a basic policy for nature restoration. The 
intention of the law is to secure biodiversity via the creation, restoration, conservation, and 
maintenance of the conditions of rivers, marshes, tidal flats, seaweed and seagrass beds, 
community-based woods, rural landscapes, forests, and other natural environments in order to 
recover the ecosystem and natural environments that have been damaged or destroyed in the 
past.  
 
The Invasive Alien Species Act (MoE 30) aims to regulate actions such as raising, planting, 
storing, carrying, and importing invasive alien species (IAS) and to mitigate IAS that are 
already existing in Japan to prevent damage to biodiversity, human safety, and agriculture, 
where ‘invasive alien species ’ means individuals (including eggs and seeds) and their organs 
that exist outside their original habitats as a result of introduction into Japan (i.e. 
non-indigenous species) from overseas and cause adverse effects on ecosystems, such as java 
mongooses, snapping turtles, and raccoons. 
 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
Prior to the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, environmental regulations tended to emerge 
following a particular environmental disaster. However, post the Kyoto Protocol countries 
have been implementing a series of environmental regulations and in this chapter I document 
the environmental regulations that appeared in the United States and Japan. Although there 
are similarities in the type of environmental policies, I find that there are country specific 
policies as environmental problems/priorities differ across countries. The implication is that 
 50 
 
policy makers must identify the environmental problems in their countries before 
implementing new environmental policies that will address these issues. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will introduce the methodology design. It will also explain the data used to 
provide answers to the research questions identified in Chapter 2. In particular, this chapter 
explains how Lee and Swaminathan’s (2000) event study and portfolio construction 
methodologies can examine the financial effects of environmental regulation announcements. 
Section 4.2 reviews the research questions and Section 4.3 discusses the research objectives. 
Section 4.4 discusses the research methods in this study, Section 4.5 describes the data used 
and Section 4.6 explains the study’s data bias and adjustment. 
 
4.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
To achieve the research goals, the following questions have been answered. 
1. How do polluting industries and environmental friendly industries react to the green 
policy announcements? 
2. Do investors overreact or underreact to the green policies? 
3. Can green effects be explained by the financial factors and seasonal factors? 
 
To achieve the research objectives, the following hypotheses were introduced. 
1. Environmentally-friendly industries are expected to be positively affected by stringent 
green policies and we expect positive ARs around announcement of green policies. 
2. Polluting industries are expected to be negatively affected by stringent green policies 
and we expect negative ARs around announcement of green policies. 
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3. Given that AR is a function of cost and revenue, it is expected that stringent policies 
will increase the cost of production of polluters and increase the revenue of 
environmentally-friendly firms. 
4. I hypothesize that environmental regulations affect either production cost or the 
industry revenue and leading to ARs. 
5. As there are more stringent policies, I expect more negative ARs than positive ARs for 
polluters. 
6. I hypothesize that investors underreact to announcements of environmental regulations 
if positive momentum returns are observed. Otherwise, I assume investors have 
overreacted. 
7. I assume investors overreact in the presence of positive contrarian profits. Otherwise, I 
assume it is underreaction. 
 
4.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
There are two main objectives in this research. Firstly, I test if there are abnormal returns 
around the announcements of green policies in Japan. Secondly, explain any abnormal returns 
with finance fundamentals (when abnormal return is observed). 
 
4.4 RESEARCH METHODS 
An innovative aspect of this work is the combination of various financial models to answer 
the follow research questions. I use event study methodology and portfolio formation 
technique to answer the first two research questions. Time series models and portfolio 
formation methodology are used to answer the final question. 
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4.4.1 Abnormal Return Calculation Using Event Study Methodology 
Event study methodology (as highlighted in the literature review chapter) is used to assess the 
impact of the 424 announcements on 39 industrial portfolios. I start by calculating the returns 
(R) of each company (i) using the equation below. 
PI
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where PI is a price index that captures capital gain, dividend income and any other market 
capitalisation like bonus issue and right issue, i represents any particular firm and t represents 
time. Next the abnormal return (AR) is calculated where AR is the difference between firm’s 
actual return and expected return after each green policy announcement. The ex post 
abnormal returns (AR) are calculated by using a simple rolling average model (v=1) as 
follows: 
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where the expected return in equation (2) is calculated by using a simple rolling average 
model (v=1) as:        
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The standard t-statistic for the abnormal return is calculated as: 
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The standard deviation of the abnormal returns is calculated using a window of 244 days 
prior to the event and 15 days after the event. A statistically significant positive AR represents 
positive reaction to the environmental regulation and is thus regarded as a winning firm, 
whereas a statistically significant negative AR represents a losing firm. When statistically 
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significant abnormal returns are not observed, I exclude them from my analysis. The results 
from this analysis enable us to observe how Japanese firms react to green policy 
announcement. My hypotheses are that the loser portfolios consist of predominantly polluting 
firms whereas the winner portfolios contain more environmentally friendly firms.  
 
One criticism of the abnormal return model as described in equation (2) is that it does not 
control for systematic risk factors such as those resulting from market size, value-growth and 
momentum effects. Hence it is important to use alternative asset pricing models (v= 2 to 4) to 
control for these effects. I adjust the returns using CAPM (v=2), the Fama and French 
three-factor model (v=3) and the Carhart four-factor model (v=4). These asset pricing models 
are specified as follows: 
   ftmtvav aI va rrRE ~~3,13,03,                                               (5) 
 
       tvatv aftmtvav aI va HMLSMBrrRE 4,34,24,14,04, ~~                      (6) 
 
         5 5 5 5 5, 5 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,I v v v v va v a a mt ft a t a t a tE R r r SMB HML MOM                         (7) 
 
where rm is market return, rf is risk-free rate, beta represents the various systematic risk 
factors, SMB is the size factor, HML is the book-to-market factor and the momentum factor 
(MOM). I posit that the first model (v=1) will generate the largest abnormal returns, which 
decline as I control for more risk factors (see Cam and Ramiah 2014). I expect to see lower 
abnormal returns from the three-factor model and four-factor models (when compared to v= 1 
to 2). 
 
Consistent with Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013) and Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa (2015a, 
2015b), various asset pricing models have been used for robustness tests (including the 
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4-factor model). The Fama and French 5-factor model has been considered as the fifth 
robustness test but could not be applied due to data limitations. As this is an interesting test, it 
is a good test to undertake in the future when data is available. 
 
4.4.2 Constructing Momentum/Contrarian Portfolios 
I adopt and adjust the portfolio construction method used of Lee and Swaminathan (2000) 
where portfolios are formed on the green policy announcement date. On each announcement 
date, I group firms with positive abnormal returns to obtain the winner portfolios and I group 
firms with negative abnormal returns to generate the loser portfolios. Next, the portfolios are 
held for K days (where K = 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 9 months, 1 year, 2 
years, 3 years, 4 years and 5 years). The returns for the K-day holding period are based on 
equally weighted average returns of every stock in the portfolios. For example, the daily 
buy-and-hold return for a five-day holding portfolio is the average of the portfolio 
buy-and-hold returns from the announcement date and the following four days. The intent of 
the strategy is to create a zero-cost contrarian
5
 portfolio by selling the winner portfolio and 
buying the loser portfolio for different holding and formation periods. 
 
According to Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), one day is skipped between the formation period 
and the holding period and checked for robustness by splitting the data set into two 
sub-periods. In my analysis, given that the announcements occur in a discontinuous manner, 
skipping one day between portfolios is not a viable exercise. Investment banks usually pay a 
licensing fee for their trading activities, which are fixed costs incurred regardless of their 
trading strategy. The transaction costs for these institutions are typically viewed as an 
in-house cost, with some practitioners suggesting costs of approximately 1 per cent for a 
                                                 
5
 Note momentum portfolios are defined as buy winner portfolios and sell loser portfolios. 
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round-trip trade. Bettman et al. (2009) use the bid-ask spread as a measure of transaction 
costs for the period 2001-2007 and report that the average round-trip spread cost in Australia 
is approximately 4.19 per cent for momentum strategies. I calculate the bid-ask spread for the 
Japanese equity market and adjust my observed contrarian profits accordingly. 
 
4.4.3 Explaining Momentum/Contrarian Portfolios 
The winner and loser portfolios are then be sub-categorised into three further portfolios, 
namely, high volume (H), medium volume (M) and low volume (L). The stocks within each 
category are split further into three other groups (H, M, and L) based on the average daily 
trading volume. My definition of trading volume and the criteria used to classify high and 
low trading volume stocks are based on stock turnover ratios. The strategy is to take long 
positions in the high trading volume stocks (H) and short the low trading volume stocks (L) 
in each category, allowing us to calculate the difference between H-L returns for each 
category. When the H-L difference is positive, I can conclude that, conditional on past 
returns, high-volume stocks generally perform better than low-volume stocks. It follows that 
when the difference is negative, low-volume stocks outperform their high-volume 
counterparts. In a similar manner, the winner, loser and contrarian portfolios are sorted 
according to the remaining accounting and finance variables, namely volume, size, 
profitability, sales, capital expenditure and leverage. 
 
Studies on the seasonal aspects of contrarian profits provide mixed results. For instance, Lee 
et al. (2003) tested for January and July calendar effects and reported no significant results 
for those two periods. Durand et al. (2006) and Ramiah, Mugwagwa, and Naughton (2011) 
documented a July effect and an April effect, respectively, while Gaunt, Gray and McIvor 
(2000) found that the equity markets are susceptible to seasonality in general. In view of 
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these conflicting results, I test whether my portfolios contain seasonal effects. In addition to a 
univariate analysis, a multivariate analysis conducted to control for accounting and finance 
variables and seasonality. To that end, the following multiple regression models estimated by:  
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where RETS,t represents the return for the extreme-portfolio strategy S at time t, where S= 1 to 
5, that is, 1 corresponds to winner portfolios, 2 characterises the loser portfolios, 3 represents 
the contrarian portfolios, 4 represents the momentum portfolios and 5 represents the 
buy-and-hold portfolios. where α0 represents the constant term, Fundamentalsk represents the 
monthly average
6
 accounting and finance variables for each variable (k=1 for volume, 2 for 
size, 3 for profitability, 4 for sales, 5 for capital expenditure and 6 for leverage), Daym 
represents the dummy variable for each day (m=1 for Monday, 2 for Tuesday, ..., 5 for 
Friday). The dummy variable for Wednesday is dropped. Monthn represents the dummy 
variable for each month (n=1 for January, 2 for February... 12 for December). The dummy 
variable for September is dropped. September is identified in the Australian seasonality 
literature as the month least likely to generate seasonal effects (Durand et al. 2006). To avoid 
the dummy variable trap, observations during September were incorporated into the constant 
term  in the model as the base case for each dummy series. Tests are carried out to check 
stock market seasonality in Japan. 
 
4.5 DATA 
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997 and came into force 
on 16 February 2005. The detailed rules for the implementation of the Protocol were adopted 
in Marrakesh in 2001 and are referred to as the "Marrakesh Accords." As a result the period 
                                                 
6
 It should be noted that data for some variables are available only on an annual basis. 
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of my study starts on 28 November 2001 and end on 23 July 2012. I focus on the entire 
Japanese market which consists of 6616 firms for the selected period. Daily stock return, 
risk-free rate, market return, volume, size, profitability, sales, capital expenditure, leverage 
and the number of outstanding shares for the period are downloaded from Datastream. 
Additionally, the size and the book-to-market data were accessed through Kenneth French 
data library. Announcement data was collected from the official website of the Ministry of 
Environment in Japan where the shareholder data was downloaded from Osiris database. 
 
The empirical analysis is based on Japanese stock market data starting from 28 November 
2002 and ending on 29 June 2012, during which 424 green policy announcements were 
released. The announcements of environmental regulations are accessed from Ministry of 
Environment, Government of Japan. Each announcement was released on a specific date 
which is then used as the announcement date. To include sufficient estimation period, I 
expand my data window from 20 December 2000 to 26 July 2013, covering 6616 firms with 
15,674,994 observations from Datastream. 
 
4.6 DATA BIASES AND ADJUSTMENTS 
In order to avoid the survivorship bias, I consider all stocks in Japan including active stocks, 
suspended stocks and delisted stocks. I identify several return index jumps which I uncovered 
to be associated predominantly with delisted and suspended stocks. Furthermore adjustments 
were made to control for the well documented data biases in Datastream—for instance return 
index error recorded by Ince and Porter (2006). The following measures were taken. 
1. Data recording error where return index is recorded as either zero or minus one are treated 
as missing observations and there are 65 observations in this category. 
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2. According to Ince and Porter (2006), when Rt or Rt-1 >= 300% and (1+Rt)(1+Rt-1)< 50%, I 
must consider Rt and Rt-1 as a missing observation. There are 45 observations that satisfy 
this condition. 
3. Base change error. Datastream tends to alter their base when calculating the return index. 
The data after a base change usually leads to unrealistically high levels of return, and I treat 
these daily returns as missing observation as well. There are 709 observations that suffer 
the base change error. 
4. I construct a statistical error detective method by using the 15 days before and after every 
calendar day (t=0). I set the dummy variable equals to zero for both 15 days before and 
after t=0, and I set the dummy variable equals to 1 when t = 0.Then I run the following 
regression:  
𝑃𝐼𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                     (9) 
where PIt is the price index at the time of t, Dt is the dummy variable. When β is significant I 
regard the price index of the day as an error, and I conclude there is no major base change 
when β is insignificant. In this error test, I set significance level equals to 0.05. The 
proportion of errors is relatively small when I compare it to the 15 million observations in my 
sample. However, failure to account for these data anomaly generates unrealistic results. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: GREEN EFFECTS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
A relatively new and important area—environmental finance—comes to mind when discussing 
green effects and the stock market. For instance, it can include the study of how stock markets 
react to environmental policy announcements (it is also referred to as sustainable finance). 
When ARs are associated with environmental policies, they are called green effects. To 
understand environmental finance well, it is important to investigate green effects from both 
ecological economics and finance aspects. In this chapter, I analyse how environmental 
regulations affect the financial market. 
 
Using the event study methodology described in Section 4.3.1, I estimate the ARs for each 
industry in the Japanese market, as the literature points to industry effects. First, the industries 
are classified as either polluters or environmentally friendly industries, based on the pollutants 
used within the industry. Second, the ARs for each industry are estimated after the 
announcement of each environmental regulation and then I determine whether green effects are 
observed. Third, I classify the industries into those expressing positive reactions, negative 
reactions and no reaction. Finally, I analyse the ARs associated with major environmental 
policies. My hypothesis is that these environmental policies affect either production costs or 
the industry’s revenue, leading to ARs. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the overall results of green effects, 
Section 5.3 breaks the green effects into industries, Section 5.4 describes the green effects 
arising from environmentally friendly industries, Section 5.5 explains the green effects 
generated by polluting industries, Section 5.6 illustrates the most significant environmental 
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regulations, Section 5.7 shows the robustness check results and Section 5.8 concludes the 
chapter. 
 
5.2 OVERALL GREEN EFFECTS 
Prior research confirms the existence of abnormal returns after announcements of green 
policies and such anomaly is referred to as the ‘green effects anomaly’. I explore whether 
green effects exists in Japan by studying how the firms and industries reacted to the 
announcements of green policies. In my thesis, 424 pieces of environmental announcements 
are included (see Appendix 5.1). Nonetheless, on any particular day I may have more than 
one announcement being released (in essence, I am analyzing the effects of 424 regulations 
that occurred as 320 event days). The announcements are collected from the official 
environmental website of Japan (as explained in Chapter 3). The abnormal return associated 
with each of the 424 environmental regulations is reported in Appendix 5.1. For example 
Announcement 1 which occurred on 28 November 2002 is about the Fifth International 
Symposium on Environmental Endocrine Disrupter and it generated an abnormal return of 
0.25% with a t-statistic of 3.82 across all firms used in our sample. To illustrate the example 
of more than one announcement on one event date, I refer to announcements 15 to 17, where 
I find abnormal return of -0.14%. Unfortunately, event study methodology does not allow us 
to disaggregate the effect. 
 
A policy is considered as stringent if the policy tries to reduce emissions or controls for 
pollution. Each of the 424 announcements is assessed to determine whether they are stringent 
or lax and the policies are grouped in these two categories. As these policies apply for Japan, 
we check how each Japanese industry is affected and also how the Japanese market has been 
affected. The Japanese market consists of all the 6616 firms and is referred to as the market 
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portfolio. 
 
There are 39 industries in Japan, 10 of them are classified as environmentally friendly 
industries and the rest of the 29 industries are regarded as polluters. Industries are classified 
as polluters
7
 if the industry uses pollutants during or after the producing process that causes 
pollution such as solid water waste, water pollution, air pollution, electronic waste, acid 
waste, chemical waste, noise pollution and food pollution.  It should be noted that the 
methodology used to classify a polluting industry does not take into account new technology 
used within the industry/firm. It is not possible to control for this endogeneity which is 
beyond the scope of this study as data is not available on whether firms/industry are altering 
their methodologies. The CAPEX variable captures the capital expenditure made by the 
firms/industry but does not specify how the money was spent. This is one limitation of this 
study. 
 
Appendix 5.2 shows the different pollution caused by each polluting industry. For example, 
alternative energy industry causes water and air pollution. Otherwise the industry is treated as 
an environmentally friendly industry. Table 5.1 below summarizes how the environmentally 
friendly and polluting industries react to environmental regulations in aggregate. 
Table 5.1: An Overview of Green Effects for 39 industries from 2001 to 2012 
Industry Type 
 
AR  t-stat 
Environmentally Friendly  
 
0.013%  4.75*** 
Polluting 0.006%  2.19** 
Difference between Means 0.007%  2.56*** 
 
 
                                                 
7
 See Yang, Ramiah, Moosa and He (2016) for more details. 
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Table 5.1 summarizes how the environmentally friendly and polluting industries react to 424 
environmental regulations in aggregate. From Table 5.1, I can observe environmentally 
friendly industries generate 0.013% abnormal return and polluting industries yield 0.006% in 
terms of abnormal returns (I find statistical significance in both cases). Interestingly, both 
categories (polluting and environmentally friendly) react positively to the announcements of 
environmental regulations. Compared to polluting industries, environmentally friendly 
industries have a larger magnitude of abnormal return resulting from environmental 
regulations (this is confirmed by the test for difference reported in Table 5.1 where the 
t-statistic is 2.56). Intuitively, it means that environmental regulations are meant to improve 
the environment by encouraging the production of environmentally friendly products which 
is in turn is perceived as ‘good news’ by environmentally friendly industries. I was expecting 
polluting industries to exhibit negative abnormal returns but interestingly the results show 
otherwise. Within the literature, such anomalous behaviour has been documented whereby 
the desired effects are not achieved (see Ramiah, Moosa and Martin, 2013). A number of 
reasons have been provided for such occurrence namely environmental regulations are not 
effective, polluters are able to pass on the costs on consumers and protected industries. 
Table 5.2: Industrial Reaction to Green Policies from 2001 to 2012 
Industry AR 
(%) 
t-stat Maximum Minimum 
   AR 
% 
Announcement AR 
% 
Announcement 
Aerospace and Defence 0.09 1.45 5.87 8 -6.55 246 
Alternative Energy 0.09 1.71* 7.39 327 -8.59 79 
Automobiles and Parts 0.00 0.42 2.18 331 -2.31 246 
Banks 0.03 4.23*** 2.24 221 -1.65 366 
Beverages 0.03 2.17** 2.76 328 -2.10 329 
Chemicals 0.02 2.21** 3.01 328 -2.80 246 
Construction and Materials 0.00 0.21 4.23 328 -3.95 246 
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Industry AR 
(%) 
t-stat Maximum Minimum 
   AR 
% 
Announcement AR 
% 
Announcement 
Electricity 0.09 5.54*** 2.85 341 -3.12 346 
Electronic and Electrical 
Equipment 
0.01 2.05** -3.65 328 -3.64 246 
Financial Services 0.02 1.36 4.43 331 -3.79 246 
Fixed-Line 
Telecommunication 
0.12 2.16** 5.31 218 -4.69 246 
Food Producers 0.01 1.01 3.79 328 -2.51 246 
Food and Drug Retailers 0.00 0.18 3.33 328 -2.92 246 
Forestry and Paper 0.05 2.79*** 4.45 328 -2.79 246 
Gas, Water and 
Multi-utilities 
0.03 1.68* 3.50 328 -2.65 246 
General Industrials -0.01 -0.71 3.18 331 -4.10 246 
General Retailers 0.02 2.31** 2.69 328 -4.35 246 
Health Care Equipment and 
Services 
-0.03 -2.06** 2.80 331 -2.73 79 
Household Goods and 
Home Construct 
-0.01 -0.37 3.68 328 -4.20 246 
Industrial Engineering 0.01 1.41 3.27 328 -3.79 246 
Industrial Metals and 
Mining 
0.03 1.96** 3.94 75 -3.62 79 
Industrial Transportation 0.02 1.4 2.38 331 -3.17 246 
Leisure Goods 0.00 0.4 2.37 331 -1.94 79 
Life Insurance 0.05 0.71 15.56 86 -11.08 79 
Media -0.11 -3.53*** 3.50 331 -5.02 246 
Mining 0.13 2.2** 9.04 6 -7.72 79 
Mobile Telecommunication 0.00 0.26 6.17 40 -3.86 41 
Non-Life Insurance 0.05 2.04** 6.78 35 -3.11 344 
Oil Equipment and Services 0.08 0.54 38.01 4 -8.75 79 
Oil and Gas Producers 0.01 0.39 2.32 228 -3.14 304 
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Industry AR 
(%) 
t-stat Maximum Minimum 
   AR 
% 
Announcement AR 
% 
Announcement 
Personal Goods -0.02 -1.69* 3.31 328 -3.62 246 
Pharmaceuticals and 
Biotechnology 
0.01 1.04 2.34 328 -2.10 246 
Real Estate Investment 
Trusts 
0.12 6.52*** 7.56 331 -11.26 328 
Real Estate Investment and 
Service 
0.04 2.73*** 4.23 331 -4.51 79 
Software and Computer 
Services 
-0.02 -1.37 3.00 331 -4.19 246 
Support Services -0.02 -1.22 3.01 331 -3.50 246 
Technology Hardware and 
Equipment 
-0.01 -1.01 3.05 331 -2.33 246 
Tobacco 0.05 1.09 5.99 331 -1.47 358 
Travel and Leisure 0.02 2.18** 2.65 328 -2.20 79 
 
Table 5.2 shows how the 39 industries reacted to 424 green policies in aggregate. In Table 5.2, 
I report the abnormal return of each industry after the 424 environmental regulations. In 
addition, the maximum and minimum abnormal returns for each industry are reported. 
Statistically significant results are highlighted in bold. 
 
I find statistical significance for 16 out of 39 industries that reacted to the announcements of 
environmental regulations (banks, beverages, chemicals, electricity, electronic and electrical 
equipment, fixed line telecommunication, forestry and paper, general retailers, health care 
equipment and services, industrial metals and mining, media, mining, non-life insurance, real 
estate investment and services, real estate investment trusts and travel and leisure industries). 
With the exception of health care equipment and services and media industries, 14 industries 
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react positively to these announcements. For example, real estate investment trusts recorded 
an abnormal return of 0.12% (with a t-statistic of 6.52), a maximum abnormal return of 7.56% 
after announcement 331 on 31 October 2008 and a minimum abnormal return of -11.26% 
after announcement 328 which occurred on 14 October 2008.  
 
I have reported each industry’s reaction following the 424 environmental regulations in 
Appendix 5.3. On the first page of Appendix 5.3, we can see the abnormal returns for 
aerospace and defense, alternative energy and automobiles and parts industries. The graphical 
representation of the abnormal return for aerospace and defense after each announcement 
shows lot variability. The pattern observes in aerospace and defense is different from 
alternative energy which in turn is also different from automobiles and parts. I find no clear 
and consistent pattern across the 39 industries. The graphical representation in Appendix 5.3 
shows clear industry effects.  
 
However, I do observe consistent pattern announcements 79, 246, 328 and 331. 
Announcement 79 which was released on 17 May 2000 is about the recycling data of home 
appliance by electric appliance manufactures generated lowest abnormal returns for several 
industries (for example see alternative energy, health care equipment and services, industrial 
metals and mining, leisure goods, life insurance, mining, oil equipment and services, real 
estate investment and service and travel and leisure industries in Appendix 5.3). 
Announcements 246 which was released on 18 January 2006 is about the response to OECD 
environmental performance review generated highest abnormal returns for several industries 
(for example see aerospace and defense, automobiles and parts, chemicals, construction and 
materials, electronic and electrical equipment, financial services, fixed line telecommunication, 
food producers, food and drug retailers, forestry and paper, gas, water and multi-utilities, 
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general industrials, general retailers, household goods and home construct, industrial 
engineering, industrial transportation, media, personal goods, pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology, software and computer services, support services, technology hardware and 
equipment industries in appendix 5.3). Announcements 328 and 331 occur on 14 and 31 
October 2008 respectively and they are about the eco-action point model project aiming to 
save energy in Japan, also produced large abnormal returns. Some of these major reactions 
are further explained in Section 5.6 of this chapter.  
 
5.3 INDUSTRY REACTION 
It is important to know the characteristics of each industry and its relationship to the 
environmental to understand its reaction to the announcements of environmental regulations. 
In this section, a brief description of each industry is given followed by its reaction.  
 
Aerospace and Defense 
Aerospace industry aims to capture the human effort in science, engineering and business to 
fly in the atmosphere of earth and surrounding space. Aerospace organizations research, 
design, manufacture, operate or maintain aircraft. Aerospace activity is diverse, with a 
multitude of commercial, industrial and military applications. Japan’s aerospace industry has 
a strong international reputation, particularly in the field of research and development. Since 
the end of the Second World War, Japan’s aerospace and defense industry has been 
significantly limited with restrictions on military equipment. The polluting activities from 
aerospace and defense industry are solid waste, water pollution and air 
pollution—consequently classified as a polluting industry in this study.  
 
As shown in Table 5.2, the abnormal return for this industry is 0.09% with t-statistic of 1.45 
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(not statistically significant). It implies that, in aggregate, the aerospace and defense industry 
is not sensitive to the announcements of 424 environmental regulations. Given that this 
industry is heavily regulated by the Japanese government and international regulations (it 
may be regarded as a protected industry in this case), it may provide an explanation as to why 
I do not observe any statistical significance. Such finding is inconsistent with Ramiah, Martin 
and Moosa (2013) who showed a positive abnormal return of aerospace industry. However, 
Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013) did not report their findings in aggregate but reported the 
effect after the release of CPRS environmental regulation. 
 
When I look at the reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), 
I find announcements 8, 236, 246 and 331 exhibiting a larger magnitude of abnormal return.  
Announcement 8 occurs on 26 May 2003 with the publication of environmental statistics 
2003 and it generated an abnormal return of 0.33% (t-statistic of 5.89). Announcement 236 
occurs on 9 December 2005 with the publication of Japan’s effort to achieve the Kyoto Target 
and it generated an abnormal return of -0.03% (t-statistic of -0.53). Announcement 246 
occurs on 18 January 2006 with Japan’s response to OECD environmental performance 
review and it generated an abnormal return of -3.46% (t-statistic of 44.23). Announcement 
331 occurs on 31 October 2008 with on the amount of the requesting budget to go towards 
environmental preservation matters and it generated an abnormal return of -1.24% (t-statistic 
of -16.06). 
 
Alternative Energy 
Alternative energy is often referenced as any energy source that is an alternative to fossil fuel. 
These alternatives are intended to address concerns about fossil fuels. In a general, alternative 
energy is produced or recovered without the undesirable consequences inherent in fossil fuel 
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use, particularly high greenhouse gas emissions—which is an important factor in global 
warming. The polluting activities from alternative energy industry are water pollution and air 
pollution—consequently classified as a polluting industry in this study.  
 
As shown in Table 5.2, abnormal return for this industry is 0.09% with an insignificant 
t-statistic of 1.71. It implies that, in aggregate, alternative energy industry is not sensitive to 
the announcements of 424 environmental regulations. Such finding is inconsistent with 
Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa (2015a) who studied the Chinese market—as they report 
statistically significant negative abnormal return for this sector. 
 
When I look at the reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), 
I find announcements 5, 79, 246, 307, 328 and 391 exhibiting a larger magnitude of abnormal 
return. Announcement 5 occurred on 31 March 2003 which is about the basic policy for 
nature restoration and it generated an abnormal return of 0.37% (t-statistic of 7.80). 
Announcement 79 generated an abnormal return of -0.60% (t-statistic of -15.14). The 
abnormal return generated by announcements 307, 328 and 391 were 0.65% (t-statistic of 
13.74), 2.78% (t-statistic of 16.61) and -0.40% (t-statistic of -0.90) respectively. 
 
Automobiles and Parts 
The Japanese automotive industry is one of the most prominent and largest industries in the 
world. Japan has been in the top three countries with most cars manufactured since the 1960s 
and is regarded as the most advanced and innovative industry in the world. Japanese 
manufacturing products, particularly in electronics and automobiles, are world leaders in both 
production and technological advancements. Japanese investments helped to grow the 
automobile industry in many countries throughout the last decades. The polluting activities 
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from the automobile industry are waste acid, heavy metal ions and solid waste 
pollution—consequently classified as a polluting industry in this study.  
 
As shown in Table 5.2, the abnormal return for this industry is 0.00% with an insignificant 
t-statistic of 0.42. It implies that, in aggregate, alternative energy industry is not sensitive to 
the announcements of 424 environmental regulations. Such finding is consistent with the 
Australian study of Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013) who report that this sector produced 
positive abnormal return. 
 
When I look at the reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), 
I find announcements 328, 331, 304 and 246 exhibiting a larger magnitude of abnormal 
return. The abnormal returns generated by announcements 328, 331, 304 and 246 were 2.78% 
(t-statistic of 16.61), 2.79% (t-statistic of 36.88), -2.04% (t-statistic of -37.09) and -3.46% 
(t-statistic of -44.23) respectively. 
 
Banking 
The banking sector in Japan consists of a number of banks that carry on banking services 
including commercial banks, long-term credit banks, trust banks, mutual loan, saving banks, 
and various specialized financial institutions. The banking system in Japan is liquid, 
competitive and developed. The banking sector is one of the dominant services that has 
contributed significantly to the GDP. Banking sector is classified as an environmentally 
friendly industry. 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, I gather that the banking industry generated 0.03% abnormal 
return with a t-statistic of 4.23. It is inconsistent with the research from Ramiah, Martin and 
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Moosa (2013), who show that this sector reacted negatively to environmental regulations in 
Australia. 
 
When I look at the reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), 
the banking industry appears to be sensitive to announcements 220, 221, 228 and 366. For 
instance, Announcement 220 occurs on 27 October 2005 which is about recycling of 
specified kinds of home appliances at municipalities and it generates an abnormal return of 
-0.19% (t-statistic of -4.38).  
 
Beverage 
Beverage industry refers to the industry that produces drinks that are ready to drink—it 
includes beverages such as wine and beer. Beverage industry covers non-alcoholic beverages 
such as beverage plants, beverage processing and beverage packing. Japanese liquor market is 
one of the biggest in the world with annual sales estimated at over 6 trillion yen. The polluting 
activities from beverage industry are water, food and air pollution, consequently regarded as a 
polluting industry. 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, beverage industry gets 0.03% abnormal return with a t-statistic 
of 2.17 after the environmental regulations. This result is consistent with the literature from 
Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013). In addition, when I look at the reaction of this industry after 
each announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), I find announcements 328 and 329 exhibiting a 
larger magnitude of abnormal return. For instance, Announcement 328 occurs on 14 October 
2008 and is about the national Eco-Action Points model project which generated an abnormal 
return of 2.78% (t-statistic of 16.61).  
 
 72 
 
Chemical 
The chemical industry comprises of companies that produce industrial chemicals. Central to 
the modern world economy, it converts raw materials such as oil, natural gas, air, water, 
metals, and minerals into thousands of different products. Basic chemical industry is a broad 
chemical category including polymers, bulk petrochemicals and intermediates etc. The 
polluting activity from chemical industry is chemical waste and regarded as a polluter.  
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the abnormal return of this industry is 0.02% with a t-statistic 
of 2.21. This result is not consistent with the research of Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013), 
who show a negative reaction to environmental regulations in Australia. When I look at the 
reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), I find 
announcements 328, 331 and 246 exhibiting a larger magnitude of abnormal return. The 
abnormal returns of those announcements are 2.78% (t-statistic of 16.61), 2.79% (t-statistic of 
36.88) and -3.46% (t-statistic of -44.23) respectively.     
 
Construction and Materials 
In Japan, the mainstay of infrastructure development is the construction industry contributing 
to one tenth of the GDP. Japanese construction industry has high expectations in terms of size 
accuracy, stone quality and processing accuracy. The polluting activities from construction 
industry are air, noise, water and solid waste pollution and consequently regarded as a 
polluting industry. 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, I can see that this industry gets 0.00% abnormal return with a 
not significant t-statistic of 0.21. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each 
announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), I find announcements 328, 331, 79 and 246 exhibiting 
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a larger magnitude of abnormal return. The abnormal returns of those announcements are 
2.78% (t-statistic of 16.61), 2.79% (t-statistic of 36.88), -0.60% (t-statistic of -15.14) and 
-3.46% (t-statistic of -44.23) respectively.     
 
Electricity 
The electricity industry is responsible for the generation, transmission, distribution and sale of 
electric power to the general public. This industry includes hydroelectric, fossil fuel, nuclear, 
solar, tidal, wind and independent electric power generators. Electricity industry accounts for 
one fourth of Japan's GDP. The polluting activities from electricity industry are water and air 
pollution and then it is defined as a polluter. 
 
As can be shown from Table 5.2, this industry generates a positive abnormal return of 0.09% 
with a significant t-statistic of 5.54 and this result confines with Ramiah, Martin and Moosa 
(2013) which is also consistent with Veith et al. (2009) who argue that firms in the European 
electricity industries successfully pass rising cost to consumers. When I look at the reaction of 
this industry after each announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), electricity industry is sensitive 
to announcements 328, 341, 346 and 327. 
 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 
The electronic and electrical equipment industry which is also known as consumer electronics 
has now become a global industry. The Japanese electronic market is well-established and 
holds a global reputation for excellence and innovation. In addition, Japan's consumer 
electronic market is one of the most advanced in the Asia Pacific. However, the size of the 
electronic industry and the use of toxic materials, plus the difficulty of recycling have caused 
serious problems of electronic waste. International and national environmental regulations 
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have been developed aiming to decrease the electronic waste. As a result, this industry is 
regarded as a polluter due to the polluting activities such as electronic waste, water and air 
pollution. 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the result shows that it has generated a positive abnormal 
return of 0.01% with a t-statistic of 2.05. This result is consistent with the research of 
Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013) who demonstrate that this sector has positive reaction in 
Australia. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer to 
Appendix 5.3), this industry appears to react to announcements 328, 331, 79 and 246. The 
abnormal returns from those announcements are 2.78% (t-statistic of 16.61), 2.79% 
(t-statistic of 36.88), -0.60% (t-statistic of -15.14) and -3.46% (t-statistic of -44.23) 
respectively.     
 
Financial Services 
Financial services refers to the services provided by the finance industry—for instance banks, 
investment banks, insurance companies, credit card companies, consumer finance companies, 
government sponsored enterprises, and stock brokerages. Financial services industry is one of 
the environmentally friendly industries. 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the industry abnormal return is 0.02% with an insignificant 
t-statistic of 1.36 which consistent with the evidence documented in the UK by Ramiah et al. 
(2016). However, this result is not consistent with Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa (2015a) and 
Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013) where these two studies shows positive and negative 
reactions respectively. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each announcement 
(refer to Appendix 5.3), I find that this industry is sensitive to announcements 327, 331, 304 
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and 246. For instance, Announcement 327 occurs on 9 October 2008 with the kick-off event 
for the nationwide Eco-Action Points model project which generated an abnormal return of 
0.55% (t-statistic of 5.62).  
 
Fixed Line Telecommunication 
Telecommunication industry is defined as any transmission, emission or reception of signs, 
signals, writings, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, radio, optical or 
other electromagnetic systems. The fixed line telecommunication sector consists of 
companies engaged in fixed-line networks for voice, data and high-density data. Japan's 
telecommunication industry is one of the most developed globally, as characterised by 
high-speed internet connections. The polluting activity for fixed line telecommunication 
industry is waste pollution and it is defined as a polluter. 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the abnormal return of this sector is 0.12% with a t-statistic of 
2.16. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer to Appendix 
5.3), this industry is sensitive to announcements 40, 218, 240 and 246. For instance, 
Announcement 40 occurs on 12 November 2003 with the model projects conducted to 
prevent global warming and the abnormal return is -0.51% (with a t-statistic of -9.42).  
 
Food Producers 
The food producers industry is a complex one with a global business perspective that supplies 
food consumed around the world. Japanese Ministry of Agriculture has unveiled a range of 
policies to promote traditional Japanese food culture to ensure the stability of Japan’s food 
supply. The polluting activities from food producer industry are water, food and air pollution 
and consequently regarded as a polluter.  
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As can be seen from Table 5.2, I can gather that it generates 0.00% abnormal return with a 
not significant t-statistic of 0.18. This finding is not consistent with the research of Ramiah, 
Martin and Moosa (2013) who report a negative abnormal return to environmental 
regulations. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer to 
Appendix 5.3), I find that this industry is responsive to announcements 328, 331 and 246. 
 
Food and Drug Retailers 
Food retailing is the process of selling consumer goods and/or services to customers through 
multiple channels of distribution to earn a profit. Japanese food enjoys a reputation for 
promoting health and longevity, with its traditional emphasis on rice, fish and seasonal 
ingredients. The polluting activities from food and drug retailers industry are water and air 
pollution, consequently classified as a polluting industry in this study.  
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, it generates 0.01% abnormal return with a not significant 
t-statistic of 1.01. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer 
to Appendix 5.3), I notice that this industry has been sensitive to announcements 328, 331 
and 246. The abnormal returns from these announcements are 2.78% (t-statistic of 16.61), 
2.79% (t-statistic of 36.88), and -3.46% (t-statistic of -44.23) respectively.    
  
Forestry and Paper 
Forestry is the economic sector related to the management and use of forest resources. 
Forestry production is essentially divided into wood resources and non-wood resources. The 
main uses of wood resources concern building, furniture making and paper 
production—while the non-wood resources subsector is principally associated with the 
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cultivation of mushrooms and other edible products, as well as energy production. According 
to the Japan Paper Association, Japan was the world’s third biggest manufacturer of paper 
after USA and China. The polluting activities from forestry and paper industry are water and 
air pollution, consequently classified as a polluting industry in this study.  
 
As is shown from Table 5.2, forestry and paper industry has got a positive abnormal return of 
0.05% with a significant t-statistic of 2.79. When I look at the reaction of this industry after 
each announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), I notice some movements around 
announcements 328, 331 and 246. 
 
Gas, Water and Multi-Utilities 
Japan is one of the three largest renewables market in the Asian region despite the growth rate 
is expected to slow down over the coming years. The activities within this industry include 
mains and non-mains water extraction by source, household and non mains water 
consumption and water losses. The polluting activities from gas, water and multi-utilities 
industry are water and air pollution—consequently classified as a polluting industry in this 
study.  
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the industry abnormal return is 0.03% with an insignificant 
t-statistic of 1.68. This result is inconsistent with the literature from Ramiah, Martin and 
Moosa (2013) and Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa (2015a). When I look at the reaction of this 
industry after each announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), this industry is sensitive to 
announcements 328, 331 and 246. The abnormal returns of those announcements are 2.78% 
(t-statistic of 16.61), 2.79% (t-statistic of 36.88), and -3.46% (t-statistic of -44.23) 
respectively.     
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General Industrials 
General industrial industry refers to all industries not included in agriculture, construction or 
maritime. The polluting activity from general industry is waste pollution, so this industry is 
considered as a polluter. As is shown from Table 5.2, the industry abnormal return is -0.01% 
with an insignificant t-statistic of -0.71. Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013) conclude a mixed 
effect in Australia market for this industry as it tends to react positively to some 
announcements while it reacts negatively to some other announcements. When I look at the 
reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), this industry 
recorded some movements around announcements 328, 331 and 246. The abnormal returns of 
those announcements are 2.78% (t-statistic of 16.61), 2.79% (t-statistic of 36.88), and -3.46% 
(t-statistic of -44.23) respectively.     
 
General Retailers 
Retailing is the process of selling consumer goods and/or services to customers through 
multiple channels of distribution to earn a profit. Demand is created through diverse target 
markets and promotional tactics, satisfying consumers' wants and needs through a lean supply 
chain. Japan is currently the third largest retail market in the world, after the US and China. 
General retailer industry is defined as an environmentally friendly industry and is expected to 
be positively affected by environmental regulations.  
 
When I look at the result from Table 5.2, general retailer industry recorded a positive 
abnormal return of 0.02% with a significant t-statistic of 2.31. When I look at the reaction of 
this industry after each announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), I observe that this industry is 
sensitive to announcements 328, 331, 79 and 246. 
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Health Care Equipment and Services 
The health care sector consists of companies engaged in manufacturing medical equipment, 
supplies and pharmaceuticals, operating health care facilities and provision of managed 
healthcare. During the past decade, Japan has quickly become a world leader in healthcare by 
several measures, and has enjoyed particular success in increasing Japanese life expectancy. 
The polluting activities from health care industry are water, solid waste and air 
pollution—consequently classified as a polluting industry in this study.  
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the abnormal return of this industry is -0.03 with a significant 
t-statistic of -2.06. Similar result is shown from Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013) who 
report a negative reaction in Australia. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each 
announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), I find that this industry is sensitive to announcements 
328, 331, 79 and 246. The abnormal returns of those announcements are 2.78% (t-statistic of 
16.61), 2.79% (t-statistic of 36.88), -0.60% (t-statistic of -15.14) and -3.46% (t-statistic of 
-44.23) respectively.    
  
Household Goods and Home Construct 
Japanese houses are mostly new and largely designed to only last for roughly 30 years. 
Culturally, the land is seen as more important than the house. Japan’s Liberal Democratic 
Party has pledged to stimulate the domestic economy through numerous public works 
projects. The polluting activities from this industry are noise, solid waste, water and air 
pollution—consequently classified as a polluting industry in this study.  
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As can be seen from Table 5.2, the industry abnormal return is -0.01% with an insignificant 
t-statistic of -0.37.  This result confirms the research of Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa (2015a) 
in Chinese market. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer 
to Appendix 5.3), I find that this industry is sensitive to announcements 328, 331, 79 and 246. 
 
Industrial Engineering 
Industrial engineering is a branch of engineering which deals with the optimization of 
complex processes or systems. Industrial engineers work to eliminate waste of time, money, 
materials, man-hours, machine time, energy and other resources that do not generate value. 
The polluting activities from industrial engineering industry are noise, solid waste, water and 
air pollution—consequently classified as a polluting industry in this study.  
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the industry abnormal return is 0.01% with an insignificant 
t-statistic of 1.41. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer to 
Appendix 5.3), I find this industry to be sensitive to announcements 328, 331, 79, 304 and 246. 
 
Industrial Metals and Mining 
Japan is one of the largest aluminum importers in Asia, its transportation and automobile 
industries have particularly large aluminum requirements. Japan is the world’s second largest 
steel producer and steel-exporting country in Asia (mostly to China, South 
Korea and Thailand). To meet demand, Japan is also one of the world's largest iron ore 
importers. The polluting activities from industrial metals and mining industry are noise, solid 
waste, water and air pollution—consequently classified as a polluting industry in this study.  
 
As can be shown from Table 5.2, this industry generated a profit of 0.03% with a significant 
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t-statistic of 1.96. This result confirms the research of Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa (2015a) 
and Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013). When I look at the reaction of this industry after each 
announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), I find that this industry is sensitive to announcements 
75, 328, 331, 79, 304 and 246. For instance, Announcement 75 occurs on 21 April 2004 with 
the current status of the law for the recycling of specified kinds of home appliance and it 
generates an abnormal return of -0.04% (t-statistic of -0.79). 
 
Industrial Transportation 
Transportation in Japan is modern and highly developed. Japan's transportation sector stands 
out for its energy efficiency, it uses less energy per person compared to other countries. 
Transportation in Japan is also very expensive in international comparison, reflecting high 
tolls and taxes, particularly on automobile transport. The polluting activities from industrial 
transportation industry are noise, solid waste and air pollution—consequently classified as a 
polluting industry. 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the industry abnormal return is 0.02% with an insignificant 
t-statistic of 1.40. This result is different to the research of Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa 
(2015a) who conclude this industry in China is significantly negatively affected by 
environmental regulations. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each 
announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), I find this industry to be sensitive to announcements 
328, 331, 79 and 246. 
 
Leisure Goods 
The entertainment industry in Japan has traditionally been characterised by youth-based 
content. With Japan’s ageing population, the sector is now in a phase of transition as it seeks to 
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adapt to its older audience. Japan is the world’s third largest economy and its consumers are 
renowned for their strong desire for excellent-quality and precision products. There is therefore 
no surprise that demand for luxury goods have traditionally been high in Japan. The polluting 
activities from leisure goods industry are solid waste, water and air pollution—consequently 
classified as a polluting industry. 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the industry abnormal return is 0.00% with an insignificant 
t-statistic of 0.40. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer 
to Appendix 5.3), I find this industry is sensitive to announcements 328, 331, 79, 286, 246 
and 304. 
 
Life Insurance 
Japan is a rare example of a life insurance market that is enormous in absolute terms, well 
developed and still expanding faster than the economy as a whole. This industry is considered 
as an environmentally friendly industry. 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the industry abnormal return is 0.05% with an insignificant 
t-statistic of 0.71. Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa (2015a) find this industry to be positively 
related to environmental regulations in Chinese market. When I look at the reaction of this 
industry after each announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), I find that this industry is sensitive 
to announcements 102, 79, 86 and 104. For instance, Announcement 102 occurs on 22 
September 2004 which is about cabinet decision on fundamental policy for enhancing 
motivation on environmental conservation and promoting environmental education and it 
generates an abnormal return of 0.19% (t-statistic of 3.67). 
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Media 
Media is the collective communication outlets or tools that are used to store and deliver 
information or data. It is either associated with communication media or the specialized 
communication businesses such as print media and the press, photography, advertising, 
cinema, broadcasting (radio and television) and publishing. Media industry in Japan is going 
through an increasingly rapid transformation due the arrival of new technologies such as 
smartphones, iPads and the increasing popularity of new media platforms such as Twitter and 
Facebook. Japan's media and information industries are strongly influenced by traditional 
Japanese culture. Media industry is defined as an environmentally friendly industry. 
 
From the results of Table 5.2, media industry has generated a profit of -0.11% with a 
significant t-statistic of -3.53. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each 
announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), I find this industry to be sensitive to announcements 
39, 331, 79 and 246. 
 
Mining 
Mining is the extraction of valuable minerals or other geological materials from the earth from 
an orebody, lode, vein, seam, reef or placer deposits. Mining in a wider sense includes 
extraction of any non-renewable resource such as petroleum, natural gas, or even water. Levels 
of metals recycling are generally low. Mining operations usually create a negative 
environmental impact, both during the mining activity and after the mine has closed. Hence, 
most of the world's nations have passed regulations to decrease the impact. The polluting 
activities from mining industry are solid waste, noise, water and air pollution—consequently 
classified as a polluting industry. 
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From the results in Table 5.2, mining industry has generated a profit of 0.13% with a 
significant t-statistic of 2.2. This result is different to the research from Ramiah, Martin and 
Moosa (2013) who find the abnormal return of mining industry from environmental 
regulations is -2.98% with a t-statistic of -2.59 in Australia. When I look at the reaction of 
this industry after each announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), I find that this industry is 
sensitive to announcements 4, 6, 328, 79 and 105. For instance, Announcement 4 occurs on 3 
March 2003 with the 6th international symposium on environmental endocrine disrupters and 
it generates an abnormal return of 0.12% (t-statistic of 2.37).  
 
Mobile Telecommunication 
Mobile telecommunication is the provision of telephone services to phones which may move 
around freely rather than stay fixed in one location. Mobile phones connect to a global cellular 
network of base stations, whereas satellite phones connect to orbiting satellites. Both networks 
are interconnected to the public switched telephone network to allow any phone in the world to 
be dialed. The polluting activity from mobile telecommunication industry is waste 
pollution—so this industry is considered as polluter.  
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the industry abnormal return is 0.00% with an insignificant 
t-statistic of 0.26. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer to 
Appendix 5.3), I find this industry to be sensitive to announcements 32, 40, 331, 41 and 42. For 
instance, Announcement 32 occurs on 16 September 2003 with the signing of the agreement 
between Japan and UNEP concerning the establishment of a regional coordinating unit for the 
northwest pacific action plan and it generated an abnormal return of -0.34% (t-statistic of 
-3.58). 
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Non-Life Insurance 
Non-life insurance is also called general insurance, including automobile and homeowners 
policies, provide payments depending on the loss from a particular financial event. General 
insurance is typically defined as any insurance that is not determined to be life insurance. The 
biggest three non-life insurance countries are EU, Japan and US. Non-life insurance is one of 
the environmentally friendly industries. 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the industry return is 0.05% with a t-statistic of 2.04. This 
finding does not hold in Australian market as Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013) find the 
abnormal return of this industry to be negatively related to environmental regulations. When I 
look at the reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), I find 
this industry is sensitive to announcements 35, 332, 198 and 344. 
 
Oil Equipment and Services 
The polluting activities from this industry are water and air pollution—consequently classified 
as a polluting industry. As can be seen from Table 5.2, the industry abnormal return is 0.08% 
with an insignificant t-statistic of 0.54. My result is different to the study of Ramiah, Pichelli 
and Moosa (2015b) who generate a significant negative reaction in the US where the 
abnormal return is -2.71%. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each 
announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), I find this industry is sensitive to announcements 4 and 
22. For instance, Announcement 4 occurs on 3 March 2003 with the 6th international 
symposium on environmental endocrine disrupters and it generates an abnormal return of 
0.12% (t-statistic of 2.37).  
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Oil and Gas Producers 
Oil and gas producers contribute to more than half of the primary sources of energy. 
According to the data from US Energy Information Administration (EIA), Japan is currently 
the second-largest importer of fossil fuels in the world (after China). The polluting activities 
from oil and gas producer industry are water and air pollution, so this industry is considered as 
polluter. As can be seen from Table 5.2, the industry abnormal return is 0.01% with an 
insignificant t-statistic of 0.39. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each 
announcement (refer to Appendix 5.3), I find this industry is sensitive to announcements 228, 
95, 328, 304 and 79. 
 
Personal Goods 
Personal goods refer to any type of property that can generally be moved, touched or felt. 
These generally include items such as furniture, clothing, jewelry, art, writings and household 
goods. Intangible personal property or intangibles goods refer to personal property that 
cannot actually be moved, touched or felt, but instead represents something of value such as 
negotiable instruments, securities and service. The polluting activity from personal goods 
industry is waste pollution, so this industry is considered as polluter.  
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the industry abnormal return is -0.02% with an insignificant 
t-statistic of -1.69. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer 
to Appendix 5.3), I find this industry is sensitive to announcements 328, 331, 79 and 246. The 
abnormal returns of those announcements are 2.78% (t-statistic of 16.61), 2.79% (t-statistic of 
36.88), -0.60% (t-statistic of -15.14) and -3.46% (t-statistic of -44.23) respectively.     
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Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 
Japan has one of the most developed biotechnology sectors in the world with a high number 
of patents filed. Japan is already the second largest pharmaceuticals market in the world. As a 
result of the country's ageing population, there is a continuous increase in societal healthcare 
awareness. Japan has a number of internationally operating research companies that are 
actively looking for collaboration opportunities with new and innovative pharmaceutical 
companies. Japan is currently the world’s largest per-capita importer of 
biotechnology-produce foods and feeds. The polluting activities from this industry are 
chemical waste and waste pollution—so this industry is considered as polluter. 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the industry abnormal return is 0.01% with an insignificant 
t-statistic of 1.04. My result is not consistent with the study of Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa 
(2015b) who document a significant negative abnormal return to environmental regulations in 
US. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer to Appendix 
5.3), I find this industry is sensitive to announcements 328, 331, 79 and 246. 
 
Real Estate Investment Trusts 
Real estate investment trust is collective investment in property. Investment trusts are 
closed-end funds and are constituted as public limited companies. In many respects, the 
investment trust was the progenitor of the investment company. Real estate investment trust 
industry is defined as an environmental friendly industry. From the results of Table 5.2, the 
industry abnormal return is 0.12% with a t-statistic of 6.52. From Appendix 5.3, this industry 
is sensitive to announcements 328, 331 and 345. The abnormal returns of those 
announcements are 2.78% (t-statistic of 16.61), 2.79% (t-statistic of 36.88) and 0.49% 
(t-statistic of 8.10) respectively.     
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Real Estate Investment and Service 
Real estate investment and service involves the purchase, ownership, management, rental 
and/or sale of real estate for profit. Improvement of property as part of a real estate investment 
strategy is generally considered to be a sub-specialty of real estate investing called real estate 
development. Real estate investment and service industry is regarded as an environmental 
friendly industry. 
 
From the results of Table 5.2, the industry abnormal return is 0.04% with a t-statistic of 2.73. 
My result is inconsistent with the research of Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa (2015b) who 
document a significant negative abnormal return to environmental regulations in the US. 
From Appendix 5.3, I can see that this industry is sensitive to announcements 328, 331, 79 and 
246. 
 
Software and Computer Services 
The software industry includes businesses for development, maintenance and publication of 
software that are using different business models, mainly either license based or Cloud based 
(such as SaaS, PaaS, IaaS, MaaS, AaaS, etc.). The industry also includes software services, 
such as training, documentation, consulting and data recovery. The computer or IT industry is 
the range of businesses involved in designing computer hardware and computer networking 
infrastructures, developing computer software, and providing information technology 
services. This industry is considered as an environmentally friendly industry.  
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the industry abnormal return is -0.02% with an insignificant 
t-statistic of -1.37. This result is not consistent with the study from Ramiah, Pichelli and 
 89 
 
Moosa (2015a) who generate a significant positive abnormal return to environmental 
regulations in China. From Appendix 5.3, I find announcements 331, 79 and 246 exhibiting a 
larger magnitude of abnormal return.   
 
Support Services 
Support services industry includes variety of services such as product support service and 
administrative support services. Product support services, is the Microsoft business unit with 
primary responsibility for responding to end-user and partner requests for assistance with the 
company's products and services. The administrative and support services industry is engaged 
in performing routine support activities for the day-to-day operations of other businesses. 
This industry is considered as environmentally friendly industry.  
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the industry abnormal return is -0.02% with an insignificant 
t-statistic of -1.22. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer 
to Appendix 5.3), I find this industry is sensitive to announcements 328, 331, 79 and 246. 
 
Technology Hardware and Equipment 
This industry includes a wide range of different sectors, such as computer hardware, software, 
electronics, semiconductors, internet, telecoms equipment, e-commerce and computer 
services. Information technology is widely recognised as a great resource for the service 
sector because it improves operational efficiency and transparency and also creates 
opportunities for new and developing markets. The Japanese IT industry is a key driver of 
global economic growth. Although Japan has lost its once-dominant position in the global IT 
industry and is facing increasing competition from foreign firms, Japanese companies still 
have a significant global presence and respected reputation. Efforts are being made by 
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Japanese IT giants and by the government to make the necessary reforms to Japan’s IT sector 
in order to restore it to its former glory. The polluting activities from this industry are solid 
waste, water and air pollution—so this industry is considered as a polluter.  
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the industry abnormal return is -0.01% with an insignificant 
t-statistic of -1.01. When I look at the reaction of this industry after each announcement (refer 
to Appendix 5.3), I find this industry to be sensitive to announcements 328, 331 and 246. The 
abnormal returns of those announcements are 2.78% (t-statistic of 16.61), 2.79% (t-statistic of 
36.88) and -3.46% (t-statistic of -44.23) respectively.     
 
Tobacco 
The tobacco industry comprises companies engaged in the growth, preparation for sale, 
shipment, advertisement, and distribution of tobacco and tobacco-related products. The 
tobacco industry is the successor entity to a nationalized tobacco monopoly first established 
by the Government of Japan in 1898 to secure tax revenue collections from tobacco leaf sales. 
The polluting activities from tobacco industry are food, water and air pollution and this 
industry is considered as a polluter.  
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, the industry abnormal return is 0.05% with an insignificant 
t-statistic of 1.09. From Appendix 5.3, this industry is sensitive to announcements 37, 331 and 
358. For example, Announcement 37 occurs on 9 October 2003 with the waste treatment 
facilities development program and it generates an abnormal return of 0.03% (t-statistic of 
0.63). 
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Travel and Leisure 
Travel and leisure industry includes travelling, accommodation and the business of operating 
tours. Japan's tourism market continues to grow in recent years and a large number of tourists 
from the region and an increasing number particularly from China. Supporting growth in both 
inbound and domestic tourism is Japan's well-developed hotel market and extensive transport 
network, which ensure the country is well placed to keep with growth. But at the meantime, 
tourism could bring some negatively effect to environment such as daily waste. The polluting 
activities of this industry are noise and waste pollution—so travel and leisure industry is 
defined as a polluting industry.  
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2, travel and leisure industry generates a positive return of 0.02% 
with t-statistic of 2.18. This result is different from the research of Ramiah, Martin and 
Moosa (2013) who find a significant negative abnormal return. From Appendix 5.3, I can find 
that this industry is sensitive to announcements 328, 331, 79 and 246. 
 
The discussion in this thesis is solely on each industry (univariate) and does not provide 
extend on the interconnectedness (if any) across sectors. For instance, I do not provide 
explanations as to why banks and non-life insurance is significant but not life insurance or 
financial services. The reason is that it is beyond the scope of thesis as we do use any 
methodology to untangle these occurrences and this is a good suggestion for future research. 
A new set of methodology will have to be used to tackle this problem. 
 
5.4 GREEN EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTALLY FRIENDLY INDUSTRY 
 
The ten industries that are environmentally friendly are listed in Table 5.3 below. They are 
banks, financial services, general retailers, life insurance, media, non-life insurance, real 
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estate investment trusts, real estate investment and service, software and computer services 
and support services.  
Table 5.3: Green Effects in Environmentally Friendly Industries 
Industry AR t-stat CAR 
(-1, +1) 
t-stat CAR 
(-5, +1) 
t-stat 
Banks 
 
0.03% 4.23*** 0.01% 1.21 0.02% 0.91 
Financial Services 
 
0.02% 1.36 0.03% 1.36 0.00% 2.16** 
General Retailers 
 
0.02% 2.31** -0.01% -2.01** 0.01% 1.18 
Life Insurance 
 
0.05% 0.71 0.07% 1.48 0.02% 2.56*** 
Media 
 
-0.11% -3.53*** -0.06% -1.76* 0.03% 1.23 
Non-life Insurance 
 
0.05% 2.04** 0.02% 1.27 0.06% 1.75* 
Real Estate Investment 
Trusts 
 
0.12% 6.52*** 0.04% 3.47*** -0.09% -2.23** 
Real Estate Investment 
and Service 
 
0.04% 2.73*** 0.01% 1.88 0.02% 1.47 
Software and Computer 
Services 
 
-0.02% -1.37 0.08% 2.51*** 0.01% 3.22*** 
Support Services -0.02% -1.22 -0.03% -2.12** 0.01% 1.39 
 
As is shown from Table 5.3, it reports the abnormal return of environmentally friendly 
industries with their corresponding t-statistics. The results show that ‘green effects’ exist in 
environmentally friendly industries whereby positive abnormal returns are found for majority 
of the environmentally friendly industries. Five industries display statistically significant 
positive abnormal returns after the announcements of environmental regulations. The 
industries exhibiting positive abnormal returns are banks, general retailers, non-life insurance, 
real estate investment trust and real estate investment and service.  
 
From these positive reaction industries, I document the largest positive reaction is from real 
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estate investment trust industry with 0.12% abnormal return (t-statistic of 6.52) and the 
lowest positive reaction is from general retailers industry with 0.02% abnormal return 
(t-statistic of 2.31). Media industry is the only industry that reacts negatively to 
announcements of environmental regulations with an abnormal return of -0.11 (t-statistic is 
-3.53). Post the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, I have experienced an emergence of 
stringent environmental policies to which I hypothesize will lead to positive abnormal returns 
to environmentally friendly businesses and the evidence presented support my hypothesis. 
 
5.5 GREEN EFFECTS OF POLLUTING INDUSTRY 
Following the classification of the industries as polluters, 29 polluting industries were 
identified and their corresponding abnormal returns and t-statistics are reported in Table 5.4.  
Table 5.4: Green Effects in Polluting Industries 
Industry AR t-stat 
Aerospace and Defence 0.09% 1.45 
Alternative Energy 0.09% 1.71* 
Automobiles and Parts 0.00% 0.42 
Beverages 0.03% 2.17** 
Chemicals 0.02% 2.21** 
Construction and Materials 0.00% 0.21 
Electricity 0.09% 5.54*** 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 0.01% 2.05** 
Fixed-Line Telecommunication 0.12% 2.16** 
Food Producers 0.00% -0.18 
Food and Drug Retailers 0.01% 1.01 
Forestry and Paper 0.05% 2.79*** 
Gas, Water and Multi-Utilities 0.03% 1.68* 
General Industrials -0.01% -0.71 
Health Care Equipment and Services -0.03% -2.06** 
Household Goods and Home Construction -0.01% -0.37 
Industrial Engineering 0.01% 1.41 
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Industry AR t-stat 
Industrial Metals and Mining 0.03% 1.96** 
Industrial Transportation 0.02% 1.4 
Leisure Goods -0.00% -0.4 
Mining 0.13% 2.2** 
Mobile Telecommunication 0.00% 0.26 
Oil Equipment and Services 0.08% 0.54 
Oil and Gas Producers 0.01% 0.39 
Personal Goods -0.02% -1.69* 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 0.01% 1.04 
Technology Hardware and Equipment -0.01% -1.01 
Tobacco 0.05% 1.09 
Travel and Leisure 0.02% 2.18** 
 
Under the assumption that there are more stringent environmental policies, I hypothesize that 
polluting industries are expected to produce negative abnormal returns. However, the 
empirical findings are mixed. Some of the polluting industries exhibit positive abnormal 
return (counter intuitive), some of them produced negative abnormal return (as hypothesized) 
and some recorded no abnormal return. From my study, there are 19 industries (aerospace and 
defense, alternative energy, automobiles and parts, construction and materials, food producers, 
food and drug retailers, gas, water and multi-utilities, general industries, household goods and 
home construct, industrial engineering, industrial transportation, leisure goods, mobile 
telecommunication, oil and gas producers, personal goods, pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology, technology hardware and equipment and tobacco industry) with insignificant 
result—meaning that these industries were insensitive to the announcements of 
environmental regulations. There are 9 industries displaying statistically significant positive 
reactions with one industry reacting negatively (health care equipment and services).  
 
Interestingly, I observe more positive reactions (see beverages industry with 0.03% abnormal 
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return, chemicals industry with 0.02% abnormal return, electricity industry with 0.09% 
abnormal return, electronic and electrical equipment industry with 0.01% abnormal return, 
fixed line telecommunication industry with 0.12% abnormal return, forestry and paper 
industry with 0.05% abnormal return, industrial metals and mining industry with 0.03% 
abnormal return, mining industry with 0.13% abnormal return and travel and leisure industry 
with 0.02% abnormal return) than negative reactions (health care equipment and services 
industry with -0.03% abnormal return). Such results question the effectiveness of 
environmental policies but is consistent with Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013) who show 
that the largest polluter (electricity providers) in Australia were not affected by the new 
regulations as they were able to pass on the cost onto consumers. Another argument used in 
the literature to explain this occurrence is that certain industries are protected. 
 
5.6 THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 
In Section 5.3, a detailed explanation was given as to how the industries reacted and the 
major announcements were highlighted in the last paragraph written about each industry. In 
this section, I elaborate more on the major environmental regulations that were highlighted. 
Compared to the existing literature like UK, US, China and Australia, Japan has the largest 
amount of environmental regulations. For instance, it has been documented that UK has 75 
announcements, US has 94 announcements, China has 25 announcements and Australia has 
19 announcements. I have explored 424 announcements reaction in Japan (see Appendix 5.1 
which reports the abnormal return associated with each announcement for the entire Japanese 
equity market) and listed the top 10 negative reaction and top 10 positive reaction 
announcements in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 respectively.  
Table 5.5: Top 10 Negative Reaction Announcements 
Event Date Announ
cement 
AR Announcement 
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2006/1/18 246 -3.46% Japan's Response to the OECD Environmental 
Performance Review of Japan Released 
2004/5/17 79 -2.47% Publication of Data on Recycling of Home Appliances by 
Electric Appliance Manufacturers 
2010/5/17 386 -2.16% Eighteenth Session of the Commission on Sustainable 
Development (CSD-18) 
2008/1/15 304 -2.04% E-Learning Version of "Pesticides/Insecticides and 
Chemicals"; the Forth Booklet for Understanding the 
Chemicals Surrounding US 
2006/1/23 249 -1.51% State of PCB Waste in Storage under the PCB Special 
Measures Law 
2004/7/27 90 -1.24% Results of Preliminary Assessment (the 3rd Survey) of 
Environmental Risks of Chemical Substances 
2008/10/30 
 
330 -1.24% On the amount of the requesting budget to go towards 
environmental preservation matters in FY 2009 
2012/5/15 418 -1.19% Estimated Market Size of Japan's Environmental 
Industries of 2010, and Report of Japan's Environmental 
Industry Growth Engine 
2005/9/29 216 -1.14% Future Vision for the Regional Environment Offices 
2011/10/28 410 -1.10% The 11th Japan-China-Korea Tripartite Roundtable 
Meeting on Environmental Industry 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.5, I have listed the top 10 negative reaction green policies. The 
largest market negative reaction of -3.46% occurs on 18 January 2006, which is about the 
response to OECD environmental performance review in Japan. The OECD Environmental 
Performance Review program provides independent assessments of countries’ progress in 
achieving domestic and international environmental policy commitments. The program has 
completed over 60 reviews that aim to help improve individual and collective performance in 
environmental management by promoting peer learning, enhancing countries’ accountability 
and helping governments to assess progress in achieving their environmental goals.  
 
The OECD provides targeted recommendations designed to reinforce national environmental 
policy initiatives, bringing about positive change to the environment. The abnormal returns of 
other regulations are -2.47% on 17 May 2004, -2.16% on 17 May 2010, -2.04% on 15 
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January 2008, -1.51% on 23 January 2006, -1.24% on 27 July 2004 and 30 October 2008, 
-1.19% on 15 May 2012, -1.14% on 29 September 2005 and -1.10% on 28 October 2011.  
This result is consistent with prior literature such as Hamilton (1995), White (1995) and 
Klassen and McLaughlin (1996).  
Table 5.6: Top 10 Positive Reaction Announcements 
Event Date Announc
ement 
AR Announcement 
2008/10/31 331 2.79% Demonstration of Eco-Action Point model project services 
by the Minister of the Environment to be held 
 
2008/10/14 328 2.78% The Nationwide Eco-Action Points model project managed 
by JCB Co., Ltd to begin 
 
2009/3/30 348 1.26% Formulation of "Environmental Information Strategy" and 
the Results of Public Comments Regarding the Strategy 
 
2009/5/26 351 0.86% The Minister of the Environment's Opinions on the Draft 
of the Environmental Impact Statement for the Onahama 
Thermal Power Station (Tentative Name). 
 
2011/6/16 406 0.81% The result of questionnaire concerning Green Purchasing 
in local government 
2009/4/20 350 0.77% Publication of Environmental Statistics 2009 
 
2004/3/8 65 0.74% Cabinet Decision on a Bill Partially Amending the Law 
Relating to the Prevention of Marine Pollution and 
Maritime Disasters 
2008/6/12 318 0.69% Guidelines for Sustainable Urban Renewal: 
Mini-Assessment for Urban Renewal Project. Publicizing 
Candidates for Designated Procurement of Public-Works 
Projects Items Associated with the Promoting Green 
Purchasing Law 
 
2010/5/28 388 0.68% Publication for designated procurement items of public 
works projects on Promoting Green Purchasing 
 
2003/8/25 22 0.67% Asia-Pacific Forum for Environment and Development 
(APFED) Fourth Substantive Meeting. Amendment to the 
Maximum Permissible Limit for the Quality of Motor 
Vehicle Fuel and for the Quantity of Substances in Motor 
Vehicle fuel 
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As is shown from Table 5.6, the most significant regulation is about the Eco-Action Point 
model which was announced 14 October 2008 and 2008 and 31 October 2008 respectively, 
where the first announcement refers to the beginning of this project and the second 
announcement is about how the model will be implemented. As part of this project, Kyoto 
Carbon Dioxide Reduction Bank issues Eco-Action Points based on the amount of CO2 
reduced in the central elements of domestic energy consumption, such as the use of electricity 
and gas. These points can be used as shopping credits at participating stores. This is the first 
such system in Japan, and it aims to drastically reduce energy consumption and CO2 
emissions in the domestic sector. Eco-Action Points are also issued upon purchasing 
energy-saving products or services. Customers can exchange earned points for products and 
services, including electronic money. As this policy tends to reduce the GHG emission, it is 
widely accepted by consumers—I observe positive green effects around this announcement. 
 
In addition to those two announcements, the abnormal return of rest announcements 
generated on 30
 
March 2009 with 1.26%, 26
 
May 2009 with 0.86%, 16
 
June 2011 with 0.81%, 
20
 
April 2009 with 0.77%, 8
 
March 2004 with 0.74%, 12
 
June 2008 with 0.69%, 28
 
May 
2010 with 0.68% and 25
 
August 2003 with 0.67%. As is shown from Table 5.6, positive 
reaction are documented around environment substantive meetings, the prevention of 
pollution, guideline for sustainable urban renewal, promoting green purchase thesis and 
Eco-Action projects.  
 
5.7 ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
Event study methodology is often criticized for the type of asset pricing model used and the 
results presented so far are also open to these criticisms. In this thesis, abnormal return is 
defined as the difference between actual return and expected return. It is worth mentioning 
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that the discussion thus far has been based on the rolling average model (see Equation 3 from 
Chapter 4) and other asset pricing models discussed in Chapter 4 (CAPM, Fama-French three 
factor model and Carhart four factor model) are used as robustness checks. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 
report the results of the robustness checks for environmentally friendly industries and 
polluting industries respectively. 
Table 5.7: Robustness Check of Green Effects in Environmentally Friendly Industries 
                                              Abnormal Return under Various Asset 
Pricing Models with t-stat 
 Single Rolling 
Average  
CAPM  Fama-French 
Three Factor 
Carhart Four 
Factor 
Banks 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% -0.04% 
 4.23*** 2.26** 1.88* -1.76* 
Financial Services 0.02% -0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 
 1.36 1.24 1.94* 1.23 
General Retailers 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.00% 
 2.31** 2.56*** 2.11** 1.45 
Life Insurance 0.05% -0.04% 0.07% 0.02% 
 0.71 1.52 1.54 1.67 
Media -0.11% 0.04% 0.02% 0.01% 
 -3.53*** 2.32** 2.02** 2.11** 
Non-life Insurance 0.05% 0.06% 0.05% 0.04% 
 2.04** 3.22*** 2.15** 2.26** 
Real Estate Investment 
Trusts 
0.12% 0.07% -0.01% -0.02% 
 6.52*** 1.57 -1.26 -1.23 
Real Estate Investment 
and Service 
0.04% -0.02% -0.02% -0.01% 
 2.73*** -1.58 -2.01** -2.11** 
Software and Computer 
Services 
-0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.01% 
 -1.37 1.83* 1.02 1.66* 
Support Services -0.02% 0.02% -0.01% 0.00% 
 -1.22 1.62 1.15 1.70* 
 
From Table 5.7, we can see 5 industries (banks, general retailers, non-life insurance, real 
estate investment trust and real estate investment service) reacting positively to 
environmental regulations when the single rolling average model is used (evidence discussed 
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earlier in this chapter). The banking sector is supported by the CAPM (AR of 0.03% and 
t-statistic of 2.26, general retailers industry is supported by the CAPM and Fama-French 
three factor model and non-life insurance is reinforced by all the models. However the 
remaining two industries are not supported by the robustness tests. Such findings are 
consistent with the literature whereby it is difficult to get all robustness tests to point to the 
same answer.  
 
As we can see from Table 5.8, 9 industries (beverages, chemicals, electricity, electronic and 
electrical equipment, fixed line telecommunication, forestry and paper and industrial metals 
and mining, mining and travel and leisure) reacted positively and one industry (healthcare 
equipment and service) reacted negatively to Japanese environmental regulations by using 
single rolling average model. The electricity sector is supported by the CAPM, Fama-French 
three factor model (AR of 0.06% and t-statistic of 3.98 in CAPM and AR of 0.04% with a 
t-statistic of 1.99 in Fama-French three factor model), health care equipment and services 
industry is supported by the CAPM, industrial metals and mining industry is reinforced by all 
the models, mining industry is supported by CAPM and Fama-French three factor model. 
However the remaining industries are not supported by the robustness tests. Such findings are 
consistent with the literature whereby it is difficult to get all robustness tests to point to the 
same answer (see Cam and Ramiah 2014 and Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa 2015a). 
Table 5.8: Robustness Check of Green Effects in Polluting Industries 
AR under Various Asset-Pricing Models with t-stat 
 Single Rolling 
Average 
CAPM Fama-French 
Three-Factor 
Carhart 
Four-Factor 
Aerospace and Defence 0.09% -0.07% -0.03% -0.02% 
 1.45 -1.89* -1.22 -1.03 
Alternative Energy 0.09% 0.08% 0.06% -0.03 
 1.71* 0.99 1.21 -1.02 
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AR under Various Asset-Pricing Models with t-stat 
 Single Rolling 
Average 
CAPM Fama-French 
Three-Factor 
Carhart 
Four-Factor 
Automobiles and Parts 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 0.01% 
 0.42 1.21 1.87* 1.55 
Beverages 0.03% -0.02% -0.00% -0.03% 
 2.17** -2.58*** -1.77* -1.02 
Chemicals 0.02% -0.01% -0.04% -0.02% 
 2.21** -1.21 -1.80* -1.29 
Construction and Materials 0.00% 0.02% 0.01% 0.00% 
 0.21 1.89* 1.58 0.23 
Electricity 0.09% 0.06% 0.04% 0.02% 
 5.54*** 3.98*** 1.99** 4.10*** 
Electronic and Electrical 
Equipment 
0.01% 0.03% 0.01% 0.00% 
 2.05** 3.75*** 1.22 1.01 
Fixed-Line Telecommunication 0.12% 0.09% -0.02% -0.07% 
 2.16** 1.69* -1.01 -0.58 
Food Producers -0.00% -0.00% -0.05% -0.03% 
 -0.18 -1.28 -1.14 -1.25 
Food and Drug Retailers 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% -0.00% 
 1.01 1.26 1.22 -1.19 
Forestry and Paper 0.05% 0.06% 0.05% 0.04% 
 2.79** 1.29 1.44 1.93* 
Gas, Water and Multi-Utilities 0.03% -0.01% 0.00% -0.01% 
 1.68* 1.18 1.09 -0.98 
General Industrials -0.01% -0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 
 -0.37 -0.92 2.24** 0.90 
Health Care Equipment and 
Services 
-0.03% -0.05% 0.01% -0.01% 
 -2.06** -3.11*** 1.07 1.33 
Household Goods and Home 
Construct 
-0.01% 0.01% 0.06% 0.04% 
 -0.37 1.25 1.66* 1.54 
Industrial Engineering 0.01% 0.00% 0.07% 0.02% 
 1.41 0.89 1.76 1.09 
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AR under Various Asset-Pricing Models with t-stat 
 Single Rolling 
Average 
CAPM Fama-French 
Three-Factor 
Carhart 
Four-Factor 
Industrial Metals and Mining 0.03% 0.01% 0.03% 0.02% 
 1.96** 2.21** 2.31** 3.03*** 
Industrial Transportation 0.02% 0.01% 0.09% -0.00% 
 1.40 1.42 1.90* -1.02 
Leisure Goods 0.00% -0.01% -0.05% -0.06% 
 0.40 -1.87* -1.79* -1.10 
Mining 0.13% 0.08% 0.04% 0.05% 
 2.20** 5.62*** 2.01** 1.91* 
Mobile Telecommunication 0.00% -0.01% 0.00% 0.02% 
 0.26 -1.37 1.71* 1.67* 
Oil Equipment and Services 0.08% 0.02% 0.01% 0.07% 
 0.54 1.66* 1.46 2.21** 
Oil and Gas Producers 0.01% 0.00% 0.04% 0.03% 
 0.39 1.29 1.56 1.34 
Personal Goods -0.02% -0.01% -0.04% -0.00% 
 -1.69* -1.34 -1.95* -0.97 
Pharmaceuticals and 
Biotechnology 
0.01% -0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 
 1.04 -0.96 1.67* 1.81* 
Technology Hardware and 
Equipment 
-0.01% -0.01% 0.01% 0.06% 
 -1.01 -1.02 2.10** 1.09 
Tobacco 0.05% 0.03% 0.02% 0.01% 
 1.09 2.01** 1.90* 2.56*** 
Travel and Leisure 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% -0.01% 
 2.18** 1.11 1.51 -1.49 
 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
Since the publication of Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013), various studies have emerged to 
study whether there are abnormal returns associated with environmental regulations and these 
studies are Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa (2015a,b), Ramiah et al. (2016) and Pham, Ramiah 
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and Moosa (2015). So far, the literature documents green effects in Australia, China, US, UK 
and France. For the hypothesis of “green effects” to hold, there is a need to test whether this 
effect exists in other markets and this chapter contributes to this debate. After study 424 
announcements of environmental regulations in Japan, I can conclude that “green effects” 
exist. Furthermore, “green effects” can be either positive or negative giving rise to winning 
and losing industrial portfolios. This conclusion will be the basis of the next chapter where I 
explore winners and losers portfolios from “green effects” in more details. 
 
Within this relatively new and sparse literature, the results of this study show clear industrial 
and overall effects. This chapter contributes to the literature by classifying industries into 
polluters and environmentally friendly—an analysis not considered by the previous literature. 
Such analysis enabled us to conclude that environmental regulations are partially achieving 
its goals. To some degree, the regulations are successful around environmentally friendly 
business (with the production of positive abnormal returns) but failing to achieve its expected 
results on polluters. It is worth noting that such conclusions have been drawn by prior studies. 
 
Another contribution of this chapter is the study of 424 pieces of announcements to conclude 
about the most significant/successful environmental regulation. The winning regulation is 
Eco-Action Point model whereby consumers/all citizens are rewarded with redeemable points 
when they select/consume environmentally friendly products. These points can later be used 
to purchase other products. Given the success of this policy in Japan and given that other 
countries do not have such a policy, I conclude that other countries should consider adopting 
the Eco-Action Point model to decrease CO2 emissions.
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Appendix 5.1: Abnormal Return of 424 Environmental Regulations in Japan 
Announcement 
 
Date  AR t-stat 
1 28/11/2002 The 5th International Symposium on Environmental Endocrine Disrupters 0.25% 3.82 
2 10/01/2003 International Symposium on SEA "For the Effective Implementation of Strategic 
Environmental Assessment” 
0.15% 2.85 
3 13/02/2003 Enactment of the Law on Special Measures Concerning Removal of Environmental 
Problems Caused by Specified Industrial Wastes 
0.13% 3.08 
4 3/03/2003 6th International Symposium on Environmental Endocrine Disrupters 0.12% 2.37 
5 31/03/2003 Basic Policy for Nature Restoration 0.37% 7.80 
6 18/04/2003 Current Status of the Law for the Recycling of Specified Kinds of Home Appliances 0.46% 9.94 
7 12/05/2003 Publication of Results to Date of Recycling of Home Appliances by Manufacturers of 
Electric Appliances 
0.30% 6.08 
8 26/05/2003 Publication of Environmental Statistics 2003 0.33% 5.89 
9 7/06/2003 Eleventh Environment Congress for Asia and the Pacific (ECO ASIA 2003) 0.57% 11.12 
10 13/06/2003 Establishing Criteria and Methods for Testing Dredged Soil Containing Dioxins -0.02% -0.38 
11 27/06/2003 Results of Survey on Status of Dioxins in Farmland Soil and Agricultural Crops, FY 
2002 
0.29% 6.13 
12 4/07/2003 2003 Water Quality Survey Results for Primary Bathing Beaches 0.41% 8.78 
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13 31/07/2003 FY 2002 Annual Report of Ozone Layer Monitoring Results -0.15% -2.09 
14 6/08/2003 Implementation Status of Sorted Collection and Recycling by Municipalities based 
on the Law for the Promotion of Sorted Collection and Recycling of Containers and 
Packaging 
-0.44% -11.51 
15 8/08/2003 The Third Japan-U.S. High-Level Consultations on Climate Change -0.14% -3.42 
16 8/08/2003 Enactment of Ministerial Ordinances for Partially Amending the Enforcement 
Regulations of the Law for the Recycling of end of life vehicles 
-0.14% -3.42 
17 8/08/2003 FY 2002 Nationwide Survey on Aquatic Life Forms -0.14% -3.42 
18 18/08/2003 The Current State of Low-emission Vehicle Introduction into the Fleet of 
Government Owned General Vehicles 
0.45% 10.44 
19 22/08/2003 FY 2002 Dissemination Status of Wastewater Treatment Facilities 0.43% 9.23 
20 22/08/2003 Dissemination Status of Johkasoh, On-site Treatment Systems for Domestic 
Wastewater 
0.43% 9.23 
21 22/08/2003 Commencement of the Operation of the Information Network on Environmental 
Technology 
0.43% 9.23 
22 25/08/2003 Asia-Pacific Forum for Environment and Development (APFED)Fourth Substantive 
Meeting 
0.67% 13.81 
23 25/08/2003 Report on the Country Consultation & Stakeholders' Meeting for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer 
0.67% 13.81 
24 25/08/2003 Amendment to the Maximum Permissible Limit for the Quality of Motor Vehicle 
Fuel and for the Quantity of Substances in Motor Vehicle fuel 
0.67% 13.81 
 106 
 
 
25 28/08/2003 Overview of the Progress in the Implementation of the Action Plan for GHG 
Emission Reduction in Government Operations in FY 20 
-0.02% -0.56 
26 28/08/2003 Revision of Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter -0.02% -0.56 
27 05/09/2003 Results of 2003 Antarctica Ozone Hole Observation by ILAS-II -0.16% -4.00 
28 10/09/2003 State of Air Pollution in FY 2002 0.10% 2.73 
29 12/09/2003 International Symposium on Environmental Endocrine Disrupters 2003 -0.15% -3.31 
30 12/09/2003 Designation of Survey Institutions under the Soil Contamination Countermeasures 
Law 
-0.15% -3.31 
31 12/09/2003 Establishment of the Cabinet Ordinance Stipulating the Enforcement Date of the Law 
Partially Revising the Law concerning the Evaluation of Chemical Substances and 
Regulation of Their Manufacture, etc., and the Cabinet Ordinance Partially Revising 
the Enforcement Ordinance of the Law concerning the Evaluation of Chemical 
Substances and Regulation of Their Manufacture, etc. 
-0.15% -3.31 
32 16/09/2003 Signing of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and UNEP concerning 
the Establishment of a Regional Coordinating Unit for the Northwest  Pacific Action 
Plan in Toyama 
-0.34% -3.58 
33 19/09/2003 Ministerial Ordinance Partially Amending the Enforcement Regulation of the Law 
Relating to Protection of the Environment in Antarctica 
0.58% 13.08 
34 25/09/2003 Cabinet Ordinance Partially Amending the Enforcement Ordinance of the Waste 
Management and Public Cleansing Law 
0.16% 1.37 
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35 2/10/2003 Fundamental Policy for Promoting Removal of Environmental Problems Caused by 
Specified Industrial Wastes 
-0.25% -4.49 
36 6/10/2003 Questionnaire Surveys on Environmental Conservation Activities of the Public, 
Children, and Citizens' Groups 
0.42% 8.18 
37 9/10/2003 Waste Treatment Facilities Development Program 0.03% 0.63 
38 24/10/2003 State of PCB Waste in Storage under the PCB Special Measures Law -0.11% -2.13 
39 27/10/2003 Japan-China Joint Crested Ibis Preservation Plan 0.38% 6.52 
40 12/11/2003 Model Projects Conducted in FY 2002 by Local Council for Preventing Global 
Warming 
-0.51% -9.42 
41 14/11/2003 Monitoring Results of Hazardous Air Pollutants by Local Governments in FY2002 0.08% 0.71 
42 14/11/2003 Introducing "The 6th International Symposium on Environmental Endocrine 
Disrupters 2003"(3rd notification) 
0.08% 0.71 
43 27/11/2003 Overview of Ground Subsidence in Japan in FY 2002 -0.15% -3.44 
44 27/11/2003 Monitoring Results of Groundwater Quality in FY 2002 -0.15% -3.44 
45 27/11/2003 Results of the FY 2002 Water Quality Survey of Public Water Areas -0.15% -3.44 
46 27/11/2003 Introducing "The 6th International Symposium on Environmental Endocrine 
Disrupters 2003"(4th notification) 
-0.15% -3.44 
47 28/11/2003 Ministerial Ordinance Partially Amending the Enforcement Regulation of the Waste 
Management and Public Cleansing Law 
-0.37% -7.53 
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48 5/12/2003 Dioxin Emission Inventory -0.02% -0.51 
49 5/12/2003 Enforcement Status of the Law Concerning Special Measures against Dioxins in 
FY2002 
-0.02% -0.51 
50 5/12/2003 The 6th International Symposium on Environmental Endocrine Disrupters -0.02% -0.51 
51 11/12/2003 Cabinet Ordinance Partially Amending the Enforcement Ordinance of the Law 
Concerning Special Measures against Dioxins 
-0.51% -10.61 
52 17/12/2003 FY 2004 Tax Reform Pertinent to the Ministry of the Environment 0.16% 1.35 
53 18/12/2003 FY 2002 Survey on the Enforcement Status of the Offensive Odor Control Law -0.81% -19.52 
54 18/12/2003 FY2002 Survey on the Enforcement Status of the Noise Regulation Law -0.81% -19.52 
55 18/12/2003 FY2002 Survey on the Enforcement Status of the Vibration Regulation Law -0.81% -19.52 
56 24/12/2003 State of the Enforcement of the Water Pollution-related Laws in FY 2002 -0.06% -1.15 
57 27/12/2004 Ministerial Ordinance Partially Amending the Enforcement Regulations of the Law 
Concerning Special Measures against Dioxins 
0.34% 7.89 
58 15/01/2004 Cabinet Ordinance Partially Amending the Enforcement Ordinance of the Waste 
Management and Public Cleansing Law 
-0.13% -3.24 
59 16/01/2004 Inscription Proposal of Shiretoko to World Heritage List Decided 0.14% 3.24 
60 19/01/2004 Overview of Environmental Budget for FY 2004 -0.13% -3.49 
61 17/02/2004 US-Japan Joint Workshop on Climate Policy 0.19% 4.36 
62 01/03/2004 State of Generation and Treatment of Industrial Waste in FY 2001 0.19% 4.36 
63 01/03/2004 State of Generation and Treatment of Municipal Solid Waste in FY 2001 0.19% 4.36 
64 01/03/2004 Bill Partially Amending the Waste Management and Public Cleansing Law 0.74% 6.88 
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65 08/03/2004 Cabinet Decision on a Bill Partially Amending the Law Relating to the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution and Maritime Disasters 
0.74% 6.88 
66 08/03/2004 Cabinet Decision on a Bill to Control the Emission of VOCs 0.20% 3.23 
67 26/03/2004 Enforcement Status of the Law for the Control of Export, Import and Others of  
Specified Hazardous Wastes and Other Wastes 
0.20% 3.23 
68 26/03/2004 Result of the Ninth Inter-Governmental Meeting of Asia-Pacific Network for Global 
Change Research (APN) 
0.40% 7.90 
69 27/03/2004 Result of the Japan-Arab Environment Ministers Seminar 0.40% 7.90 
70 29/03/2004 PRTR Data for FY 2002 Published 0.18% 3.67 
71 30/03/2004 Publication of Environmental Statistics 2004 0.18% 3.67 
72 30/03/2004 Manual for Mercury Analysis 0.43% 8.82 
73 31/03/2004 Evaluation of Environmental Load Reduction through Green Purchasing by the 
Government Institutions 
0.18% 3.63 
74 08/04/2004 Material Flow and Material Flow Indicators in Japan for FY 2001 0.09% 1.64 
75 21/04/2004 Current Status of the Law for the Recycling of Specified Kinds of Home Appliances 
(FY2003) 
-0.04% -0.79 
76 26/04/2004 Outcome of the Earth Observation Summit II -0.03% -0.61 
77 28/04/2004 Survey on Illegal Dumping of Industrial Waste in FY 2003 -0.07% -1.60 
78 13/05/2004 Recommendation by Central Environment Council on a "Vision for a Virtuous Circle 
for Environment and Economy in Japan" 
 
-2.47% -38.64 
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79 17/05/2004 Publication of Data on Recycling of Home Appliances by Electric Appliance 
Manufacturers 
 
-0.60% -15.14 
80 27/05/2004 Asia-Pacific Forum for Environment and Development (APFED) Fifth Substantive 
Meeting 
0.38% 11.02 
81 11/06/2004 Reduce, Reuse and Recycle ("3R") Initiative Adopted in the G8 Summit 0.52% 10.44 
82 14/06/2004 Action Plan for Eradication of Illegal Dumping of Industrial Waste -0.16% -3.27 
83 20/06/2004 The 12th Environment Congress for Asia and the Pacific (ECO ASIA 2004) Held -0.16% -3.27 
84 21/06/2004 Aggregates of Fluorocarbons Destructed in FY 2003 0.12% 2.77 
85 25/06/2004 Comprehensive Report on Acid Deposition Survey 0.26% 5.97 
86 29/06/2004 Publication of Coral Reefs of Japan 0.29% 6.02 
87 1/07/2004 Inscription of "Sacred Sites and Pilgrimage Routes in the Kii Mountain Range" to 
World Heritage List 
0.20% 3.42 
88 2/07/2004 2004 Water Quality Survey Result of Primary Bathing Beaches 0.14% 4.16 
89 16/07/2004 FY 2003 Nationwide Survey on Aquatic Life Forms -1.24% -28.07 
90 27/07/2004 Results of Preliminary Assessment (the 3rd Survey) of Environmental Risks of 
Chemical Substances 
-0.74% -20.82 
91 29/07/2004 FY 2003 Annual Report of Ozone Layer Monitoring Results -0.17% -5.25 
92 6/08/2004 Status on Illegal Dumping of Post-Consumer Use Home Appliances -0.17% -5.25 
93 6/08/2004 Relevant project of The 2005 World Exposition, Aichi, Japan. The International 
Conference on Environment and Transport in AICHI 
0.38% 9.43 
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94 10/08/2004 Ministerial Conference on the 3R Initiative to Be Held in Tokyo in April 2005 -0.20% -6.46 
95 16/08/2004 Amendment to the Enforcement Regulation for the Law Relating to Protection of the 
Environment in Antarctica 
0.10% 3.35 
96 20/08/2004 FY 2003 Dissemination Status of Johkasoh 0.10% 3.35 
97 20/08/2004 FY 2003 Dissemination Status of Wastewater Treatment Facilities -0.03% -0.95 
98 25/08/2004 Implementation Status of Sorted Collection and Recycling by Municipalities based 
on the Law for the Promotion of Sorted Collection and Recycling of Containers and 
Packaging 
-0.31% -6.95 
99 6/09/2004 Result of FY 2002 Marine Environment Monitoring -0.25% -9.07 
100 10/09/2004 FY 2003 Status of Air Pollution -0.25% -9.07 
101 10/09/2004 FY 2003 Monitoring Results of Hazardous Air Pollutants -0.56% -16.69 
102 22/09/2004 Cabinet Decision on Fundamental Policy for Enhancing Motivation on 
Environmental Conservation and Promoting Environmental Education 
0.19% 3.67 
103 24/09/2004 Assessment and Review of the Climate Change Policy Programme Interim Report 0.08% 1.21 
104 27/09/2004 Dioxin Emission Inventory -0.33% -10.50 
105 14/10/2004 Lake Water Study Committee Report -0.15% -4.81 
106 21/10/2004 FY 2003 Edition of Chemical Substance Fact Sheets -0.22% -7.49 
107 22/10/2004 Japanese Environment Minister Yuriko Koike Welcomes Russian State Duma 
Approval on Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
-0.31% -8.34 
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108 26/10/2004 Opening Ceremony of the NOWPAP Regional Coordinating Unit Toyama Office and 
the Symposium Commemorating the 10th Anniversary of the NOWPAP 
-0.06% -1.39 
109 27/10/2004 Partial Amendment of the Enforcement Regulation of the Waste Management and 
Public Cleansing Law and the Ministerial Ordinance Stipulating Technical Standards 
for Final Landfill Site for Municipal Solid Waste and Industrial Waste 
-0.06% -1.39 
110 27/10/2004 Japanese Environment Minister Yuriko Koike welcomes again Russian Federation 
Council Approval on Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
0.06% 1.11 
111 29/10/2004 Release of Nationwide Car Traffic Noise Map -0.38% -9.48 
112 2/11/2004 Overview of the Progress in the Implementation of the Action Plan for GHG 
Emission Reduction in Government Operations in FY 2003 
-0.38% -9.48 
113 2/11/2004 Setting up of a Task Force for the Ministerial Conference on the 3R Initiative and the 
Launch of the 3R Conference Website 
-0.15% -3.90 
114 5/11/2004 Towards the Entry into Force of the Kyoto Protocol 0.20% 5.44 
115 8/11/2004 2004 Low Emission Vehicle Guidebook Published 0.10% 2.93 
116 10/11/2004 Ozone Depleting Substances Recovery and Disposal Workshop in Asia and the 
Pacific Region Held 
-0.33% -8.88 
117 12/11/2004 FY 2003 Survey Results of Water Pollution by Agricultural Chemicals Used at Golf 
Courses 
2.31% 0.96 
118 16/11/2004 International Symposium on the Kyoto Protocol to be Held on November 27, 2004 in 
Kyoto 
-0.19% -5.09 
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119 19/11/2004 State of Fluorocarbons Recovery from Commercial Freezer/Air Conditioner in FY 
2003 Complying with Fluorocarbons Recovery and Destruction Law 
-0.26% -6.02 
120 29/11/2004 Central Environment Council Review Report on the Progress of the Basic 
Environment Plan 
-0.26% -6.02 
121 29/11/2004 Cabinet Ordinance Partially Amending the Enforcement Ordinance of the Law 
concerning the Protection of the Ozone Layer through the Control of Specified 
Substances and Other Measures 
-0.32% -9.67 
122 3/12/2004 Sixth Substantive Meeting of Asia-Pacific Forum for Environment and Development 0.29% 8.35 
123 6/12/2004 The Sixth Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting among Korea, China and Japan 0.12% 2.54 
124 9/12/2004 Workshop on Prevention of Illegal Transboundary Movement of Wastes -0.12% -2.67 
125 15/12/2004 FY 2005 Tax Reform Pertinent to the Ministry of the Environment -0.12% -2.67 
126 15/12/2004 Commemorative Event to Mark the Entry into Force of the Kyoto Protocol to Be Held 
on 16 February 2005 in Kyoto 
-0.18% -4.52 
127 16/12/2004 Overview of Ground Subsidence in Japan in FY 2003 -0.18% -4.52 
128 16/12/2004 Monitoring Results of Groundwater Quality in FY 2003 -0.18% -4.52 
129 16/12/2004 Results of the FY 2003 Water Quality Survey of Public Water Areas -0.23% -6.51 
130 17/12/2004 Star Watching Network - Implementation of Winter Star Watching and Result of 
Summer Star Watching For FY 2004 
0.24% 6.51 
131 20/12/2004 7th International Symposium on Environmental Endocrine Disruptors -0.08% -2.34 
132 21/12/2004 FY 2003 Survey on the Enforcement Status of the Noise Regulation Law -0.08% -2.34 
133 21/12/2004 FY 2003 Survey on the Enforcement Status of the Offensive Odor Control Law -0.08% -2.34 
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134 21/12/2004 FY 2003 Survey on the Enforcement Status of the Vibration Regulation Law -0.43% -11.55 
135 24/12/2004 State of Fluorocarbons Recovery from Automotive Air-Conditioners in FY 2003 0.09% 2.11 
136 19/01/2005 Overview of Expenditure for Environmental Conservation in FY 2005 Budget 0.22% 6.15 
137 21/01/2005 State of Discharge and Treatment of Municipal Solid Waste in FY 2002 0.07% 2.09 
138 21/01/2005 State of Discharge and Treatment of Industrial Waste in FY 2002 0.07% 2.09 
139 21/01/2005 State of PCB Waste in Storage under the PCB Special Measures Law 0.07% 2.09 
140 25/01/2005 Commemorative Event to Mark the Entry into Force of the Kyoto Protocol 0.18% 5.46 
141 3/02/2005 Web Page on Invasive Alien Species Act 0.32% 8.99 
142 4/02/2005 Status of Illegal Dumping of Post-Consumer Use Home Appliances and Personal 
Computers during April to Sept-04 
0.03% 0.75 
143 4/02/2005 Status of Recycling Post-Consumer Use Personal Computers in Municipalities 0.03% 0.75 
144 9/02/2005 Commemorative Event to Mark the Entry into Force of the Kyoto Protocol Detailed 
Program Announcement 
-0.01% -0.41 
145 14/02/2005 The 1st International Workshop of the Water Environmental Partnership in Asia 
(WEPA) Held 
-0.04% -1.01 
146 15/02/2005 Environmental Accounting Guidelines 2005 -0.11% -3.24 
147 24/02/2005 Ministerial Ordinance Partially Amending the Enforcement Regulation of the Hot 
Springs Law 
0.12% 4.16 
148 7/03/2005 Bill Partially Amending the Waste Management and Public Cleansing Law -0.08% -1.98 
149 7/03/2005 Cabinet Decision on a Bill for Nonroad Special Motor Vehicles Exhaust Regulation -0.08% -1.98 
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150 7/03/2005 Bill Partially Amending the Law concerning Special Measures for the Conservation 
of Lake Water Quality 
-0.08% -1.98 
151 10/03/2005 Status of Photochemical Oxidant Warnings and Reported Damages in 2004 0.19% 6.47 
152 14/03/2005 Perspectives on Endocrine Disrupting Effects of Substances- Extend 2005 0.54% 14.24 
153 18/03/2005 Enforcement Status of the Water Pollution-related Laws in FY 2003 -0.05% -1.42 
154 28/03/2005 Partial Amendment to the Cabinet Order of the Chemical Substances Control Law -0.01% -0.37 
155 29/03/2005 Status of Motor Vehicle Traffic Noise in FY 2003 0.12% 3.37 
156 30/03/2005 Framing of the Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessment for "New 
Mutsu-Ogawara Development Basic Plan." 
-0.75% -19.78 
157 30/03/2005 Amendment of the Basic Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessment -0.75% -19.78 
158 30/03/2005 Publication of Environmental Statistics 2005 -0.75% -19.78 
159 31/03/2005 2004 Enforcement Status of the Law for the Control of Export, Import and Others of 
Specified Hazardous Wastes and Other Wastes 
0.19% 5.72 
160 31/03/2005 Effects of Green Purchasing by Government Institutions 0.19% 5.72 
161 18/04/2005 The Tenth Inter-Governmental Meeting of Asia-Pacific Network for Global Change 
Research 
-0.48% -9.48 
162 26/04/2005 Status of Low-Emission Vehicle Introduction into the Fleet of Government-Owned 
General Vehicles 
0.17% 5.02 
163 27/04/2005 Announcing a Nickname for a New Style Business Wears for Summer and 
Environmental Events Held at EXPO 2005 
0.00% 0.11 
164 27/04/2005 Cabinet Decision on the Kyoto Protocol Target Achievement Plan 0.00% 0.11 
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165 28/04/2005 Launching of National Campaign to Fight Global Warming "Team Minus 6%" -0.08% -2.27 
166 28/04/2005 Japan's Action Plan for a World-Wide Sound Material-Cycle Society through the 3R 
Initiative 
-0.08% -2.27 
167 30/04/2005 Outcome of the Ministerial Conference on the 3R Initiative 0.24% 5.93 
168 25/05/2005 Amendments on Enforcement Regulation for Invasive Alien Species Act -0.45% -13.43 
169 26/05/2005 Amendment of Basic Policy for Comprehensive and Systematic Promotion of 
Measures on Waste Reduction and Proper Waste Disposal 
-0.42% -12.16 
170 26/05/2005 Greenhouse Gas Emissions in FY 2003 -0.42% -12.16 
171 27/05/2005 Publication of Data on Recycling of Home Appliances by Electric Appliance 
Manufacturers 
-0.23% -6.14 
172 29/05/2005 Status of Low Emission Vehicle Introduced as Governmental Vehicles -0.04% -1.04 
173 31/05/2005 Enforcement of Invasive Alien Species Act 0.56% 15.22 
174 31/05/2005 IUCN Evaluation of Nomination of Shiretoko to the World Heritage List 0.56% 15.22 
175 1/06/2005 Signing of the Statement of Intent on Cooperation between Japan and Romania on the 
Kyoto Mechanisms  
0.09% 2.54 
176 1/06/2005 Japan starts a program to facilitate gathering safety information of chemicals 0.09% 2.54 
177 5/06/2005 The 13th Environment Congress for Asia and the Pacific (ECO ASIA 2005) Held 0.36% 10.15 
178 6/06/2005 Contents of New Emission Regulation of Volatile Organic Compounds 0.36% 10.15 
179 6/06/2005 Relevant project of The 2005 World Exposition, Aichi, Japan. The International 
Conference on Environment and Transport in AICHI 
 
0.36% 10.15 
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180 10/06/2005 Opening of the Website on the Asian Network for Prevention of Illegal 
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes 
-0.02% -0.53 
181 15/06/2005 Status of Improper Disposal of Sulfate Pitch -0.02% -0.51 
182 20/06/2005 Plan to Reduce Dioxins Levels Resulting from Business Activities Modified 0.30% 7.24 
183 24/06/2005 National Implementation Plan for the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants 
0.11% 2.86 
184 28/06/2005 Partial Amendment to the Permissible Limits of Motor Vehicle Exhaust Emissions 0.06% 1.83 
185 28/06/2005 Aggregates of Fluorocarbons Destructed in FY 2004 0.06% 1.83 
186 1/07/2005 2005 Water Quality Survey Result of Primary Bathing Beaches -0.10% -3.36 
187 11/07/2005 Breeding Results of Japanese Crested Ibis for 2005 -0.08% -2.63 
188 14/07/2005 Inscription of Shiretoko on the World Heritage List Finalized -0.09% -3.17 
189 15/07/2005 Results of FY 2004 Comprehensive Survey on Water Pollutant Discharge -0.03% -1.04 
190 25/07/2005 Red Data Book on Land and Freshwater Mollusks Revised 0.29% 8.30 
191 25/07/2005 Star Watching Network - Implementation of 2005 Summer Star Watching and Result 
of 2004 Winter Star Watching 
0.29% 8.30 
192 28/07/2005 Osaka Eco Town Program Approved -0.09% -2.81 
193 28/07/2005 Japan Participates in the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate -0.09% -2.81 
194 29/07/2005 FY 2004 Annual Report of Ozone Layer Monitoring -0.12% -3.66 
195 4/08/2005 FY 2003 Annual Report of Environmental Health Surveillance for Air Pollution -0.48% -14.30 
196 4/08/2005 Launching of Verification Project for Production and Use of Sugarcane Derived 
Biomass Ethanol 
-0.48% -14.30 
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197 8/08/2005 The International Conference on Environment and Transport in AICHI held -0.45% -12.87 
198 9/08/2005 Results of the Fourth Initial Environmental Risk Assessment of Chemicals 0.62% 17.19 
199 9/08/2005 Cabinet Ordinance Partially Amending the Enforcement Ordinance of the Law 
Concerning Special Measures against Dioxins 
0.62% 17.19 
200 11/08/2005 Dioxin Concentration of Exhaust Gas emitted from Waste Incinerators -0.28% -7.30 
201 22/08/2005 FY 2004 Dissemination Status of Wastewater Treatment Facilities -0.35% -10.25 
202 22/08/2005 FY 2004 Dissemination Status of Johkasoh, On-Site Treatment System of Domestic 
Effluent 
-0.35% -10.25 
203 22/08/2005 The First Expert Meeting on Design of Regional Network, Prevention and Control of 
Dust and Sandstorms in Northeast Asia Held 
-0.35% -10.25 
204 26/08/2005 Logo Mark for "WARM BIZ" and Information on "COOL BIZ Collection 2006" -0.15% -5.50 
205 29/08/2005 Publication of Case Report on Activities for Release Reduction of Chemical 
Substances Subjected to the PRTR 
0.30% 9.65 
206 29/08/2005 FY 2004 Edition of Chemical Substance Fact Sheets 0.30% 9.65 
207 29/08/2005 FY 2004 Status of Air Pollution 0.30% 9.65 
208 29/08/2005 Ministry of the Environment Launches E-mail News Service 0.30% 9.65 
209 7/09/2005 Promotion of Recycling Discarded FRP Boats and Fire Extinguishers -0.21% -7.00 
210 15/09/2005 Implementation Status of Sorted Collection and Recycling by Municipalities 2.16% 0.98 
211 15/09/2005 The 5th Tripartite Roundtable Meeting on Environmental Industry Held 2.16% 0.98 
212 16/09/2005 Yokkaichi Eco Town Program Approved 0.06% 1.71 
213 16/09/2005 The 15th Asia-Pacific Seminar on Climate Change Held 0.06% 1.71 
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214 27/09/2005 Establishment of the Regional Environment Offices 0.09% 0.41 
215 27/09/2005 Enforcement Status of the Water Pollution-related Laws in FY 2004 0.09% 0.41 
216 29/09/2005 Future Vision for the Regional Environment Offices -1.14% -18.20 
217 30/09/2005 FY 2004 Monitoring Results of Hazardous Air Pollutants 0.42% 9.29 
218 20/10/2005 Technology Development of Energy Saving Lighting Apparatus Using White LED 0.07% 2.04 
219 24/10/2005 The Seventh Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting among Korea, China and 
Japan 
0.28% 6.74 
220 27/10/2005 Recycling of Specified Kinds of Home Appliances at Municipalities -0.19% -4.38 
221 27/10/2005 Status of Illegal Dumping of Post-Consumer Use Home Appliances and Personal 
Computers during April to Sept 
-0.19% -4.38 
222 28/10/2005 Result of "Cool Biz" Campaign 0.37% 10.48 
223 4/11/2005 State of Discharge and Treatment of Municipal Solid Waste in FY 2003 -0.13% -2.77 
224 8/11/2005 Designation of New Ramsar Sites under the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands 0.17% 4.09 
225 8/11/2005 Survey on Illegal Dumping of Industrial Waste in FY 2004 0.17% 4.09 
226 8/11/2005 State of Discharge and Treatment of Industrial Waste in FY 2003 0.17% 4.09 
227 11/11/2005 FY 2004 Survey Results of Water Pollution by Agricultural Chemicals Used at Golf 
Courses 
0.26% 4.70 
228 24/11/2005 The First Plenary Meeting of the Asia-Pacific Forum for Environment and 
Development in the Second Phase (APFED II) Held 
-0.02% -0.51 
229 25/11/2005 Dioxin Emission Inventory 2004 
 
-0.37% -8.78 
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230 25/11/2005 FY2004 Enforcement Status of the Law Concerning Special Measures against 
Dioxins 
-0.37% -8.78 
231 28/11/2005 Asia-Pacific Regional Inception Workshop on the Environmentally Sound 
Management of Electronic and Electrical Wastes and the Second Workshop of the 
Asian Network for Prevention of Illegal Transboundary Movement of Hazardous 
Wastes Held 
0.03% 0.70 
232 29/11/2005 FY 2004 Survey on the Enforcement Status of the Noise Regulation Law 0.20% 5.49 
233 29/11/2005 FY 2004 Survey on the Enforcement Status of the Vibration Regulation Law 0.20% 5.49 
234 29/11/2005 FY 2004 Survey on the Enforcement Status of the Offensive Odor Control Law 0.20% 5.49 
235 5/12/2005 Results of a Questionnaire Survey on Environmental Tax 0.51% 10.20 
236 9/12/2005 Minister Koike presents Japan’s Effort to Achieve the Kyoto Target -0.03% -0.53 
237 12/12/2005 Star Watching Network - Implementation of Winter Star Watching and Result of 
Summer Star Watching For FY 2005 
0.14% 2.65 
238 13/12/2005 DVD "Eco-driving: Money Saving Tips for Household Managers" -0.02% -0.54 
239 15/12/2005 FY 2006 Tax Reform Pertinent to the Ministry of the Environment 0.50% 12.35 
240 16/12/2005 State of Fluorocarbons Recovery from Commercial Freezer/Air Conditioner in FY 
2004 
0.02% 0.43 
241 20/12/2005 FY 2004 Survey on the Enforcement Status of the Air Pollution Control Law -0.16% -3.42 
242 20/12/2005 Overview of Ground Subsidence in Japan in FY 2004 -0.16% -3.42 
243 20/12/2005 Results of the FY 2004 Water Quality Survey of Public Water Areas -0.16% -3.42 
244 20/12/2005 Monitoring Results of Groundwater Quality in FY 2004 -0.16% -3.42 
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245 20/12/2005 Signing of the Memorandum on Cooperation between Japan and the Republic of 
Bulgaria on the Kyoto Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol 
-0.16% -3.42 
246 18/01/2006 Japan's Response to the OECD Environmental Performance Review of Japan 
Released 
-3.46% -44.23 
247 20/01/2006 Ehime Eco Town Program Approved -0.52% -10.92 
248 20/01/2006 Cabinet Decision on a Bill on Asbestos Health Damage Relief -0.52% -10.92 
249 23/01/2006 State of PCB Waste in Storage under the PCB Special Measures Law -1.51% -27.74 
250 25/01/2006 APFED New International Environment Award (APFED Awards for Good Practices) 
Launched. 
0.56% 13.26 
251 31/01/2006 Ordinance of MOE Stipulating Amended Effluent Standard to Be Enforced -0.26% -6.70 
252 31/01/2006 Status of Issuance of Photochemical Oxidant Warnings and Reporting of Damages in 
2005 
-0.26% -6.70 
253 31/01/2006 Draft Budget for the FY2006 Kyoto Protocol Target Achievement Plan -0.26% -6.70 
254 9/02/2006 Cabinet Decision on the Bill Partially Amending the Climate Change Policy Law -0.45% -12.06 
255 10/02/2006 Efforts by Aerosol Manufacturers and Municipalities for the Promotion of Proper 
Treatment and Recycling of Waste Aerosol Products 
-0.35% -10.29 
256 15/02/2006 Status of Improper Disposal of Sulfate Pitch in the First Half of FY 2005 0.33% 8.06 
257 9/03/2006 Cabinet Decision on a Bill Partially Amending the Law for the Promotion of Sorted 
Collection and Recycling of Containers and Packaging 
-0.28% -6.70 
258 17/03/2006 Measures to Cope with By-product Hex chlorobenzene under the Chemical 
Substances Control Law 
-0.33% -9.48 
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259 20/03/2006 An Aggregate Amount of Fluorocarbons Recovered from Motor Vehicle Air- 
Conditioners in FY 2004 
-0.19% -4.97 
260 31/03/2006 Effects of Green Procurement by Government Institutions in FY 2004 0.12% 2.87 
261 9/01/2007 Opinions of the Minister of the Environment on the Environmental Impact Statement 
for the Tokyo Gaikan Expressway 
-0.25% -7.66 
262 22/01/2007 Overview of the Environmental Conservation Expenditure in the FY2007 Budget 0.24% 5.02 
263 1/02/2007 Results of Public Comments Received Regarding the Draft Summary of Revised 
Designated Procurement Items and Evaluation Criteria under the Law on Promoting 
Green Purchasing 
-0.15% -4.41 
264 1/02/2007 Partial Revision to the Basic Policy for the Promotion of Procurement of 
Eco-Friendly Goods and Services 
-0.15% -4.41 
265 1/03/2007 Invitation for Public Comments regarding the Draft Guidelines for the Introduction of 
Strategic Environmental Assessment 
0.24% 8.16 
266 2/03/2007 Opinions of the Minister of the Environment on the Environmental Impact Statement 
concerning the Draft New Basic Plan for the Development of Mutsu-Ogawara Area 
0.39% 14.03 
267 14/03/2007 Opinions of the Minister of the Environment on the Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement for the Replacement of the Sendai Thermal Power Station 
0.24% 8.84 
268 19/03/2007 Approval of the Regional Environmental Pollution Control Programs of Four Areas -0.74% -20.82 
269 20/03/2007 Winners of the 2007 White Paper on the Environment Cover Page Illustration Contest -0.06% -2.07 
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270 23/03/2007 Opinions of the Minister of the Environment on the Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement for the Replacement of No.1 Unit in the Sakaide Thermal Power Station 
-0.35% -12.22 
271 2/04/2007 Results of a Questionnaire Survey on Green Purchasing in Local Governments 0.12% 3.76 
272 2/04/2007 Green Purchasing Achieved by the State and Other Entities and Its Environmental 
Load Reduction Effect 
0.12% 3.76 
273 5/04/2007 Public Comments Invited Regarding Draft Interim Report on Environmental 
Reporting Guidelines (Fiscal Year 2007 Version) 
0.39% 13.25 
274 13/04/2007 Publication of Environmental Statistics 2007 0.10% 3.63 
275 19/04/2007 Opinions of the Minister of the Environment on the Environmental Impact Statement 
for the Construction of the Shitara Dam 
0.24% 7.25 
276 18/06/2007 Proposals Invited regarding Designated Procurement Items under the Law on 
Promoting Green Purchasing (Procurement Items and Services) 
0.34% 3.53 
277 18/06/2007 Proposals Invited regarding Designated Procurement Items under the Law on 
Promoting Green Purchasing (Public-works) 
0.34% 3.53 
278 18/06/2007 Publication of Candidates for Designated Procurement Items of Public-works under 
the Law on Promoting Green Purchasing 
0.34% 3.53 
279 21/06/2007 Eco-Volunteer Fair to be Held on July 7 in Shibuya 0.00% -0.14 
280 28/06/2007 Formulation of Environmental Reporting Guidelines FY2007 Version 0.31% 10.78 
281 31/07/2007 Mobile Version of "Eco-family Web Site" Fully Renewed 0.49% 13.46 
282 6/08/2007 Invitation of Proposals for Community Invigoration in View of a Sound 
Material-Cycle, Harmonious Coexistence, and Participation 
-0.15% -4.32 
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283 6/08/2007 Invitation for FY2007 Environmental Conservation Projects utilizing Community 
Fund 
-0.15% -4.32 
284 10/08/2007 Basic Policy for Coordinating the Budget Estimation Policies for FY2008 
Environmental Conservation Expenses 
0.03% 0.71 
285 20/08/2007 2008 White Paper on the Environment and the Sound Material-Cycle Society Cover 
Page Illustration Contest to be Held 
-0.81% -17.89 
286 3/09/2007 Results of Questionnaire Survey on Eco-Labeling 0.41% 11.49 
287 3/09/2007 Public Comments Invited regarding the Draft Guidelines for Eco-labeling 0.41% 11.49 
288 12/09/2007 Opinions of the Minister of the Environment on the Environmental Impact Statement 
for the Ohkawa-Saga Road 
-0.43% -10.09 
289 19/09/2007 Opinions of the Minister of the Environment on the Environmental Impact Statement 
for the Ken-O Expressway 
-0.83% -19.02 
290 5/10/2007 Twelve Areas Instructed to Formulate Regional Environmental Pollution Control 
Programs 
0.38% 9.62 
291 12/10/2007 Public Comments Invited regarding the Draft Cabinet Orders of the Law concerning 
the Promotion of Contracts considering Reduction of GHGs Emissions by the State 
and Other Entities 
0.13% 3.67 
292 12/10/2007 Budget Request for FY 2008 Environmental Conservation Expenditure 0.13% 3.67 
293 15/10/2007 The Wagaya-no-Eco-Sengen (The Eco Declaration of My Family) Invited 0.15% 2.43 
294 22/10/2007 Symposium on the Pilot Project of the Environmental Technology Verification to Be 
Held 
0.07% 1.50 
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295 25/10/2007 Public Comments Invited on the Draft Basic Policy on the Promotion of Contracts 
Considering Reduction of GHGs Emissions by the State and Other Entities 
-0.05% -1.11 
296 15/11/2007 Cabinet Orders for the Law on Promotion of Contracts to consider Reduction of GHG 
Emissions by the State and Other Entities 
-0.02% -0.37 
297 15/11/2007 Achievements of Green Purchasing by the State and Other Entities in FY2006  -0.02% -0.37 
298 22/11/2007 Public Comments Invited regarding the Draft Outlines of the Revision of Designated 
Procurement Items and Evaluation Criteria of the Law concerning the Promotion of 
Procurement of Eco-Friendly Goods and Services by the State and Other Entities 
-0.01% -0.33 
299 30/11/2007 Outline of the Eco-business Contest; Discovering and Growing Seeds for 
Eco-business. Winners announced Eco Japan Cup 2007 
0.25% 6.70 
300 6/12/2007 Cabinet Decision on the Basic Policy for the Law concerning the Promotion of 
Contracts Considering Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions by the State and 
Other Entities 
-0.27% -7.38 
301 12/12/2007 Exhibition, Ceremony and Reception held for Prize-winning Works from 
Eco-Products 2007 
0.53% 15.96 
302 14/12/2007 FY 2008 Tax Reform Pertinent to the Ministry of the Environment -0.12% -3.39 
303 27/12/2007 Prediction of Pollen Diffusion for the Coming Spring 0.44% 7.18 
304 15/01/2008 E-Learning Version of "Pesticides/Insecticides and Chemicals"; the Forth Booklet for 
Understanding the Chemicals Surrounding Us 
-2.04% -37.09 
305 17/01/2008 Eco-internship Symposium to be held on February 13th 2008 0.07% 1.17 
 126 
 
306 21/01/2008 Opinions of the Minister of the Environment on the Environmental Impact Statement 
for the Construction of the Yamatosaka Dam 
0.35% 7.11 
307 24/01/2008 The Ministry of the Environment has arranged expenditures for environmental 
conservation in fiscal year 2008 
0.65% 13.74 
308 4/02/2008 Results of Public Comments Received Regarding the Draft Summary of Revised 
Designated Procurement Items and Evaluation Criteria under the Law on Promoting 
Green Purchasing 
0.14% 3.13 
309 4/02/2008 Partial Revision to the Basic Policy for the Promotion of Procurement of 
Eco-Friendly Goods and Services 
0.14% 3.13 
310 7/03/2008 Public Comment invited regarding the Draft Cabinet Order partially amending the 
Enforcement Ordinance of the Environmental Impact Assessment Law 
0.23% 6.01 
311 24/03/2008 Winner announced for the 2008 Environment and Recycling Society White Paper 
Cover Picture 
0.40% 7.57 
312 14/04/2008 2008 Statistic of the Environment 0.62% 14.68 
313 15/05/2008 Public Comments Invited Regarding the Draft Outlines of the Investigation of the 
Designated Procurement Item for Falsified-recycling Paper Issue 
0.39% 7.66 
314 16/05/2008 Symposium on the Basic Environment Plan to Be Held -0.10% -2.27 
315 12/06/2008 Guidelines for Sustainable Urban Renewal: Mini-Assessment for Urban Renewal 
Project 
0.69% 17.33 
316 12/06/2008 Publicizing Candidates for Designated Procurement of Public-Works Projects Items 
Associated with the Promoting Green Purchasing Law 
0.69% 17.33 
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317 12/06/2008 Collecting Proposals for the Designated Procurement of Items Applying to the 
Promoting Green Purchasing Law (Public-Works Projects) 
0.69% 17.33 
318 12/06/2008 Collecting Proposals for the Designated Procurement of Items Applying to the 
Promoting Green Purchasing Law (Goods and Services) 
0.69% 17.33 
319 20/06/2008 Result of the Medical Data Examination for Acknowledgment of Designated 
Diseases under the Act on Asbestos Health Damage Relief 
0.11% 2.80 
320 23/06/2008 Green Purchasing in Local Governments Questionnaire Results 0.07% 1.66 
321 27/06/2008 The Ministry of the Environment's Opinions on the Follow-up Report of the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Review of the Isahaya Bay Reclamation Project 
-0.15% -4.15 
322 27/06/2008 The Minister of the Environment's Opinions on the Environmental Impact Statement 
for the Urban Planning Road, Itakohokota-line 
-0.15% -4.15 
323 8/08/2008 Basic policy on the estimated budget for environmental preservation matters in fiscal 
year 2009 
-0.18% -4.16 
324 19/08/2008 2009 White Paper on the Environment and the Sound Material-Cycle Society Cover 
Page Illustration Contest to be Held 
0.12% 2.90 
325 25/08/2008 Interim Assessment of the Japan HPV Challenge Program Released 0.19% 3.30 
326 29/08/2008 The Minister of the Environment's opinions on the Environmental Impact Statement 
for the Honjo Road 
-0.31% -6.33 
327 9/10/2008 Kick-off event for the Nationwide Eco-Action Points model projects to be held 0.55% 5.62 
328 14/10/2008 The Nationwide Eco-Action Points model project managed by JCB Co., Ltd to begin 2.78% 16.61 
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329 30/10/2008 Opinions of the Minister of the Environment on the Environmental Impact Statement 
on the Kobe International Port City Construction Planning Road on the Seishin-line 
of the Osaka Wangan-line 
-1.24% -16.06 
330 30/10/2008 On the amount of the requesting budget to go towards environmental preservation 
matters in FY 2009 
-1.24% -16.06 
331 31/10/2008 Demonstration of Eco-Action Point model project services by the Minister of the 
Environment to be held 
2.79% 36.88 
332 4/11/2008 T CARD & MARKETING Co., Ltd-managed Nationwide Eco-Action Points Model 
Project to begin 
-0.19% -2.35 
333 7/11/2008 The Minister of the Environment's Opinions on the Environmental Impact Statement 
of the Douou-ken Connection Road between Naganuma Town and Ebetsu City (a 
Regional High-Standard Road) 
0.51% 8.12 
334 7/11/2008 Announcement of the results of the 8th Tripartite Round-table Meeting on 
Environmental Industry between China, Korea and Japan 
0.51% 8.12 
335 7/11/2008 Announcement of the results of the 8th Tripartite Round-table Meeting on 
Environmental Industry between China, Korea and Japan 
0.51% 8.12 
336 21/11/2008 Publication of the "Kodomo Kankyo Hakusho 2009"November 21, 2008 -0.31% -4.74 
337 2/12/2008 Results of the Medical Data Examination for the Acknowledgment of Designated 
Diseases under the Act on Asbestos Health Damage Relief 
0.59% 8.68 
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338 8/12/2008 Public Comments Invited Regarding the Draft Outlines of the Revisions of the 
Designated Procurement Items and the Evaluation Criteria of the Law Concerning the 
Promotion of Procurement of Eco-Friendly Goods and Services by the State and 
Other Entities 
-0.27% -4.15 
339 19/12/2008 Public Comments Invited Regarding the Draft of the Revision of the "Basic Policy for 
the Promotion of Contracts Considering Reduction of Greenhouse Gases and others 
Emissions by the State and Other Entities" 
-0.30% -4.95 
340 22/12/2008 Results of the Medical Data Examination for the Acknowledgment of Designated 
Diseases under the Act on Asbestos Health Damage Relief 
-0.48% -6.72 
341 30/01/2009 Brief announcement on the amount of the budget to go towards environmental 
preservation matters in FY 2009 
0.63% 10.72 
342 12/02/2009 Revision to the Basic Policy for the Promotion of Procurement of Eco-Friendly 
Goods and Services 
0.18% 3.28 
343 12/02/2009 Results of the Public Comments Received Regarding the Draft Summary of the 
Revised Designated Procurement Items and Evaluation Criteria under the Law on 
Promoting Green Purchasing 
0.18% 3.28 
344 19/02/2009 Environmental Communication Awards Ceremony and Environmental 
Communication Symposium to be held 
-0.36% -6.32 
345 26/02/2009 The Selection of the Winners of the 12th Environmental Communication Awards 0.49% 8.10 
346 10/03/2009 Open call for participants in the "Construction promotion project on the model 
maintenance of symbiotic housing in the 21
st
 century" 
-0.28% -4.96 
 130 
 
347 19/03/2009 Report on enforcement status of Law Concerning the Promotion of Business 
Activities with Environmental Consideration 
0.15% 2.46 
348 30/03/2009 Formulation of "Environmental Information Strategy" and the Results of Public 
Comments Regarding the Strategy 
1.26% 20.98 
349 17/04/2009 Submissions of the Minister of the Environment on the Environmental Impact 
Statement for the Power Generation Facility Unit No.3 at Higashi Power Station in 
Tokuyama Factory 
-0.27% -4.37 
350 20/04/2009 Publication of Environmental Statistics 2009 0.77% 4.66 
351 26/05/2009 The Minister of the Environment's Opinions on the Draft of the Environmental 
Impact Statement for the Onahama Thermal Power Station 
0.86% 8.95 
352 27/05/2009 Cabinet Decision on the "White Paper on the Environment, the Sound Material-Cycle 
Society, and Biodiversity in FY 2009" 
0.04% 0.80 
353 1/06/2009 Invitation for 2009 Submissions regarding Model Projects for Promotion of 
Sustainable Urban Renewal 
0.55% 9.18 
354 9/06/2009 GEIC "Eco-Volunteer Day" 0.37% 7.24 
355 12/06/2009 Announcement of Items under Consideration as Designated Procurement Items for 
Public-works Projects associated with the Law on Promoting Green Purchasing 
0.20% 4.20 
356 12/06/2009 Submission of Proposals for Designated Procurement Items pursuant to the law on 
Promoting Green Purchasing (for public-works projects) 
0.20% 4.20 
357 12/06/2009 Submission of Proposals for Designated Procurement Items pursuant to the law on 
Promoting Green Purchasing (for procurement items and services) 
0.20% 4.20 
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358 29/06/2009 On the results of the questionnaire concerning "Green Purchasing" in local 
government 
0.59% 11.09 
359 16/07/2009 Invitation for Second Submissions of 2009 Model Projects for the Promotion of 
Sustainable Urban Renewal 
0.19% 4.38 
360 30/07/2009 Report of the Study Group on the Environmental Impact Assessment System 
Released 
-0.32% -7.49 
361 7/08/2009 Basic Policy Related to the Estimated Expenses for Environmental Conservation in 
FY 2010 
-0.18% -4.75 
362 4/09/2009 Japan Sweden Environmental Seminar to be Held on Local Level Cooperation for 
Sustainable Cities 
-0.53% -3.50 
363 8/09/2009 Results of the Medical Data Examination for Acknowledgment of Designated 
Diseases under the Act on Asbestos Health Damage Relief 
-0.22% -0.95 
364 28/09/2009 MOE's Opinions on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement regarding the plan to 
increase No.3 advanced pressurized water reactor in Sendai Nuclear Power Plant. 
-0.67% -1.69 
365 30/10/2009 Publication of the "Annual Report on the Environment for Children 2010" 0.04% 0.70 
366 24/11/2009 MOE Invites Entries to the 13th Environmental Communication Awards  -0.73% -1.53 
367 27/11/2009 Budget Request Amount for FY 2010 Environmental Conservation Expenditures -0.88% -1.17 
368 30/11/2009 Formulation of Eco-Action 21 Guidelines FY 2009  
 
0.54% 0.86 
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369 4/12/2009 MOE's Opinions on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement regarding the 
replacement of facility in No.2 Himeji Power Plant 
-0.33% -1.77 
370 4/12/2009 Public Comments Invited Regarding the Draft Outlines of the revision of the 
designated procurement items and evaluation criteria of the Law concerning the 
Promotion of Procurement of Eco-Friendly Goods and Services by the State and 
Other Entities 
-0.33% -1.77 
371 10/12/2009 The Nationwide Eco-Action Points model project managed by Econos Co., Ltd to 
begin December 10, 2009 
-0.54% -1.02 
372 18/12/2009 Public Comments Invited regarding the draft of the revision of 'Basic Policy for the 
Promotion of Contracts considering Reduction of Emissions of Greenhouse Gases 
and others by the State and Other Entities' 
-0.18% -0.64 
373 22/12/2009 FY 2010 Tax Reform Policy Principle Pertinent to the MOE -0.10% -0.68 
374 25/12/2009 Survey Results of Environmentally Friendly Corporate Behaviors -0.24% -0.72 
375 5/02/2010 Brief announcement on the amount of the budget to go towards environmental 
preservation matters in FY 2010 
-0.92% -1.00 
376 5/02/2010 Revision of the Basic Policy concerning the Promotion of Contracts Considering 
Reduction of Emissions of Greenhouse Gases and others by the state and Other 
Entities 
-0.92% -1.00 
377 5/02/2010 Revision of the Basic Policy for the Promotion of Procurement of Eco-Friendly 
Goods and Services 
 
-0.92% -1.00 
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378 9/02/2010 Environmental Communication Awards Ceremony and Environmental 
Communication Symposium to be held 
-0.59% -2.07 
379 22/02/2010 Result of the Public Comments regarding the Draft Report of the Environmental 
Impact Assessment System discussed in the MOE's Committee and the Central 
Environment Council Report 
0.40% 0.77 
380 19/03/2010 Winners of the Cover Page Illustration Contest of the Annual Report on the 
Environment, the Sound Material-Cycle Society and the Biodiversity 2010 (210 
White Paper) 
0.17% 1.85 
381 9/04/2010 Publication of the Environmental Statistics 2010 0.14% 1.79 
382 14/04/2010 Economic Survey of Environmental Industries (tentative name) Preliminary Report 0.08% 0.49 
383 23/04/2010 Publication of the "Earth for habitats" 0.25% 1.15 
384 7/05/2010 Public Comments Invited regarding the Draft Promotional Strategy on 
Environmental Research and Technology Development 
-2.57% -1.77 
385 14/05/2010 Minister's Opinion on Environmental Impact Statement for the Urban Planning Road, 
Misumi-Masuda-Line 
-0.42% -0.53 
386 17/05/2010 Eighteenth Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development -2.16% -2.13 
387 20/05/2010 Minister of the Environment Award for contribution in business, academia, and 
government 
-1.14% -1.33 
388 28/05/2010 Publication for designated procurement items of public works projects on Promoting 
Green Purchasing 
 
0.68% 2.57 
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389 28/05/2010 Proposals for public works projects applicable in revising the law on Promoting 
Green Purchasing 
0.68% 2.57 
390 28/05/2010 Proposals for the procurement items and services applicable in revising the law on 
Promoting Green Purchasing 
0.68% 2.57 
391 17/06/2010 Submitting the Minister's opinion on the policy relating to Motosu City planning area -0.40% -0.90 
392 10/08/2010 Basic Policy for Adjusting Cost Estimation Policies for FY 2011 Environmental 
Conservation Expenses 
-0.50% -1.46 
393 30/09/2010 The Cover Page Competition for Annual Report on the Environment, the Sound 
Material-Cycle Society and the Biodiversity 2011 
0.02% 0.29 
394 26/11/2010 Annual Report on the Environment in Japan 2011 for Children Released -0.11% -2.33 
395 3/12/2010 Public Comments on the draft of the revision of the designated procurement items 
and their evaluation criteria under the Law concerning the Promotion of Procurement 
of Eco-Friendly Goods and Services by the State and Other Entities 
0.09% 2.36 
396 4/02/2011 Results of the Public Comments Received Regarding the Draft Summary of Revised 
Designated Procurement Items and Evaluation Criteria under the Law on Promoting 
Green Purchasing 
0.12% 2.50 
397 4/02/2011 Revision to the Basic Policy for the Promotion of Procurement of Eco-Friendly 
Goods and Services 
0.12% 2.50 
398 8/02/2011 Outline of FY 2011 Environmental Conservation Expenditures -0.06% -1.23 
399 17/02/2011 Establishment of the guideline of reliability for eco-friendly goods and services -0.13% -2.59 
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400 25/02/2011 Economic Survey of Environmental Industries in December 2010 -0.03% -0.60 
401 15/04/2011 Publication of Environmental Statistics 2011 0.53% 10.11 
402 24/05/2011 Collecting proposals for designated procurement items applying to the law on 
Promoting Green Purchasing (for procurement items and services) 
-0.19% -3.40 
403 24/05/2011 The achievements of the environmental effectiveness of green purchasing by the 
national entities in FY 2009 
-0.19% -3.40 
404 24/05/2011 Collecting proposals for designated procurement items applying to the law on 
Promoting Green Purchasing (for public works projects) 
-0.19% -3.40 
405 24/05/2011 Publicizing candidates for designated procurement items of public works projects 
associated with the law on Promoting Green Purchasing 
-0.19% -3.40 
406 16/06/2011 The result of questionnaire concerning Green Purchasing in local government 0.81% 15.37 
407 9/08/2011 Collecting comments for the interim report for the revision of the Basic Environment 
Plan 
0.01% 0.09 
408 26/08/2011 Economic Survey of Environmental Industries in June 2011 -0.34% -1.49 
409 6/10/2011 Principles for Financial Action towards a Sustainable Society -0.81% -3.12 
410 28/10/2011 The 11th Japan-China-Korea Tripartite Roundtable Meeting on Environmental 
Industry 
-1.10% -4.50 
411 18/11/2011 The Cover Page Competition for Annual Report on the Environment, the Sound 
Material-Cycle Society and the Biodiversity 2012 
0.13% 0.71 
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412 2/12/2011 Public Comments on the draft of the revision of the designated procurement items 
and their evaluation criteria under the Law concerning the Promotion of Procurement 
of Eco-Friendly Goods and Services by the State and Other Entities 
-0.31% -1.35 
413 8/12/2011 Announcement of the 11th Tripartite Roundtable Meeting on Environmental Industry 
among China, Korea and Japan 
0.23% 1.20 
414 7/02/2012 Revision of Basic Policy on Promoting Green Purchasing -0.53% -2.19 
415 7/02/2012 Results of Public Comments Received Regarding the Draft Summary of Revised 
Designated Procurement Items and their Evaluation Criteria under the Law on 
Promoting Green Purchasing 
-0.53% -2.19 
416 10/02/2012 Outline of FY 2012 Environmental Conservation Expenditures 0.00% 0.02 
417 24/02/2012 Economic Survey of Environmental Industries in December 2011 -0.50% -2.14 
418 15/05/2012 Estimated Market Size of Japan's Environmental Industries of 2010, and Report of 
Japan's Environmental Industry Growth Engine 
-1.19% -7.85 
419 1/06/2012 Publication of Environmental Statistics 2012 -0.49% -3.74 
420 5/06/2012 Publicizing candidates for designated procurement items of public-works projects 
associated with the law on Promoting Green Purchasing 
-0.33% -1.01 
421 5/06/2012 Collecting proposals for designated procurement items applying to the law on 
Promoting Green Purchasing (for public-works projects) 
-0.33% -1.01 
422 5/06/2012 Collecting proposals for designated procurement items applying to the law on 
Promoting Green Purchasing (for procurement items and services) 
 
-0.33% -1.01 
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423 5/06/2012 The achievements of the environmental effectiveness of green purchasing by the 
national entities in FY 2010 
-0.33% -1.01 
424 29/06/2012 The result of questionnaire concerning Green Purchasing in local governments -0.43% -1.48 
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Appendix 5.2: Polluting Activities for the Polluting Industries 
 
Industry Polluting Activities 
Aerospace and Defense 
 
Alternative energy                                           
 
Solid waste, water pollution and air pollution 
 
Water and air pollution 
Automobiles and Parts 
 
Waste acid, heavy metal ions, solid waste 
Beverages 
 
Water, air and food pollution 
Chemicals 
 
Chemical waste 
Construction and Materials 
 
Air, noise, water pollution and solid waste 
Electricity 
 
Water pollution and air pollution 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 
 
Water pollution, electronic waste and air 
pollution 
Fixed Line Telecommunication 
 
Waste pollution 
Food Producers 
 
Water, air and food pollution 
Food and Drug Retailers 
 
Water and air pollution 
Forestry and Paper 
 
Waste pollution 
Gas, Water and Multi-utilities 
 
Water pollution and air pollution 
General Industrials 
 
Waste pollution 
Health Care Equipment and Services Water pollution, solid wastes and air pollution 
Household Goods and Home 
Construct 
 
Air, noise, water pollution and solid waste 
Industrial Engineering 
 
Air, noise, water pollution and solid waste 
Industrial Metals and Mining 
 
Air, noise, water pollution and solid waste 
Industrial Transportation 
 
Solid wastes, noise pollution and air pollution 
Leisure Goods 
 
Water pollution, solid wastes and air pollution 
Mining 
 
Air, noise, water pollution and solid waste 
Mobile Telecommunication 
 
Waste pollution 
Oil Equipment and Services 
 
Water pollution and air pollution 
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Oil and Gas Producers 
 
Water pollution and air pollution 
Personal Goods 
 
Waste pollution 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 
 
Chemical wastes and waste pollution 
Technology Hardware and 
Equipment 
 
Water pollution, solid waste and air pollution 
Tobacco 
 
Water, air and food pollution 
Travel and Leisure 
 
Noise and waste pollution 
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Appendix 5.3: Industry Reaction to 424 Environmental Regulations 
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Automobiles and Parts 
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CHAPTER SIX: TRADING STRATEGIES AROUND ANNOUNCEMENTS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The last chapter provided evidence in favour of green effects. In other words, I found ARs 
associated with environmental policy announcements. The implication for investors is that 
they can either lose (negative ARs) or win (positive AR) when new environmental regulations 
are introduced. Within the finance literature, contrarian and momentum portfolios are created 
in association with extreme winners and losers. The previous chapter clarified that winners and 
losers exist after environmental regulation announcements. To that end, I tested whether 
momentum, contrarian and buy-and-hold strategies worked around these announcements. 
 
First, I created winner, loser, contrarian, momentum and buy-and-hold portfolios around each 
environmental policy announcement date and then held these portfolios for various holding 
periods from 1 to 5 years. Second, I explored how the fundamental characteristics (including 
volume, size, capital expenditure, leverage, sales and profitability) were related to the portfolio 
returns that I constructed. Third, I investigated the seasonal aspects of the various strategies. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 describes how the environmental portfolios 
are constructed, Section 6.3 explains what drives winner portfolios (explaining the winners’ 
curse), Section 6.4 refers to the losers’ curse, Section 6.5 explains momentum portfolios, 
Section 6.6 illustrates the effects around contrarian portfolios, Section 6.7 explains buy-hold 
portfolios, Section 6.8 shows a green portfolio analysis and Section 6.9 concludes the chapter. 
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6.2 ENVIRONMENTAL PORTFOLIOS 
In Chapter 5, the effects of 424 environmental announcements on industrial portfolio returns 
were studied to show the existence of ARs—green effects. In the current chapter, I study the 
same 424 environmental announcements, but this time on 6616 individual equity stocks. As 
more than one announcement could be made on any given day, I investigate 320 event dates. 
For each event date, I identify the stocks associated with statistically significant returns and 
classify them as winners (where positive AR is observed) or losers (negative AR), then 
estimating the return of the momentum/contrarian/buy-and-hold portfolios. 
 
6.3 THE WINNERS’ CURSE 
In this section, I provide a detailed analysis of the winner portfolios that arise from 
environmental regulation. More specifically, I study portfolios made up of stocks that reacted 
positively to announcements of environmental regulations (captured through statistically 
significant positive ARs). First, I show the winners’ portfolio performance over various 
holding periods and second, I explain the fundamental characteristics of the firms that made it 
to the portfolios. Third, I control for seasonality in the data set. 
 
6.3.1 Winner Portfolio Holding Return  
Firms with statistically significant positive ARs on a particular event day are defined as 
winners. Table 6.1 summarises average (over 424 announcements) portfolio returns and their 
corresponding t-statistic for different investment periods. Table 6.1 show that row 2 reports the 
equal-weighted average daily returns for winner portfolios over the next K-days (K = 1 day, 1 
week, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 9 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years and 5 years) and 
row 3 reports their corresponding t-statistics. For example, when K = 1 day (shown as K = 1 D 
in the table), past winner portfolios return is 0.06%, with an insignificant t-statistic of 0.92, and 
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when K = 1 month (shown as K = 1 M in the table), past winners, on average win 1.47% over 
the next 1 month (corresponding t-statistic of 4.33). 
 
When examining holding periods greater than one week, statistically significant profits are 
evident for up to 5 years. Further, the magnitude of the profit increases with the holding period. 
For instance, when K = 3 M, 6 M, 9 M, 1 Y and 2 Y, the ARs of the winner portfolio are 3.82%, 
7.40%, 11.03%, 13.19% and 19.96% respectively. From K = 3 M to 2 Y, we find an upward 
trend in the ARs, which slows down after 2 years (AR of 12.52% after 5 years) and this is 
depicted in Figure 6.1. One interesting observation is that ARs increase and persist in the long 
run—an observation consistent with De Bondt and Thaler (1985), who show that winners 
continue to win over a longer period. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) use the theory of 
conservatism to explain why winners continue to win. 
Figure 6.1: Winner Portfolio Return from 1 Day to 5 Years 
 
 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) use conservatism bias to explain underreaction. Within 
the cognitive psychology literature, conservatism is a bias that may occur when human beings 
are processing information whereby there is a tendency to rely more on previous 
knowledge/information and less on new information. In other words, people with 
conservatism bias have a tendency to slowly adjust to new information. The implication is 
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that we do not find the ‘right’ adjustment on the first day of trading after an announcement is 
made and delayed reactions are observed. Following Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) 
use conservatism bias to explain under-reaction. Within the cognitive psychology literature, 
conservatism is a bias that may occur when human beings are processing information 
whereby there is a tendency to rely more on previous knowledge/information and less on new 
information. When applied to the stock market, it may lead traders to slowly adjust to new 
information. According to conservatism theory, investors take their time to adjust to new 
information; this leads to return continuation whereby winners continue to win. Although the 
under-reaction theory does not specifically discuss announcements of environmental 
regulations, it generally examines stock performance through price series. The findings here 
are consistent with Ramiah et al. (2016) and inconsistent with the findings from Ramiah, 
Mugwagwa and Naughton (2011), who show a decreasing trend in the return from winner 
portfolios. 
 
Evidence provided regarding the returns of winner portfolios is consistent with the 
under-reaction hypothesis—implying that investors tend to under-react to announcements of 
green policies. Thus, I address the thesis’s second research objective and second research 
question. 
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Table 6.1: Trading Strategies around Announcements of Environmental Regulations 
  
This table summarizes portfolio mean returns and their corresponding t-statistic partitioning on investment horizon. The portfolios include the 
winner, the loser, the momentum, the contrarian and buy-and-hold (an equally weighted portfolio of the winner and the loser) portfolios. 
Investment horizons (K day holding period) include 1 day (1 D), 1 week (1 W), 1 month (1 M), 3 months (3 M), 6 months (6 M), 9 months (9 M), 
1 year (1 Y), 2 years (2 Y), 3 years (3 Y), 4 years (4 Y) and 5 years (5 Y).  
 
 1 D 1 W 1 M 3 M 6 M 9 M 1 Y 2 Y 3 Y 4 Y 5 Y 
Winner  0.06% 0.30% 1.47% 3.82% 7.40% 11.03% 13.19% 19.96% 16.97% 12.86% 12.52% 
t-stat 0.92 1.95* 4.33*** 5.75*** 7.00*** 8.84*** 8.69*** 9.03*** 6.09*** 4.27*** 4.12*** 
Loser  0.44% 1.05% 2.12% 3.96% 6.83% 9.88% 12.12% 19.28% 15.44% 11.10% 11.57% 
t-stat 6.58*** 8.08*** 7.69*** 7.41*** 7.65*** 9.15*** 9.23*** 9.86*** 6.79*** 4.76*** 5.01*** 
Momentum  -0.37% -0.76% -0.65% -0.14% 0.57% 1.15% 1.07% 0.68% 1.53% 1.76% 0.95% 
t-stat -5.66*** -6.32*** -1.27 -0.50 1.42 2.45*** 1.86* 0.85 1.49 1.38 0.71 
Contrarian  0.37% 0.76% 0.65% 0.14% -0.57% -1.15% -1.07% -0.68% -1.53% -1.76% -0.95% 
t-stat 5.66*** 6.32*** 1.27 0.50 -1.42 -2.45*** -1.86 -0.85 -1.49 -1.38 -0.71 
Buy Hold  0.25% 0.68% 1.80% 3.89% 7.12% 10.46% 12.66% 19.62% 16.21% 11.98% 12.05% 
t-stat 4.25*** 5.26*** 6.12*** 6.63*** 7.43*** 9.15*** 9.11*** 9.58*** 6.50*** 4.58*** 4.60*** 
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6.3.2 Fundamental Characteristics of Winner Portfolios 
In this section, I examine whether there is any relationship between positive abnormal returns 
from environmental regulations and past trading volume (as well as size, profitability, sales, 
capital expenditure and leverage) for equities listed in the Japanese market. Table 6.2 and 
Appendix 6.1 to Appendix 6.6 report returns for portfolios formed on the basis of a two-way 
sort between past positive abnormal returns and past trading volume (including size, 
profitability, sales, capital expenditure and leverage).  
 
More specifically, I investigate whether there is a relationship between the fundamental 
factors (such as firm’s volume, size, profitability, sales, capital expenditure and leverage) and 
the winner portfolios return from environmental regulation. After each environmental 
regulation announcement, we identify all the firms that are winners through positive AR and 
create a portfolio of winners. The portfolio AR is calculated using a simple average of the 
firms AR. We then calculate the t-statistics of the portfolio. Table 6.2 shows the fundamental 
characteristics of the winner portfolios for holding periods of 1 day whilst the results of the 
remaining holding periods are shown in Appendix 6.1 to Appendix 6.6. 
Table 6.2: Fundamental Characteristics of Winner Portfolios for Holding Period of One Day 
 
  
Volume Size Profit Sales CAPEX Leverage 
1 day H 0.19% 0.07% -0.16% -0.20% -0.17% -0.06% 
t-stat 1.85* 1.01 -2.48*** -2.78*** -2.51*** -0.68 
L -0.39 -0.35% -0.08% 0.00% -0.03% -0.02% 
t-stat -5.81*** -3.88*** -0.71 0.04 -0.28 -0.25 
H-L 0.58% 0.43% -0.08% -0.20% -0.14% -0.04% 
t-stat 6.21*** 5.25*** -0.84 -2.13** -1.59 -0.54 
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Table 6.2.1: Fundamental Characteristics Definition 
Variable Definition 
CAPEX Capital expenditure = purchase of new fixed assets + upgrades to existing 
fixed assets - sale of any fixed assets during the accounting period 
Sales Net Sales = Gross Sales - (Product Returns + Damaged or Missing Goods 
+ Discounts) 
Size Natural log of total assets 
Volume The number of shares or contracts traded in a security or an entire market 
during a given period of time 
Leverage The degree of operating leverage equals to the percentage change in EBIT 
divide by the percentage change in sales 
Profitability Net profit margin equals net income divided by net sales times 100 
 
Holding Period of One Day 
Several interesting results can be observed from Table 6.2 for the holding period of one day. 
Conditional on past returns, when high-volume stocks perform better than low-volume stocks, 
the H (high volume) - L (low volume) portfolios result in a positive value. The results 
provided show positive returns for H-L for winner portfolios. Hence, I can conclude that, 
conditional on past returns, there is evidence that volume affects winner portfolios profits 
over the one day holding period. For instance, in the Japanese equity portfolio, the 
high-volume portfolio earned on average 0.19%, and the low volume portfolio lost on 
average 0.39%. A portfolio that longed the high-volume portfolio and shorted the low-volume 
portfolio (H-L) would have resulted in a profit of 0.58% on average (statistically significant 
t-statistic of 6.21), as shown in Table 6.2. After each environmental regulation announcement, 
we identify all the firms that are winners through positive AR and create a portfolio of 
winners. The portfolio AR is calculated using a simple average of the firms AR. We then 
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calculate the t-statistics of the portfolio. 
 
Similar to the volume analysis, we can apply the same reasoning to the remaining 
fundamentals. When I apply this methodology to the size factor, I can state that conditional 
on past returns, when large stocks perform better than small stocks, the H (large) - L (small) 
portfolios result in a positive value. The results provided show positive returns for H-L for 
winner portfolios. Hence, I can conclude that, conditional on past returns, there is evidence 
that size affects winner portfolios profits over the one day holding period. For instance, 
portfolios with large stocks earned on average 0.07%, and the portfolio with small stocks lost 
on average 0.35%. A portfolio that longed the high-volume portfolio and shorted the 
low-volume portfolio (H-L) would have resulted in a profit of 0.43% on average (statistically 
significant t-statistic of 5.25).  
 
When this principle is applied to profitability, I can state that conditional on past returns, 
when highly profitable stocks perform better than stocks with low profitability, the H (high) - 
L (low) portfolios result in a positive value. The results provided show negative returns (not 
statistically significant) for H-L for winner portfolios. Hence, I can conclude that, conditional 
on past returns, there is no evidence that profitability affects winner portfolios profits over the 
one day holding period. For example, portfolios with highly profitable stocks earned on 
average -0.16%, and the portfolio with low profitability stocks lost on average 0.08%. A 
portfolio that longed the highly profitable portfolio and shorted the low profitability portfolio 
(H-L) would have resulted in a loss of 0.08% on average (statistically not significant 
t-statistic of -0.84).  
 
As I apply this technique to the sales factor, I can state that conditional on past returns, when 
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firms with high sales perform better than low sales stocks, the H (high) - L (low) portfolios 
result in a positive value. The results provided show statistically significant negative returns 
for H-L of winner portfolios. Hence, I can conclude that, conditional on past returns, sales 
factor affects winner portfolios profits over the one day holding period. For instance, 
portfolios with larger sales stocks loss on average 0.20%, and the portfolio with low sales 
stocks earned on average 0.00%. A portfolio that longed the large sales portfolio and shorted 
the low sales portfolio (H-L) would have resulted in a loss of 0.20% on average (statistically 
significant t-statistic of -2.13), as shown in Table 6.2. 
 
When this principle is applied to capital expenditure (CAPEX), I can state that conditional on 
past returns, when firms with large capital expenditure perform better than stocks with low 
capital expenditure, the H (large) - L (low) portfolios result in a positive value. The results 
provided show negative returns (not statistically significant) for H-L for winner portfolios. 
Hence, I can conclude that, conditional on past returns, there is no evidence that capital 
expenditure affects winner portfolios profits over the one day holding period. For example, 
portfolios with large capital expenditure stocks earned on average -0.17%, and the portfolio 
with low capital expenditure stocks lost on average 0.03%. A portfolio that longed the highly 
profitable portfolio and shorted the low profitability portfolio (H-L) would have resulted in a 
loss of 0.14% on average (statistically not significant t-statistic of -1.59), as shown in Table 
6.2. 
 
When I apply this principal to capital leverage, I can state that conditional on past returns, 
when highly leveraged stocks perform better than stocks with low leverage, the H (high) - L 
(low) portfolios result in a positive value. The results provided show negative returns (not 
statistically significant) for H-L for winner portfolios. Hence, I can conclude that, conditional 
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on past returns, there is no evidence that leverage has an impact on winner portfolios profits 
over the one day holding period. For example, portfolios with highly leveraged stocks earned 
on average -0.06%, and the portfolio with low leverage stocks lost on average 0.02%. A 
portfolio that longed the highly leveraged portfolio and shorted the low leveraged portfolio 
(H-L) would have resulted in a loss of 0.04% on average (statistically not significant 
t-statistic of -0.54), as shown in Table 6.2. 
 
Volume  
As can be seen in Table 6.3, a portfolio that long the high-volume portfolio and short the 
low-volume portfolio (H-L) over a holding period of one week, result in a profit of 1.33% on 
average (statistically significant t-statistic of 7.86). When the holding period is increased to 1 
month and 3 months, the H-L portfolios earn statistically significant return of 1.58% and 1.32% 
respectively. However, when the holding period is further increased to four years, I do not 
observe any statistical significance. Finally, when the holding period is 5 years, I find 
statistically significant negative returns for H-L. 
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Table 6.3: Fundamental Analysis with Winner Portfolios 
 
  
Volume Size Profit Sales CAPEX Leverage 
1 day R(H-L) 0.58% 0.43% -0.08% -0.20% -0.14% -0.04% 
t-stat 6.21*** 5.25*** -0.84 -2.13** -1.59 -0.54 
1 week R(H-L) 1.33% 1.58% 0.56% 0.14% 0.30% -0.49% 
t-stat 7.86*** 10.54*** 2.87*** 0.65 1.48 -3.59*** 
1 month R(H-L) 1.58% 1.86% 1.28% 0.45% 0.71% -0.32% 
t-stat 5.38*** 6.6*** 3.83*** 1.34 2.14** -1.47 
3 month R(H-L) 1.32% 1.76% 3.51% 2.09% 2.50% -0.56% 
t-stat 2.98*** 3.92*** 7.58*** 4.77*** 5.51*** -1.77* 
6 month R(H-L) 1.03% 1.76% 4.67% 3.27% 3.68% -0.52% 
t-stat 1.88* 3.51*** 8.34*** 6.32*** 6.84*** -1.34 
1 year R(H-L) 0.22% 1.83% 11.05% 7.26% 7.75% -2.14% 
t-stat 0.29 2.16** 11.86*** 7.12*** 7.76*** -3.52*** 
2 years R(H-L) 0.50% 4.91% 23.33% 18.53% 18.83% -4.32% 
t-stat 0.52 4.64*** 16.2*** 11.72*** 12.7*** -5.08*** 
3 years R(H-L) -1.05% 5.66% 33.17% 29.20% 28.73% -7.96% 
t-stat -0.92 5.01*** 21.77*** 16.79*** 16.83*** -7.1*** 
4 years R(H-L) -2.57% 5.72% 38.20% 35.55% 35.28% -14.83% 
t-stat -1.76* 4.35*** 21.19*** 17.1*** 16.58*** -11.27*** 
5 years R(H-L) -3.81% 4.50% 40.89% 40.15% 39.67% -19.81% 
t-stat -2.42*** 3.13*** 20.37*** 17.11*** 16.61*** -13.18*** 
 
The volume evidence provided in Table 6.3 shows that (1) high volume explains the winner 
portfolio returns for holding period of up to three month, (2) volume does not explain the 
portfolio return for holding periods of 6 months to four years and (3) low volume explains the 
return for holding period of five years. The conclusion that I can draw is that volume plays an 
important role in explaining the return of the winner portfolios but its significance depends on 
the holding period. 
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Within the winners’ literature I find consistency with Ramiah et al. (2016), Chordia and 
Swaminathan (2000) and Hameed and Ting (2000) who argue that returns of portfolios 
containing high volume stocks outperform portfolios comprised of low volume stocks but the 
results presented here challenge the work of Lee et al. (2003).  
 
Size 
As can be seen in Table 6.3, a portfolio that long large firms and short smaller ones (H-L) 
over a holding period of one week, result in a profit of 1.58% on average (statistically 
significant t-statistic of 10.54). When the holding period is increased to 1 month and 3 
months, the H-L portfolios earn statistically significant return of 1.86% and 1.76% 
respectively. For the remaining holding periods, H-L is positive and statistically significant 
indicating that size affects the return of winner portfolios. Within the winners’ literature I find 
consistency with Ramiah et al. (2016) who find larger size firms drive return of winner 
portfolios. 
 
Profitability 
Except for the holding period of one day, all other holding periods exhibit statistically 
significant positive H-L implying that highly profitable stocks drive the returns of winner 
portfolios—showing the evidence that profitability is an important factor (see Table 6.3). 
 
Sales 
Except for the holding periods of one day to one month, all other holding periods exhibit 
statistically significant positive H-L implying that high sales firms drive the returns of winner 
portfolios—showing the evidence that sales is an important factor (see Table 6.3). My finding 
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is consistent with the research of Ramiah et al. (2016) who document higher sales drive the 
winner portfolios return. 
 
Capital Expenditure 
Except for the holding periods of one day and one week, all other holding periods exhibit 
statistically significant positive H-L implying that firms with high capital expenditure drive 
the returns of winner portfolios—showing the evidence that capital expenditure is an 
important factor (see Table 6.3). My finding is consistent with the research of Ramiah et al. 
(2016) who document larger capital expenditure drives the winner portfolios return. 
 
Leverage 
I find that leverage factor is important generally for longer periods of holding returns as H-L 
is negative indicating that firms with low leverage affect the winner portfolios. Similar to 
volume, no clear and consistent pattern is detected as no such evidence is obtained for shorter 
holding periods. 
 
6.3.3 Seasonal Aspects of Winner Portfolios 
Results of the regression analysis of Equation 8 of Chapter 4 are presented in Table 6.4. The 
coefficients and t-statistics for each fundamental factor and seasonal dummy variable are 
reported. I do not find any seasonality in the winner portfolios and this finding is consistent 
with Ramiah, Mugwagwa and Naughton (2011) but not consistent with Ramiah et al. (2016) 
who find February effect for winner portfolios. With regards to the day-of-week effect, the 
coefficients for Monday, Tuesday, Thursday and Friday are -0.00, 0.02, -0.00 and -0.01 
respectively and their corresponding t-statistics are -0.18, 1.15, -0.11 and -0.71 respectively. 
As none of the days are statistically significant, it means no statistical evidence of a 
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day-of-week effect in the winner portfolios. Month of the year is captured by dummy 
variables representing January to December (except September) and similar to the 
day-of-week effect, none of the coefficient is statistically significant.  
 
Table 6.4: Seasonality in Returns of Portfolios 
 
 
6.4 THE LOSERS’ CURSE 
In this section, I provide a detailed analysis of the performance of loser portfolios which arise 
  Winner 
Portfolio 
Loser 
Portfolio 
Contrarian 
Portfolio 
Buy-and-hold 
Portfolio 
 Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat 
Volume 0.00 0.11 -0.00 -1.64 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 
Size 0.00 2.75*** 0.00 3.72*** 0.00 2.90*** 0.00 2.25** 
Profitability 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.70* 0.00 0.75 0.00 1.02 
Sales 0.00 1.68* 0.00 1.64 -0.00 -0.68 0.00 0.56 
CAPEX -0.00 -0.63 0.00 3.08*** -0.00 -0.58 0.00 1.58 
Leverage -0.00 -0.08 -0.00 -0.52 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.87 
Monday -0.00 -0.18 -0.15 -0.47 -0.20 -0.11 -0.16 -1.02 
Tuesday 0.02 1.15 -0.17 -0.48 -0.03 -1.51 -0.15 -1.44 
Thursday -0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.12 -0.43 -0.23 0.00 0.98 
Friday -0.01 -0.71 -0.15 -0.48 0.63 0.36 -0.11 -1.75* 
January -0.03 -1.39 -0.01 -2.44*** 0.02 0.84 -0.23 -1.36 
February -0.04 -1.57 -0.01 -1.84 0.03 1.13 0.12 0.89 
March -0.04 -1.59 -0.01 -1.33 0.02 1.1 -0.87 -1.33 
April -0.03 -1.1 -1.00 -2.29*** 0.01 0.59 0.01 1.65 
May -0.04 -1.73* -1.03 -2.38*** 0.03 1.13 0.01 1.12 
June -0.03 -1.31 -0.30 -0.74 0.04 1.29 0.00 1.13 
July -0.03 -1.16 -0.27 -0.57 0.03 1.03 0.00 0.87 
August -0.04 -1.69* -0.41 -1.01 0.02 1.27 0.00 1.03 
October  -0.02 -0.95 -0.47 -1.14 0.01 0.59 0.00 1.14 
November 0.01 0.65 -0.57 -1.44 -0.02 -0.97 -0.00 -1.23 
December  -0.03 -1.38 -0.47 -1.24 0.02 1.11 0.01 1.35 
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as a result of environmental regulation. In particular, I am studying portfolios made up of 
stocks that reacted negatively to announcements of environmental regulations (captured 
through statistically significant negative abnormal returns). First, I show the loser portfolios’ 
performance over various holding periods, second I explain the fundamental characteristics of 
these portfolios and thirdly I test for seasonality. 
 
6.4.1 Loser Portfolio Holding Return  
Firms with statistically significant negative abnormal return on a particular event day are 
defined as losers (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1 for details). Referring to Table 6.1, we can see 
that row 4 reports the equal-weighted average daily returns for loser portfolios over a series 
of K holding periods  (K = 1 day to 5 years) and row 5 reports their corresponding 
t-statistics. For example, when K = 1 day, past loser portfolios return is 0.44% with a 
significant t-statistic of 6.58, and when K = 1 month, past losers, on average, win 1.05% over 
the next one month (corresponding t-statistic of 8.08).  
 
When we look at holding periods that are greater than one week, I can find statistically 
significant profit for up to 5 years. Furthermore the magnitude of the profit increases with the 
holding period. For instance, when K = 3 M, 6 M, 9 M, 1 Y and  2 Y, the abnormal returns 
of the loser portfolio are 3.96%, 6.83%, 9.88%, 12.12% and 19.28%  respectively. From K 
=3 M to 2 Y, we find an upward trend in the abnormal returns which slows down after 2 
years (abnormal return of 11.57% after 5 years) and this is depicted in Figure 6.2.  
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Figure 6.2: Loser Portfolio Return from 1 Day to 5 Years 
 
 
 
Similar to the winner portfolios (see Figure 6.1), abnormal returns of the loser portfolios 
increase and persist in the long run. Once again, I observe returns continuation which is 
consistent with Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) but in an unusual manner. In that sense, 
I am addressing the second research objective and providing an answer to the second research 
question of this thesis.    
 
6.4.2 Fundamental Characteristics of Loser Portfolios 
In this section, I examine whether there is any relationship between negative abnormal 
returns from environmental regulation and six fundamental characteristics of equities listed in 
the Japanese market. Table 6.5 and Appendix 6.1 to Appendix 6.6 report returns for portfolios 
formed on the basis of a two-way sort between past abnormal returns and these fundamentals.  
 
More specifically, I investigate whether there is a relationship between the fundamental 
factors (such as firm’s volume, size, profitability, sales, capital expenditure and leverage) and 
the loser portfolios return originating from announcements of environmental regulation. Table 
6.5 shows the fundamental characteristics of the loser portfolios for holding periods of 1 day 
while the results of the remaining holding periods are shown in Appendix 6.1 to Appendix 
6.6. 
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Table 6.5: Fundamental Characteristics of Loser Portfolios for Holding Period of One Day 
 
  
Volume Size Profitability Sales CAPEX Leverage 
1 day H 0.00% 0.35% 0.36% 0.63% 0.28% 0.37% 
t-stat -0.01 4.00*** 4.53*** 2.09** 3.75*** 4.31*** 
L 0.62% 0.12% 0.22% 0.51% 0.41% 0.49% 
t-stat 7.32*** 0.98 1.74* 0.04 3.92*** 6.61*** 
H-L -0.62% 0.23% 0.15% 0.08% -0.12% -0.12% 
t-stat -4.23*** 1.98** 1.23 2.88*** -1.23 -1.78* 
 
Holding Period of One Day 
Several interesting results can be observed from Table 6.5 for the holding period of one day. 
With regards to volume, the results provided show negative returns for H-L for loser 
portfolios. Hence, I can conclude that, conditional on past returns, there is evidence that 
volume affects loser portfolios profits over the one day holding period. For instance, the 
high-volume portfolio earned on average 0.00%, and the low volume portfolio earned on 
average 0.62%. A portfolio that longed the high-volume portfolio and shorted the low-volume 
portfolio (H-L) would have resulted in a loss of 0.62% on average (statistically significant 
t-statistic of -4.23), as shown in Table 6.5. A negative H-L value in this case represents 
illiquidity premium. 
 
As for the size factor, I can state that conditional on past returns, when large stocks perform 
better than small stocks, the H (large) - L (small) portfolios result in a positive value. The 
results provided show positive returns for H-L for loser portfolios. Hence, I can conclude that, 
conditional on past returns, there is evidence that size affects loser portfolios profits over the 
one day holding period. For instance, portfolios with large stocks earned on average 0.35%, 
and the portfolio with small stocks earned on average 0.12%. A portfolio that longed the 
high-volume portfolio and shorted the low-volume portfolio (H-L) would have resulted in a 
 170 
 
profit of 0.23% on average (statistically significant t-statistic of 1.98).  
 
When this principle is applied to profitability, I can see positive returns (not statistically 
significant) for H-L for loser portfolios. Hence, I can conclude that, conditional on past 
returns, there is no evidence that profitability affects loser portfolios profits over the one day 
holding period. For example, portfolios with highly profitable stocks earned on average 
0.36%, and the portfolio with low profitability stocks earned on average 0.22%. A portfolio 
that longed the highly profitable portfolio and shorted the low profitability portfolio (H-L) 
would have resulted in a profit of 0.15% on average (statistically not significant t-statistic of 
1.23).  
 
As I apply this technique to the sales factor, I find statistically significant positive returns for 
H-L of loser portfolios. Hence, I can conclude that, conditional on past returns, there is 
evidence that sales factor affects loser portfolios profits over the one day holding period. As 
for capital expenditure, the results show negative returns (not statistically significant) for H-L 
for loser portfolios—indicating no statistical relationship is discerned. Similarly, no 
relationship is observed for leverage. 
 
Volume  
As can be seen in Table 6.6, a portfolio that long the high-volume portfolio and short the 
low-volume portfolio (H-L) over a holding period of one week, result in a loss of 1.46% on 
average (statistically significant t-statistic of -6.15). If I look at all the holding periods, H-L is 
negative and statistically significant indicating that volume affects the return of loser 
portfolios.  
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Table 6.6: Fundamental Analysis with Loser Portfolios 
  Volume Size Profit Sales CAPEX Leverage 
1 day R(H-L) -0.62% 0.23% 0.15% 0.08% -0.12% -0.12% 
t-stat -4.23*** 1.98** 1.23 2.88*** -1.23 -1.78* 
1 week R(H-L) -1.46% 0.67% 0.26% -0.58% -0.38% -0.42% 
t-stat -6.15*** 2.97*** 1.18 -3.02*** -2.07** -2.82*** 
1 
month 
R(H-L) -2.46% 2.01% 2.42% 0.11% 0.55% -1.16% 
t-stat -6.1*** 4.15*** 4.47*** 0.28 1.19 -3.84*** 
3 
month 
R(H-L) -3.07% 1.75% 5.88% 1.37% 1.43% -2.78% 
t-stat -5.29*** 2.81*** 6.42*** 2.21** 1.89* -5.1*** 
6 
month 
R(H-L) -2.60% 2.29% 7.97% 2.61% 2.45% -4.30% 
t-stat -3.78*** 2.96*** 7.53*** 3.53*** 2.64*** -6.47*** 
1 year R(H-L) -2.16% 3.41% 16.89% 6.74% 5.65% -8.47% 
t-stat -2.31** 3.15*** 12.3*** 5.86*** 4.34*** -8.52*** 
2 years R(H-L) -2.36% 6.45% 28.76% 11.21% 9.21% -13.49% 
t-stat -1.86* 4.47*** 17.79*** 6.97*** 5.61*** -10.45*** 
3 years R(H-L) -4.53% 6.25% 37.27% 18.24% 14.18% -20.88% 
t-stat -3.16*** 3.77*** 20.32*** 10.16*** 7.48*** -13.09*** 
4 years R(H-L) -6.89% 5.67% 40.84% 22.41% 17.37% -28.41% 
t-stat -4.28*** 2.78*** 19.06*** 10.35*** 7.62*** -15.69*** 
5 years R(H-L) -6.77% 4.26% 43.86% 24.99% 20.28% -31.16% 
t-stat -3.57*** 1.88* 19.54*** 10.75*** 8.26*** -14.65*** 
 
The volume evidence provided in Table 6.6 shows that low volume explains the return for all 
the holding period. The conclusion that I can draw is that volume plays an important role in 
explaining the return of the loser portfolios and the negative sign refers to illiquidity premium. 
My finding is consistent with the research of Ramiah, Mugwagwa and Naughton (2011) who 
find that cold portfolios (loser portfolios) profit is dominated by low volume stocks. This 
finding is also consistent with the research from Ramiah et al. (2011) and Ramiah et al. 
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(2016), but inconsistent with the study from Bremer and Hiraki (1999), and Hameed and Ting 
(2000) who report that the portfolios profit is driven by high volume stocks.  
 
Size 
As can be seen in Table 6.6, a portfolio that takes a long position on large firms and short 
small firms (H-L) over a holding period of one week, result in a profit of 0.67% on average 
(statistically significant t-statistic of 2.97). For the rest holding periods (except for 5 years), 
H-L is positive and statistically significant indicating that large size explains the return of 
loser portfolios. My finding is consistent with the study of Lee et al. (2003) and not consistent 
with Ramiah et al (2016). 
 
Profitability 
Except for the holding periods of one day and one week, all other holding periods exhibit 
statistically significant positive H-L—showing the evidence that profitability is an important 
factor (See Table 6.6). 
 
Sales 
When the holding period is 1 week, the H-L portfolios earn statistically significant return of 
-0.58% indicating low sales firms drive the loser portfolios return. However, except for the 
holding periods of one week and one month, all other holding periods exhibit statistically 
significant positive H-L implying that high sales firms drive the returns of loser 
portfolios—showing the evidence that sales is an important factor (See Table 6.6). This 
finding is not consistent with the study of Ramiah et al. (2016). 
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Capital Expenditure 
Except for the holding periods of one day to three month, all other holding periods exhibit 
statistically significant positive H-L implying that firms with high capital expenditure drive 
the returns of loser portfolios—showing the evidence that capital expenditure is an important 
factor (See Table 6.6). This finding is not consistent with the study of Ramiah et al. (2016). 
 
Leverage 
Except for the holding periods of one day, all other holding periods exhibit statistically 
significant negative H-L implying that firms with low leverage drive the returns of loser 
portfolios—showing the evidence that leverage is an important factor.  
 
6.4.3 Seasonal Aspects of Loser Portfolios 
Results of the regression analysis of Equation 8 of Chapter 4 are presented in Table 6.4. The 
coefficients and t-statistics for each fundamental factor and seasonal dummy variable are 
reported. Monthly effects such as January, April and May are detected for loser portfolios. 
With regards to the monthly effect, the coefficients for January, April and May are -0.01, 
-1.00 and -0.03 respectively and their corresponding t-statistics are -2.44, -2.29 and -2.38 
respectively. As none of the days are statistically significant, it means no statistical evidence 
of a day-of- week effect is found for the loser portfolios. I find no evidence of a July effect in 
loser portfolios which is consistent with the research of Ramiah, Mugwagwa and Naughton 
(2011) and Lee et al. (2003) but is inconsistent with Durand et al. (2006). April and May 
effects are consistent with the research of Ramiah, Mugwagwa and Naughton (2011). 
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6.5 MOMENTUM PORTFOLIOS 
Momentum portfolios are constructed by having a long position on the winner portfolios and 
short position on the loser portfolios (losers and winners are defined as in Section 6.3 and 
6.4). Referring to Table 6.1, we can see that row 6 reports the equal-weighted average daily 
returns for momentum portfolios over a series of K holding periods (K = 1 day to 5 years) and 
row 7 reports their corresponding t-statistics. For example, when K = 1 day, past momentum 
portfolios have a loss of -0.37% with a significant t-statistic of -5.66, and when K = 1 month, 
past momentum portfolios have a loss of -0.76% over the next one month (corresponding 
t-statistic of -6.32). When we look at holding periods that are greater than one month, we 
cannot detect any consistent results over the 5 year period.  
 
Consequently, it is not meaningful to investigate how the fundamental and seasonality factors 
are related to momentum portfolios (after announcements of environmental regulations) as I 
do not find any statistically significant momentum profit
8
. This finding is not consistent with 
the research of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Rouwenhorst (1998), Hestonet et al. (1999) and 
Lee and Swaminathan (2000). However, the existing literature builds their portfolio based on 
previous performance and not around announcements of environmental policies. In this sense, 
the previous literature does not provide the basis for comparison. 
 
6.6 CONTRARIAN PORTFOLIOS 
In this section, I provide a detailed analysis of the contrarian portfolios which arise as a result 
of environmental regulation. More specifically, I am studying portfolios made up of stocks 
that reacted positively and negatively to announcements of environmental regulations 
(captured through statistically significant positive and negative abnormal returns). First, I 
                                                 
8
 Similarly, there is no economic reason to check for the profits after transaction cost. 
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show the contrarian portfolios performance over various holding periods and secondly I 
explain the fundamental characteristics of the firms that made it to the portfolios. Thirdly, I 
control for seasonality in the data set. 
 
6.6.1 Contrarian Portfolio Holding Return  
Winner and loser portfolios are defined in sections 6.3 and 6.4 respectively, contrarian 
portfolios are constructed by taking a long position on the loser portfolios and short position 
on the winner portfolios. Table 6.1 summarizes average (over 424 announcements) portfolio 
returns and their corresponding t-statistic for different investment periods.  
 
From Table 6.1, we can see that row 8 reports the equal-weighted average daily returns for 
contrarian portfolios over the next K days (K = 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 
9 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years and 5 years) and row 9 reports their corresponding 
t-statistics. For example, when K = 1 day (shown as K=1 D in the table), past contrarian 
portfolios return is 0.37% with a significant t-statistic of 5.66, and when K = 1 week (shown 
as K =1 W in the table), past contrarian portfolios have a profit of 0.76% over the next one 
week (corresponding t-statistic of 6.32). It should be noted that the presence of contrarian 
profits suggests a violation of the efficient market hypothesis. It should be noted that this 
percentage is less than the estimated transaction cost of around 1%. When we look at holding 
periods that are greater than one week, we find majority periods with statistically 
insignificant results up to 5 years and this is depicted in Figure 6.3.  
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Figure 6.3: Contrarian Portfolio Return from 1 Day to 5 Years 
 
 
 
The momentum and contrarian literature has an ongoing debate as to how holding periods 
affect winner portfolios. Earlier arguments suggest that investors tend to overreact 
(representativeness theory) and underreact (conservatism theory) in the short term—in other 
words profits are observed in the first month of trading but then disappear. However, recent 
evidence shows that these phenomenon persist in the long term (5 years or more) and 
research is being undertaken to explain why this is the case. In the case of environmental 
regulation, the findings are consistent with the short term horizon theory.  
 
Existing literature focuses on contrarian effect in both long run and short run perspective 
which is explained by the overreaction hypothesis. The short-run contrarian effect detected in 
this study is in accordance with the study of Bowan and Iverson (1998), Atkins and Dyl 
(1990), Akhigbe, Gosnell and Harikumar (1998), Kryzanowshi and Zhang (1992), Otchere 
and Chan (2003), Alonso and Rubbio (1990), Brailsford (1992), Clare and Thomas (1995), 
and Chang et al (1995) who find the short-term overreaction in global market. In addition, my 
finding is inconsistent with the study of De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Zarowin (1990), 
Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992) who explain the long run contrarian effect by using 
monthly returns, and they believe the stock price temporarily apart from the fundamental 
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value because of investor’s pessimism and optimism.  
 
6.6.2 Fundamental Characteristics of Contrarian Portfolios 
In this section, I examine whether there is any relationship between positive and negative 
abnormal returns and past trading volume (as well as size, profitability, sales, capital 
expenditure and leverage) for equities listed in the Japanese market. Table 6.7 and Appendix 
6.1 to Appendix 6.6 report returns for portfolios and past trading volume (including size, 
profitability, sales, capital expenditure and leverage).  
 
More specifically, I investigate whether there is a relationship between the fundamental 
factors (such as firm’s volume, size, profitability, sales, capital expenditure and leverage) and 
the contrarian portfolios return from environmental regulation. Table 6.7 shows the 
fundamental characteristics of the contrarian portfolios for holding periods of 1 week whilst 
the results of the remaining holding periods are shown in Appendix 6.1 to Appendix 6.6. 
 
Table 6.7: Fundamental Characteristics of Contrarian Portfolios for Holding Period of One 
Week  
 
  
Volume Size Profit Sales CAPEX Leverage 
1 
week 
H -0.60% 0.42% 0.71% 0.77% 0.75% 1.15% 
t-stat -2.26** 3.31*** 6.31*** 5.13*** 5.73*** 7.09*** 
L 2.19% 1.33% 1.01% 1.48% 1.42% 1.08% 
t-stat 13.50*** 4.96*** 3.56*** 6.14*** 5.57*** 6.91*** 
H-L -2.79% -0.91% -0.31% -0.72% -0.67% 0.07% 
t-stat -9.98*** -3.42*** -1.07 -2.74*** -2.63*** 0.38 
 
Holding Period of One Week 
Several interesting results can be observed from Table 6.7 for the holding period of one week. 
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Conditional on past returns, when high-volume stocks perform better than low-volume stocks, 
the H (high volume) - L (low volume) portfolios result in a positive value. The results 
provided show statistically significant negative returns for H-L for contrarian portfolios. 
Hence, I can conclude that, conditional on past returns, volume affects contrarian portfolios 
profits over the one week holding period. For instance, in the Japanese equity portfolio, the 
high-volume portfolio earned on average -0.60%, and the low volume portfolio earned on 
average 2.19%. A portfolio that longed the high-volume portfolio and shorted the low-volume 
portfolio (H-L) would have resulted in a loss of 2.79% on average (statistically significant 
t-statistic of -9.98), as shown in Table 6.7.  
 
Similar to the volume analysis, I can apply the same reasoning to the remaining fundamentals. 
When I apply this methodology to the size factor, I can state that conditional on past returns, 
when large stocks perform better than small stocks, the H (large) - L (small) portfolios result 
in a positive value. The results provided show statistically significant negative returns for H-L 
for contrarian portfolios. Hence, I can conclude that, conditional on past returns, size affects 
contrarian portfolios profits over the one week holding period. For instance, portfolios with 
large stocks earned on average 0.42%, and the portfolio with small stocks lost on average 
1.33%. A portfolio that longed the high-volume portfolio and shorted the low-volume 
portfolio (H-L) would have resulted in a loss of 0.91% on average (statistically significant 
t-statistic of -3.42).  
 
When this principle is applied to profitability, I can state that conditional on past returns, 
when highly profitable stocks perform better than stocks with low profitability, the H (high) - 
L (low) portfolios result in a positive value. The results provided show negative returns (not 
statistically significant) for H-L for contrarian portfolios. Hence, I can conclude that, 
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conditional on past returns, there is no evidence that profitability affects contrarian portfolios 
profits over the one week holding period. For example, portfolios with highly profitable 
stocks earned on average 0.71%, and the portfolio with low profitability stocks earned on 
average 1.01%. A portfolio that longed the highly profitable portfolio and shorted the low 
profitability portfolio (H-L) would have resulted in a loss of 0.31% on average (statistically 
not significant t-statistic of -1.07).  
 
As I apply this technique to the sales factor, I can articulate that conditional on past returns, 
when firms with high sales perform better than low sales stocks, the H (high) - L (low) 
portfolios result in a positive value. The results provided show statistically significant 
negative returns for H-L of contrarian portfolios. Hence, I can conclude that, conditional on 
past returns, sales factor affects contrarian portfolios profits over the one week holding period. 
For instance, portfolios with larger sales stocks earned on average 0.77%, and the portfolio 
with low sales stocks earned on average 1.48%. A portfolio that longed the large sales 
portfolio and shorted the low sales portfolio (H-L) would have resulted in a loss of 0.72% on 
average (statistically significant t-statistic of -2.74), as shown in Table 6.7. 
 
When this principle is applied to capital expenditure (CAPEX), I postulate that conditional on 
past returns, when firms with large capital expenditure perform better than stocks with low 
capital expenditure, the H (large) - L (low) portfolios result in a positive value. The results 
provided show statistically significant negative returns for H-L for contrarian portfolios. 
Hence, I can conclude that, conditional on past returns, capital expenditure factor affects 
contrarian portfolios profits over the one week holding period. For example, portfolios with 
large capital expenditure stocks earned on average 0.75%, and the portfolio with low capital 
expenditure stocks earned on average 1.42%. A portfolio that longed the highly profitable 
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portfolio and shorted the low profitability portfolio (H-L) would have resulted in a loss of 
0.67% on average (statistically significant t-statistic of -2.63), as shown in Table 6.7. 
 
When I apply this principal to capital leverage, it implies that conditional on past returns, 
when highly leveraged stocks perform better than stocks with low leverage, the H (high) - L 
(low) portfolios result in a positive value. The results provided show positive returns (not 
statistically significant) for H-L for contrarian portfolios. Hence, I can conclude that, 
conditional on past returns, there is no evidence that leverage has an impact on contrarian 
portfolios profits over the one week holding period. For example, portfolios with highly 
leveraged stocks earned on average 1.15%, and the portfolio with low leverage stocks earned 
on average 1.08%. A portfolio that longed the highly leveraged portfolio and shorted the low 
leveraged portfolio (H-L) would have resulted in a profit of 0.07% on average (statistically 
not significant t-statistic of 0.38), as shown in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.8: Fundamental Analysis with Contrarian Portfolios 
  Volume Size Profit Sales CAPEX Leverage 
1 day R(H-L) -1.21% -0.19% 0.23% -0.08% 0.02% -0.08% 
t-stat -7.04*** -1.28 1.47 -0.61 0.14 -0.74 
1 week R(H-L) -2.79% -0.91% -0.31% -0.72% -0.67% 0.07% 
t-stat -9.98*** -3.42*** -1.07 -2.74*** -2.63*** 0.38 
1 
month 
R(H-L) -4.04% 0.16% 1.14% -0.35% -0.16% -0.83% 
t-stat -9.02*** 0.29 1.83* -0.73 -0.28 -2.19** 
3 
month 
R(H-L) -4.39% -0.01% 2.38% -0.72% -1.07% -2.22% 
t-stat -6.69*** -0.02 2.4*** -1 -1.22 -3.48*** 
6 
month 
R(H-L) -3.64% 0.53% 3.30% -0.66% -1.23% -3.78% 
t-stat -4.7*** 0.61 2.85*** -0.76 -1.18 -5.03*** 
1 year R(H-L) -2.38% 1.58% 5.85% -0.52% -2.11% -6.33% 
t-stat -2.15** 1.23 3.64*** -0.39 -1.43 -5.79*** 
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2 years R(H-L) -2.86% 1.54% 5.43% -7.32% -9.61% -9.16% 
t-stat -1.87* 0.91 2.74** -4.47*** -5.64*** -6.64*** 
3 years R(H-L) -3.48% 0.59% 4.10% -10.95% -14.55% -12.91% 
t-stat -2.01** 0.31 1.85* -5.69*** -7.21*** -6.98*** 
4 years R(H-L) -4.32% -0.05% 2.64% -13.15% -17.91% -13.58% 
t-stat -2.13** -0.02 1.04 -5.78*** -7.38*** -6.08*** 
5 years R(H-L) -2.96% -0.23% 2.97% -15.15% -19.39% -11.34% 
t-stat -3.57*** -1.88* 19.54*** -10.75*** -8.26*** -14.65*** 
 
Volume  
As can be seen in Table 6.8, a portfolio that long the high-volume portfolio and short the 
low-volume portfolio (H-L) over a holding period of one week, result in a loss of -2.79% on 
average (statistically significant t-statistic of -9.98). When the holding period is increased to 1 
month and 3 months, the H-L portfolios earn statistically significant return of -4.04% and 
-4.39% respectively. All holding periods exhibit statistically significant negative H-L 
implying that low volume firms drive the returns of contrarian portfolios—showing the 
evidence that volume is an important factor. Our results support the findings of Lee et al. 
(2003) and Ramiah et al. (2011) who state low volume stocks drive contrarian profits. 
 
Size 
As can be seen in Table 6.8, a portfolio that long large firms and short smaller ones (H-L) 
over a holding period of one week, result in a loss of 0.91% on average (statistically 
significant t-statistic of -3.42). For the remaining holding periods, H-L is statistically 
insignificant indicating that size affects the return of contrarian portfolios in one week only. 
My finding is inconsistent with Ramiah et al. (2016) and Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter 
(1992) who find size affect contrarian profits. 
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Profitability 
Except for the holding period of one day to 1 month and 2 year to 3 year, all other holding 
periods exhibit statistically significant positive H-L implying that highly profitable stocks 
drive the returns of contrarian portfolios—showing the evidence that profitability is an 
important factor (see Table 6.8). My finding is inconsistent with Dreman and Berry’s (1995) 
who show low profitability stocks drive the contrarian profits. 
 
Sales 
For the holding periods of one day to one year, H-L has statistically significant negative 
return in one week only and insignificant in the rest periods. For the holding periods from 2 
year to 5 year, H-L exhibit statistically significant negative H-L implying that low sales firms 
drive the returns of contrarian portfolios—showing the evidence that sales is an important 
factor (see Table 6.8). My finding is inconsistent with the research of Ramiah et al. (2016). 
 
Capital Expenditure 
Similar to sales, no clear and consistent pattern is detected as no such evidence is obtained for 
shorter holding periods within one year. For the holding periods from 2 year to 5 year, H-L 
exhibit statistically significant negative H-L implying that low capital expenditure firms drive 
the returns of contrarian portfolios—showing the evidence that capital expenditure is an 
important factor (see Table 6.8). My finding is inconsistent with the research of Ramiah et al. 
(2016). 
 
Leverage 
Except for one day and one week, all other holding periods exhibit statistically significant 
negative H-L implying that low leverage firms drive the returns of contrarian 
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portfolios—showing the evidence that leverage is an important factor (see Table 6.8). 
 
6.6.3 Seasonal Aspects of Contrarian Portfolios 
Results of the regression analysis of Equation 8 of Chapter 4 are presented in Table 6.4. The 
coefficients and t-statistics for each fundamental factor and seasonal dummy variable are 
reported. I do not find any seasonality in the contrarian portfolios and this finding is 
inconsistent with Ramiah, Mugwagwa and Naughton (2011), Ramiah et al. (2016), Grinblatt 
and Moskowitz (2004) and Durand et al. (2006). 
 
With regards to the day-of-week effect, the coefficients for Monday, Tuesday, Thursday and 
Friday are -0.20, -0.03, -0.43 and 0.63 respectively and their corresponding t-statistics are 
-0.11, -1.51, -0.23 and -0.36 respectively. As none of the days are statistically significant, it 
means no statistical evidence of a day-of -week effect in the contrarian portfolios. Month of 
the year is captured by dummy variables representing January to December (except 
September) and similar to the day-of-week effect, none of the coefficients are statistically 
significant. 
 
6.6.4 Robustness Check of Contrarian Profits 
Short run contrarian profits are observed in my study (see Section 6.5.1). To ensure that the 
short run contrarian effect is not driven by outliers, I have done a robustness check to divide 
the winner and loser firms in quintiles as it is a recommended empirical analysis in the 
finance area. For example, Fama and French (1993) study the well received 3 factor model 
with 25 size and B/M sorted portfolios, and they sort portfolio in quintiles in each dimension. 
Furthermore, Brennan, Wang and Xia (2004), Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2006), Gomes 
and Schmid (2010), Boguth and Kuehn (2013) and many others use quintiles analysis.  
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Table 6.9 presents short-term contrarian portfolio returns and their corresponding t-statistics 
partitioning on every-day performance. Contrarian portfolios are divided into quintiles, the 
first quintile refers to the worst 20% losers minus the best 20% winners, and the fifth quintile 
refers to the best 20% losers minus the worst 20% winners. The rest three quintile portfolios 
are constructed in same rationale. As can be seen from Table 6.9, I report the quintiles’ 
contrarian profits for polluting (P) and environmentally friendly (Eco) firms. For instance, the 
overall contrarian return is 0.37% (t-statistic of 5.66) in the 1 day and 0.76% (t-statistic of 
6.32) in one week. When I look at the 5 quintile contrarian returns for the holding period of 1 
day, they are 0.15%, 0.48%, 0.41%, 0.59% and 0.26% respectively and their corresponding 
t-statistics are 2.16, 7.99, 5.80, 5.53 and 1.46 respectively. Similarly, when I look at the 5 
quintile contrarian returns for the holding period of 1 week, they are 0.13%, 0.83%, 0.90%, 
1.14% and 0.83% respectively and their corresponding t-statistics are 1.68, 7.97, 6.08, 5.56 
and 2.32 respectively. 
 
I find that (1) short term contrarian profits are generated in 1 day and 1 week and this is 
consistent with Lee et al. (2003) and Durand et al. (2006) who observe significant short-term 
contrarian profits, (2) polluters invariably contribute greater contrarian returns than 
non-polluters and (3) contrarian profits are robust because the contrarian returns are observed 
in all quintiles.  
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Table 6.9: Quintile Robustness Check for Contrarian Returns 
 
This table summarizes short-term (1 day and 1 week holding periods) contrarian portfolio returns and their t-statistics partitioning on event-day 
performance. Contrarian portfolios are divided into quintiles. The first quintile refers to the worst 20% losers minus the best 20% winners, and 
the fifth quintile refers to the best 20% losers minus the worst 20% winners. The rest three quintile portfolios are constructed following the same 
rationale. The empirical results also show difference between environmentally friendly industries (Eco) and polluting industries (P).  
 
 Overall First Quintile Second Quintile Third Quintile Fourth Quintile Fifth Quintile 
1 
day 
0.37% 
(5.66***) 
0.15% 0.48% 0.41% 0.59% 0.26% 
(2.16**) (7.99***) (5.80***) (5.53***) (1.46) 
Eco P Eco P Eco P Eco P Eco P Eco P 
0.27% 
(3.40***) 
0.51% 
(7.14***) 
0.11% 
(2.16**) 
0.23% 
(4.69***) 
0.49% 
(6.66***) 
0.53% 
(6.05***) 
0.29% 
(3.33***) 
0.53% 
(5.61***) 
0.58% 
(4.43***) 
0.76% 
(5.83***) 
0.15% 
(0.65) 
0.52% 
(2.46***) 
1 
week 
0.76% 
(6.32***) 
0.13% 0.83% 0.90 % 1.14% 0.83% 
(1.68*) (7.97***) (6.08***) (5.56***) (2.32**) 
Eco P Eco P Eco P Eco P Eco P Eco P 
0.55% 
(3.68***) 
1.01% 
(7.64***) 
0.08% 
(0.84) 
0.24% 
(2.28**) 
0.83% 
(5.95***) 
0.94% 
(6.60***) 
0.76% 
(4.02***) 
1.09% 
(5.41***) 
1.04% 
(3.82***) 
1.39% 
(5.67***) 
0.39% 
(0.84) 
1.22% 
(2.57***) 
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6.7 BUY-AND-HOLD PORTFOLIO 
In this section, I provide a detailed analysis of the buy-and-hold portfolios which arises as a 
result of environmental regulation. More specifically, I am studying portfolios made up of 
stocks that reacted positively and negatively to announcements of environmental regulations 
(captured through statistically significant positive and negative abnormal returns). First, I 
show the buy-and-hold portfolio performance over various holding periods and secondly I 
explain the fundamental characteristics of the firms that made it to the portfolios. Thirdly, I 
control for seasonality in the data set. 
 
6.7.1 Buy-and-Hold Portfolio Holding Return  
The same definition is used for winners and losers in this section and the buy-and-hold 
portfolios are constructed by taking long positions on the equally-weighted winner and loser 
portfolios. Table 6.1 summarizes average portfolio returns and their corresponding t-statistic 
for different holding periods. From Table 6.1, we can see that row 10 reports the 
equal-weighted average daily returns for buy-and-hold portfolios over the next K days (K = 1 
day, 1 week, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 9 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years and 5 
years) and row 11 reports their corresponding t-statistics. For example, when K = 1 day 
(shown as K=1 D in the table), past buy-and-hold portfolios return is 0.25% with a significant 
t-statistic of 4.25, and when K = 1 month (shown as K =1 M in the table), past buy-and-hold 
portfolios have a profit of 1.80% over the next one month (corresponding t-statistic of 6.12). 
We can find statistically significant profit for all holding periods and this is depicted in 
Figure 6.4.  
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Figure 6.4: Buy-and-Hold Portfolio Return from 1 Day to 5 Years 
 
 
 
Buy-and-hold strategy invariably achieves the best performance from Table 6.1 in every 
investment horizons, with the best return occurs at 2-year holding period. Such result is above 
the threshold of 1% of transaction cost. 
 
6.7.2 Fundamental Characteristics of Buy-and-Hold Portfolios 
In this section, I examine the relationship between positive and negative abnormal returns 
from environmental regulations and past trading volume for equities listed in the Japanese 
market. Table 6.10 and Appendix 6.1 to Appendix 6.6 report returns for portfolios formed on 
the basis of a two-way sort between past returns and past trading volume (including size, 
profitability, sales, capital expenditure and leverage).  
 
More specifically, I investigate the relationship between the fundamental factors and the 
buy-and-hold portfolios return from environmental regulation. Table 6.10 shows the 
fundamental characteristics of the buy-and-hold portfolios for holding periods of 1 month 
whilst the results of the remaining holding periods are shown in Appendix 6.1 to Appendix 
6.6. 
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Table 6.10: Fundamental Characteristics of Buy-and-Hold Portfolios for Holding Period of 1 
Month 
 
  
Volume Size Profit Sales CAPEX Leverage 
1 
Month 
H 0.03% 1.10% 1.01% 0.61% 0.71% 0.45% 
t-stat 2.29** 2.12** 2.11** 1.28 2.11** 1.23 
L 0.47% -0.83% -0.84% 0.33% 0.72% 1.19% 
t-stat 1.56 -1.27 -2.13** 1.89* 1.78* 2.34*** 
H-L -0.44% 1.93% 1.85% 0.28% -0.01% -0.75% 
t-stat -2.07** 1.09 2.17** 1.97** -1.12 -2.21** 
 
Holding Period of One Month 
Several interesting results can be observed from Table 6.10 for the holding period of one 
month. Conditional on past returns, when high-volume stocks perform better than 
low-volume stocks, the H (high volume) - L (low volume) portfolios result in a positive value. 
The results provided show statistically significant negative returns for H-L for buy-and-hold 
portfolios. Hence, I can conclude that, conditional on past returns, there is evidence that 
volume affects buy-and-hold portfolios profits over the one month holding period. For 
instance, in the Japanese equity portfolio, the high-volume portfolio earned on average 0.03%, 
and the low volume portfolio earned on average 0.47%. A portfolio that longed the 
high-volume portfolio and shorted the low-volume portfolio (H-L) would have resulted in a 
loss of 0.44% on average (statistically significant t-statistic of -2.07), as shown in Table 6.10. 
A negative value for volume is usually regarded as an illiquidity premium. 
 
Similar to the volume analysis, I can apply the same reasoning to the remaining fundamentals. 
When I apply this methodology to the size factor and the results provided show positive 
returns (not statistically significant) for H-L for buy-and-hold portfolios. Hence, I can 
conclude that, conditional on past returns, there is no evidence that size affects buy-and-hold 
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portfolios profits over the one month holding period. For instance, portfolios with large 
stocks earned on average 1.10%, and the portfolio with small stocks lost on average 0.83%. A 
portfolio that longed the high-volume portfolio and shorted the low-volume portfolio (H-L) 
would have resulted in a profit of 1.93% on average (statistically not significant t-statistic of 
1.09).  
 
As for profitability, the results show statistically significant positive returns for H-L for 
buy-and-hold portfolios implying that profitability affects buy-and-hold portfolios profits 
over the one month holding period. For example, portfolios with highly profitable stocks 
earned on average 1.01%, and the portfolio with low profitability stocks lost on average 
0.84%. A portfolio that longed the highly profitable portfolio and shorted the low profitability 
portfolio (H-L) would have resulted in a profit of 1.85% on average (statistically significant 
t-statistic of 2.17).  
 
As I apply this technique to the sales factor, the results suggest statistically significant 
positive returns for H-L of buy-and-hold portfolios. Hence, I can conclude that, conditional 
on past returns, there is evidence that sales factor affects buy-and-hold portfolios profits over 
the one month holding period. For instance, portfolios with larger sales stocks earned on 
average 0.61%, and the portfolio with low sales stocks earned on average 0.33%. A portfolio 
that longed the large sales portfolio and shorted the low sales portfolio (H-L) would have 
resulted in a profit of 0.28% on average (statistically significant t-statistic of 1.97), as shown 
in Table 6.10. 
 
When this principle is applied to capital expenditure (CAPEX), I find no evidence that capital 
expenditure affects buy-and-hold portfolios profits over the one month holding period. With 
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regards to leverage, the results show statistically significant negative returns for H-L for 
buy-and-hold portfolios.  
Table 6.11: Fundamental Analysis with Buy-and-Hold Portfolios 
  Volume Size Profit Sales CAPEX Leverage 
1 day R(H-L) -0.04% 0.65% 0.06% -0.40% -0.27% -0.16% 
t-stat -1.23 1.76* 1.91* -1.41 -1.09 -0.9 
1 week R(H-L) -0.11% 2.25% 0.82% -0.45% -0.07% -0.91% 
t-stat -1.56 2.01** 2.34*** -1.24 -1.02 -1.98** 
1 month R(H-L) -0.88% 3.86% 3.70% 0.55% -0.02% -1.49% 
t-stat -2.07** 1.09 2.17** 1.97** -1.12 -2.21** 
3 month R(H-L) -0.11% 3.52% 9.39% 3.47% 3.92% -3.33% 
t-stat -2.11** 2.13** 1.98** 2.23** 2.54*** -2.11** 
6 month R(H-L) -1.58% 4.05% 12.65% 5.88% 6.14% -4.82% 
t-stat -1.99** 2.09** 2.54*** 2.41*** 4.21*** -2.18** 
1 year R(H-L) -1.93% 5.24% 27.93% 13.99% 13.39% -10.60% 
t-stat -1.59 2.65*** 4.54*** 2.45*** 2.35*** -4.54*** 
2 years R(H-L) -1.86% 11.37% 52.10% 29.75% 28.03% -17.80% 
t-stat -2.11** 5.13*** 5.67*** 9.18*** 3.89*** -3.56*** 
3 years R(H-L) -5.58% 11.92% 70.44% 47.45% 42.91% -28.85% 
t-stat -2.18** 4.52*** 3.24*** 7.14*** 9.01*** -4.53*** 
4 years R(H-L) -9.46% 11.38% 79.03% 57.96% 52.65% -43.22% 
t-stat -3.66*** 6.43*** 7.01*** 3.45*** 12.35*** -6.54*** 
5 years R(H-L) -10.59% 8.75% 84.75% 65.15% 59.96% -50.97% 
t-stat -2.79*** 2.15** 10.21*** 7.15*** 4.23*** -12.23*** 
 
Volume  
Except for the holding periods of one day, one week and one year, all other holding periods 
exhibit statistically significant negative H-L implying that low volume stocks drive the 
returns of buy-and-hold portfolios—showing the evidence that volume is an important factor 
(see Table 6.11). My finding is consistent with the study of Lee et al. (2003), but inconsistent 
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with the study of Ramiah et al. (2016), Conrad, Hameed and Niden (1994), Chordia and 
Swaminathan (1999), Bremer and Hiraki (1999) and Hameed and Ting (2000). 
 
Size 
Except for the holding periods of one day and one month, all other holding periods exhibit 
statistically significant positive H-L implying that large stocks drive the returns of 
buy-and-hold portfolios—showing the evidence that size is an important factor (see Table 
6.11). This finding is consistent with the study of Ramiah et al. (2016). 
 
Profitability 
Except for the holding period of one day, all other holding periods exhibit statistically 
significant positive H-L implying that highly profitable stocks drive the returns of 
buy-and-hold portfolios—showing the evidence that profitability is an important factor (see 
Table 6.11). 
 
Sales 
Except for the holding periods of one day and one week, all other holding periods exhibit 
statistically significant positive H-L implying that high sales firms drive the returns of 
buy-and-hold portfolios—showing the evidence that sales is an important factor (see Table 
6.11).  
 
Capital Expenditure 
Except for the holding periods of one day to one month, all other holding periods exhibit 
statistically significant positive H-L implying that firms with high capital expenditure drive 
the returns of buy and portfolios—showing the evidence that capital expenditure is an 
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important factor (see Table 6.11). My finding is consistent with the research of Ramiah et al. 
(2016) who document larger capital expenditure drives the portfolios return. 
 
Leverage 
Except for the holding period of one day, all other holding periods exhibit statistically 
significant negative H-L implying that firms with low leverage drive the returns of 
buy-and-hold portfolios—showing the evidence that leverage is an important factor (see 
Table 6.11).  
 
6.7.3 Seasonal Aspects of Buy-and-Hold Portfolios 
Results of the regression analysis of Equation 8 of Chapter 4 are presented in Table 6.4. The 
coefficients and t-statistics for each fundamental factor and seasonal dummy variable are 
reported. I do not find any seasonality in the buy-and-hold portfolios and this finding is 
inconsistent with Ramiah, Mugwagwa and Naughton (2011) and Ramiah et al. (2016). With 
regards to the day-of-week effect, the coefficients for Monday, Tuesday, Thursday and Friday 
are -0.16, -0.15, 0.00 and -0.11 respectively and their corresponding t-statistics are -1.02, 
-1.44, 0.98 and -1.75 respectively. As none of the days are statistically significant, it means 
no statistical evidence of a day-of-week effect in the buy-and-hold portfolios. Month of the 
year is captured by dummy variables representing January to December (except September) 
and similar to the day-of-week effect, none of the coefficient are statistically significant.
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6.8 A GREEN PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS 
From sections 6.3, 6.4 and 6.6, I have created portfolios winners, losers and contrarian 
respectively. The winners, losers and contrarian portfolios are subcategorized into polluters 
and environmentally portfolios. This gives rise to six portfolios which provide additional 
insights on the performance of green portfolios. In this section, I study the returns of these six 
portfolios after controlling for fundamental and seasonality factors. 
 
6.8.1 Environmentally Friendly Portfolios 
Table 6.12 reports how the fundamentals factors (such as firm’s volume, size, profitability, 
sales, capital expenditure and leverage) are related to environmentally friendly industry after 
control for seasonality. In this section, I measure the joint effects of fundamental and seasonal 
factors through a multivariate analysis. The coefficients and t-statistics for each fundamental 
factor and seasonal dummy variable are reported. The intercept measures the performance of 
the portfolio after controlling for fundamental characteristics and seasonality. The intercept 
for the winners, losers and contrarian portfolios for the environmentally friendly portfolios 
are 0.11 (t-statistic of 2.77), -0.06 (t-statistic of -13.41) and -0.16 (t-statistic of -3.90) 
respectively. 
 
With regards to the day-of-week effect, as none of the days are statistically significant, it 
means no statistical evidence of a day-of-week effect in environmentally friendly portfolios. 
The calendar month of the year effect is captured by dummy variables representing January 
to December (except September). Except for the April and May, none of the coefficient are 
statistically significant. With regards to the fundamental factors, I find that (1) size and sales 
affect winner portfolios (2) volume, size, sales, capital expenditure affect the loser portfolios 
and (3) size affects the contrarian portfolio. 
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Table 6.12: Performance of Environmentally Friendly Portfolios 
 Winner Portfolio Loser Portfolio Contrarian Portfolio 
 Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.11 2.77*** -0.06 -13.41*** -0.16 -3.90*** 
Volume 0.00 0.33 0.00 2.11** 0.00 0.03 
Size 0.00 2.03** 0.00 2.91*** 0.00 2.00** 
Profitability 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.06 0.00 0.43 
Sales 0.00 1.99** 0.00 2.18** 0.00 0.78 
CAPEX 0.00 1.03 0.00 2.62*** 0.00 0.03 
Leverage 0.00 0.74 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.69 
Monday -0.01 -0.42 -0.18 -0.48 -0.05 -0.02 
Tuesday 0.04 1.06 -0.35 -0.90 -0.01 -1.56 
Thursday -0.02 -0.62 -0.04 -0.10 0.00 0.20 
Friday -0.03 -0.91 -0.30 -0.87 0.01 0.33 
January -0.02 -0.55 -0.80 -1.57 0.01 0.20 
February -0.02 -0.41 -0.88 -1.85* 0.00 0.12 
March -0.02 -0.52 -0.37 -0.82 0.01 0.23 
April -0.01 -0.30 -0.01 -2.35*** -0.01 -0.13 
May -0.03 -0.74 -0.01 -2.18** 0.01 0.24 
June -0.02 -0.46 -0.19 -0.42 0.02 0.44 
July -0.02 -0.39 -0.38 -0.72 0.01 0.25 
August -0.02 -0.63 -0.19 -0.41 0.02 0.43 
October  -0.01 -0.16 -0.25 -0.53 -0.00 -0.10 
November 0.01 1.72* -0.31 -0.70 -0.07 -1.84* 
December  -0.00 -0.36 -0.17 -0.39 0.01 0.27 
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6.8.2 Polluting Portfolios 
The performance of the polluting portfolios is shown in Table 6.13. The coefficients 
and t-statistics for each fundamental factor and seasonal dummy variable are reported. 
The intercept for the winners, losers and contrarian portfolios for the polluting 
portfolios are 0.10 (t-statistic of 4.97), -0.05 (t-statistic of -11.55) and -0.16 (t-statistic 
of -6.98) respectively. 
 
With regards to the fundamental and seasonality factors, I find that (1) volume, size 
and seasonality (February, March, April, May, June, August, October and December) 
affect winner portfolios, (2) size, leverage and seasonality (January and May) affect 
the loser portfolios and (3) volume, size and seasonality (February, March, June, 
August and December) affect the contrarian portfolios.  
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Table 6.13: Performance of Polluting Portfolios 
  Winner 
Portfolio 
Loser 
Portfolio 
Contrarian 
Portfolio 
  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.10 4.97*** -0.05 -11.55*** -0.16 -6.98*** 
Volume 0.00 4.97*** 0.00 -0.64 0.00 -2.71*** 
Size 0.00 -2.43*** 0.00 2.20** 0.00 2.74*** 
Profitability 0.00 0.17 0.00 -0.13 0.00 0.39 
Sales 0.00 -0.20 0.00 1.67* 0.00 -0.36 
CAPEX 0.00 0.56 0.00 -1.92 0.00 -0.42 
Leverage 0.00 0.88 0.00% -2.33*** -0.01 -1.07 
Monday 0.01 0.41 -0.00 -0.46 -0.01 -0.52 
Tuesday 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.32 -0.01 -0.31 
Thursday 0.02 1.12 0.08 0.22 -0.02 -1.20 
Friday 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.11 -0.00 -0.06 
January -0.04 -1.70* -0.01 -2.91*** 0.03 1.48 
February -0.05 -2.42*** -0.01 -1.39 0.05 2.41*** 
March -0.05 -2.68*** -0.00 -1.56 0.04 2.20** 
April -0.05 -2.24** -0.00 -1.62 0.04 1.58 
May -0.04 -2.07** -0.01 -2.23** 0.04 1.90* 
June -0.04 -2.03** -0.00 -1.00 0.05 2.27** 
July -0.03 -1.46 -0.00 -0.40 0.05 1.80* 
August -0.05 -2.31** -0.00 -0.99 0.05 2.20** 
October  -0.04 -2.05** -0.01 -1.13 0.04 1.78* 
November -0.04 -1.79* -0.01 -1.79* 0.03 1.68* 
December  -0.04 -2.30** -0.01 -1.82* 0.04 2.08** 
 
6.9 CONCLUSION 
The first wave of the extreme portfolio literature (momentum and contrarian portfolio 
strategies) focused on identifying price and earnings momentum/contrarian profits 
across different countries. The second wave of studies aimed at explaining what 
drives these profits. The first and second generation papers are characterized (but not 
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limited) by the following classical papers such as Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985), Rouwenhorst (1998), Lee and Swaminathan (2000), 
Menkhoff and Schmidt (2005), Ramiah Mugwagwa and Naughton (2011) and 
Ramiah et al. (2016). My thesis contributes to the third generation of extreme 
portfolio analysis whereby I show that it is possible to extract contrarian profits from 
announcements of environmental regulations. 
 
The extreme portfolio literature explains that returns continuation (underreaction 
hypothesis) leads to momentum profits and return reversal (overreaction hypothesis) 
lead to contrarian profits. Based on the evidence provided I can conclude that 
following the announcements of environmental regulations (1) investors have a 
tendency to underreact to winner portfolios, (2) investors have a tendency to act in an 
unusual manner when it comes to loser portfolios, (3) no momentum profit is 
observed, (4) contrarian profits are detected, (5) buy-and-hold profits are noticeable. 
 
The emerging environmental finance literature has set the foundation in terms of 
identifying abnormal returns around announcements of environmental regulations and 
based on my analysis I conclude that these abnormal returns can be adopted to 
develop trading strategies like contrarian and buy-and-hold strategy. 
 
The analysis of how fundamental and seasonal factors affect extreme portfolios after 
announcements of green policies produces no clear and consistent pattern. 
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Nonetheless, it is possible to conclude (1) weak (if not negligible) seasonality in the 
portfolios, (2) that size factor plays a significant role in explaining returns and (3) no 
clear pattern with the remaining fundamentals. 
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Appendix 6.1: Volume Analysis for Portfolios Return 
 
This table presents average K-day estimation period returns for portfolios sorted by 
event day returns and past average monthly trading volume for the period from 
November 2001 to July 2012. RL represents the extreme-loser portfolios, and RW 
represents the extreme-winner portfolios. The contrarian strategy buys loser portfolios 
and sells winner portfolios (RL-RW). I report the findings of the formation period and 
a holding period for 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 3 month, 6 month, 1 year, 2 years, 3 
years, 4 years, and 5 years. The extreme portfolios are ranked on the accounting and 
finance variables, where L, M and H represents the lowest portfolios, medium 
portfolios and highest portfolios, respectively.  
 
 H M L H-L 
1 day 
 
RL 0.00% 0.51% 0.62% -0.62% 
t-stat -0.01 6.44 7.32 -4.23  
RW 0.19% -0.02% -0.39% 0.58% 
t-stat 1.85 -0.25 -5.81 6.21  
RL-RW -0.20% 0.53% 1.01% -1.21% 
t-stat -1.23 6.40 10.75 -7.04  
0.5*(RL+RW) 0.10% 0.25% 0.12% -0.02% 
t-stat 3.75 2.8 3.92 -1.23 
1 week 
 
RL -0.04% 1.08% 1.41% -1.46% 
t-stat -0.16 6.12 9.45 -6.15  
RW 0.56% -0.31% -0.78% 1.33% 
t-stat 2.69 -1.74 -5.33 7.86  
RL-RW -0.60% 1.38% 2.19% -2.79% 
t-stat -2.26 8.13 13.50 -9.98  
0.5*(RL+RW) 0.26% 0.39% 0.32% -0.06% 
t-stat 1.77 2.33 1.22 -1.56 
1 month 
 
RL -0.59% 1.63% 1.87% -2.46% 
t-stat -1.19 4.57 6.16 -6.10  
RW 0.64% 0.04% -0.94% 1.58% 
t-stat 1.53 0.11 -3.16 5.38  
RL-RW -1.23% 1.59% 2.81% -4.04% 
t-stat -2.73 5.78 10.27 -9.02  
0.5*(RL+RW) 0.03% 0.84% 0.47% -0.44% 
t-stat 2.29 2.76 1.56 -2.07 
3 month 
 
RL -0.92% 2.17% 2.15% -3.07% 
t-stat -1.15 3.38 3.88 -5.29  
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RW 0.43% 0.52% -0.89% 1.32% 
t-stat 0.56 0.78 -1.57 2.98  
RL-RW -1.35% 1.65% 3.04% -4.39% 
t-stat -2.29 3.78 7.83 -6.69  
0.5*(RL+RW) 0.26% 0.39% 0.32% -0.06% 
t-stat -1.29 2.76 1.89 -2.11 
6 month RL -0.19% 2.75% 2.42% -2.60% 
t-stat -0.18 3.05 3.05 -3.78  
RW 0.63% 1.24% -0.40% 1.03% 
t-stat 0.63 1.36 -0.53 1.88  
RL-RW -0.82% 1.51% 2.82% -3.64% 
t-stat -1.30 2.80 5.39 -4.70  
0.5*(RL+RW) 0.22% 2.00% 1.01% -0.79% 
t-stat 2.12 1.09 2.17 -1.99 
1 year 
 
RL -0.52% 4.71% 1.64% -2.16% 
t-stat -0.30 2.93 1.15 -2.31  
RW -0.02% 2.20% -0.25% 0.22% 
t-stat -0.01 1.37 -0.18 0.29  
RL-RW -0.50% 2.51% 1.88% -2.38% 
t-stat -0.55 3.03 2.26 -2.15  
0.5*(RL+RW) -0.27% 3.46% 0.70% -0.97% 
t-stat -2.51 1.21 2.01 -1.59 
2 years 
 
RL -2.44% 3.33% -0.08% -2.36% 
t-stat -1.04 1.50 -0.04 -1.86  
RW -3.21% -0.55% -3.71% 0.50% 
t-stat -1.50 -0.24 -1.85 0.52  
RL-RW 0.77% 3.88% 3.63% -2.86% 
t-stat 0.64 3.63 2.93 -1.87  
0.5*(RL+RW) -2.83% 1.39% -1.90% -0.93% 
t-stat -2.59 1.88 -2.01 -2.11 
3 years 
 
RL -13.28% -6.94% -8.75% -4.53% 
t-stat -4.88 -2.63 -3.70 -3.16  
RW -16.11% -11.38% -15.06% -1.05% 
t-stat -6.15 -4.25 -6.56 -0.92  
RL-RW 2.83% 4.44% 6.31% -3.48% 
t-stat 2.00 3.71 4.19 -2.01  
0.5*(RL+RW) -14.70% -9.16% -11.91% -2.79% 
t-stat -12.58 -11.88 -21.01 -2.18 
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4 years 
 
RL -24.83% -16.19% -17.94% -6.89% 
t-stat -8.86 -5.90 -7.53 -4.28  
RW -29.26% -22.07% -26.69% -2.57% 
t-stat -10.02 -7.92 -10.94 -1.76  
RL-RW 4.44% 5.89% 8.76% -4.32% 
t-stat 2.60 4.31 5.03 -2.13  
0.5*(RL+RW) -27.05% -19.13% -22.32% -4.73% 
t-stat -23.51 -27.11 -23.78 -3.66 
5 years 
 
RL -28.54% -18.38% -21.77% -6.77% 
t-stat -10.69 -6.96 -8.89 -3.57  
RW -34.78% -25.83% -30.96% -3.81% 
t-stat -11.97 -9.31 -12.69 -2.42  
RL-RW 6.23% 7.45% 9.19% -2.96% 
t-stat 3.25 4.81 4.46 -1.26  
0.5*(RL+RW) -31.66% -22.11% -26.37% -5.30% 
t-stat -25.21 -21.9 -24.21 -2.79 
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Appendix 6.2: Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) Analysis for Portfolios Return 
 
This table presents average K-day estimation period returns for portfolios sorted by 
event day returns and past average monthly capital expenditure for the period from 
November 2001 to July 2012. RL represents the extreme-loser portfolios, and RW 
represents the extreme-winner portfolios. The contrarian strategy buys loser portfolios 
and sells winner portfolios (RL-RW). I report the findings of the formation period and 
a holding period for 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 3 month, 6 month, 1 year, 2 years, 3 
years, 4 years, and 5 years. The extreme portfolios are ranked on the accounting and 
finance variables, where L, M and H represents the lowest portfolios, medium 
portfolios and highest portfolios, respectively.  
 
 H M L H-L 
1 day 
 
RL 0.28% 0.27% 0.41% -0.12% 
t-stat 3.75 2.80 3.92 -1.23  
RW -0.17% -0.01% -0.03% -0.14% 
t-stat -2.51 -0.11 -0.28 -1.59  
RL-RW 0.45% 0.28% 0.44% 0.02% 
t-stat 6.41 2.62 3.38 0.14  
0.5*(RL+RW) 0.06% 0.13% 0.19% -0.14% 
t-stat 1.12 2.1 1.35 -1.09 
1 week 
 
RL 0.67% 0.50% 1.04% -0.38% 
t-stat 4.29 2.72 5.20 -2.07  
RW -0.08% 0.00% -0.38% 0.30% 
t-stat -0.56 0.01 -1.61 1.48  
RL-RW 0.75% 0.50% 1.42% -0.67% 
t-stat 5.73 2.82 5.57 -2.63  
0.5*(RL+RW) 0.30% 0.25% 0.33% -0.04% 
t-stat 1.09 0.9 1.87 -1.02 
1 month 
 
RL 1.15% 0.70% 1.87% 0.55% 
t-stat 3.76 1.92 6.16 1.19  
RW 0.27% 0.14% -0.43% 0.71% 
t-stat 0.90 0.46 -0.95 2.14  
RL-RW 0.87% 0.55% 1.03% -0.16% 
t-stat 3.67 1.83 2.03 -0.28  
0.5*(RL+RW) 0.71% 0.42% 0.72% -0.01% 
t-stat 2.11 1.35 1.78 -1.12 
3 month 
 
RL 2.08% 0.71% 0.66% 1.43% 
t-stat 3.74 1.10 0.79 1.89  
 203 
 
RW 1.17% 0.58% -1.33% 2.50% 
t-stat 2.01 0.98 -1.70 5.51  
RL-RW 0.92% 0.12% 1.98% -1.07% 
t-stat 2.28 0.26 2.74 -1.22  
0.5*(RL+RW) 1.63% 0.65% -0.34% 1.96% 
t-stat 2.56 1.23 -1.56 2.54 
6 month RL 2.63% 1.07% 0.18% 2.45% 
t-stat 3.21 1.24 0.17 2.64  
RW 2.14% 1.16% -1.55% 3.68% 
t-stat 2.66 1.43 -1.52 6.84  
RL-RW 0.49% -0.08% 1.73% -1.23% 
t-stat 0.97 -0.15 1.97 -1.18  
0.5*(RL+RW) 2.39% 1.12% -0.69% 3.07% 
t-stat 3.21 3.15 -2.34 4.21 
1 year 
 
RL 3.99% 1.57% -1.65% 5.65% 
t-stat 2.86 1.03 -0.91 4.34  
RW 4.19% 1.71% -3.56% 7.75% 
t-stat 2.91 1.21 -2.01 7.76  
RL-RW -0.20% -0.14% 1.91% -2.11% 
t-stat -0.26 -0.16 1.53 -1.43  
0.5*(RL+RW) 4.09% 1.64% -2.61% 6.70% 
t-stat 4.32 5.43 -5.65 2.35 
2 years 
 
RL 3.77% -0.62% -5.44% 9.21% 
t-stat 2.08 -0.30 -2.31 5.61  
RW 6.49% -1.06% -12.33% 18.83% 
t-stat 3.46 -0.53 -4.82 12.70  
RL-RW -2.73% 0.44% 6.89% -9.61% 
t-stat -2.87 0.36 4.41 -5.64  
0.5*(RL+RW) 5.13% -0.84% -8.89% 14.02% 
t-stat 2.56 -1.45 -5.56 3.89 
3 years 
 
RL -2.91% -10.79% -17.09% 14.18% 
t-stat -1.45 -4.46 -6.58 7.48  
RW -0.30% -11.22% -29.03% 28.73% 
t-stat -0.14 -4.63 -9.64 16.83  
RL-RW -2.61% 0.43% 11.94% -14.55% 
t-stat -2.38 0.30 6.19 -7.21  
0.5*(RL+RW) -1.61% -11.01% -23.06% 21.46% 
t-stat -4.32 -6.78 -5.23 9.01 
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4 years 
 
RL -10.99% -19.98% -28.36% 17.37% 
t-stat -5.62 -8.40 -9.98 7.62  
RW -8.92% -21.45% -44.20% 35.28% 
t-stat -4.18 -8.32 -12.99 16.58  
RL-RW -2.07% 1.47% 15.84% -17.91% 
t-stat -1.72 0.86 6.77 -7.38  
0.5*(RL+RW) -9.96% -20.72% -36.28% 26.33% 
t-stat -6.56 -4.45 -5.44 12.35 
5 years 
 
RL -11.77% -22.12% -32.06% 20.28% 
t-stat -6.58 -9.50 -10.56 8.26  
RW -11.01% -25.09% -50.68% 39.67% 
t-stat -5.57 -9.90 -14.40 16.61  
RL-RW -0.76% 2.97% 18.63% -19.39% 
t-stat -0.59 1.58 7.29 -7.57  
0.5*(RL+RW) -11.39% -23.61% -41.37% 29.98% 
t-stat -10.11 -1.91 -14.56 4.23 
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Appendix 6.3: Leverage Analysis for Portfolios Return 
 
This table presents average K-day estimation period returns for portfolios sorted by 
event day returns and past average monthly leverage for the period from November 
2001 to July 2012. RL represents the extreme-loser portfolios, and RW represents the 
extreme-winner portfolios. The contrarian strategy buys loser portfolios and sells 
winner portfolios (RL-RW). I report the findings of the formation period and a 
holding period for 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 3 month, 6 month, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 
4 years, and 5 years. The extreme portfolios are ranked on the accounting and finance 
variables, where L, M and H represents the lowest portfolios, medium portfolios and 
highest portfolios, respectively.  
 
 H M L H-L 
1 day 
 
RL 0.37% 0.50% 0.49% -0.12% 
t-stat 4.31 6.75 6.61 -1.78 
RW -0.06% -0.10% -0.02% -0.04% 
t-stat -0.68 -1.36 -0.25 -0.54 
RL-RW 0.43% 0.60% 0.51% -0.08% 
t-stat 4.23 7.51 6.30 -0.74 
0.5*(RL+RW) 0.16% 0.20% 0.24% -0.08% 
t-stat 1.55 1.67 2.31 -0.9 
1 week 
 
RL 0.81% 1.14% 1.23% -0.42% 
t-stat 5.00 7.76 7.61 -2.82 
RW -0.35% -0.10% 0.14% -0.49% 
t-stat -1.99 -0.67 0.85 -3.59 
RL-RW 1.15% 1.24% 1.08% 0.07% 
t-stat 7.09 9.22 6.91 0.38 
0.5*(RL+RW) 0.23% 0.52% 0.69% -0.46% 
t-stat 2.09 1.76 1.37 -1.98 
1 month 
 
RL 0.86% 1.96% 2.02% -1.16% 
t-stat 2.54 5.63 6.38 -3.84 
RW 0.03% 0.24% 0.36% -0.32% 
t-stat 0.09 0.74 1.04 -1.47 
RL-RW 0.83% 1.71% 1.66% -0.83% 
t-stat 2.68 5.64 6.39 -2.19 
0.5*(RL+RW) 0.45% 1.10% 1.19% -0.75% 
t-stat 1.23 1.67 2.34 -2.21 
3 month 
 
RL 0.98% 2.64% 3.76% -2.78% 
t-stat 1.59 4.70 5.94 -5.10 
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RW 0.34% 1.00% 0.89% -0.56% 
t-stat 0.50 1.64 1.51 -1.77 
RL-RW 0.65% 1.64% 2.87% -2.22% 
t-stat 1.42 3.97 6.16 -3.48 
 0.5*(RL+RW) 0.66% 1.82% 2.33% -1.67% 
t-stat 2.13 2.09 2.15 -2.11 
6 month RL 0.72% 2.99% 5.02% -4.30% 
t-stat 0.82 3.97 6.00 -6.47 
RW 0.86% 1.78% 1.38% -0.52% 
t-stat 0.96 2.07 1.73 -1.34 
RL-RW -0.15% 1.21% 3.64% -3.78% 
t-stat -0.26 2.32 6.41 -5.03 
0.5*(RL+RW) 0.79% 2.39% 3.20% -2.41% 
t-stat 1.44 2.41 3.12 -2.18 
1 year 
 
RL -1.17% 4.16% 7.30% -8.47% 
t-stat -0.73 2.97 4.94 -8.52 
RW 0.37% 3.63% 2.50% -2.14% 
t-stat 0.23 2.52 1.71 -3.52 
RL-RW -1.53% 0.53% 4.80% -6.33% 
t-stat -1.69 0.68 5.89 -5.79 
0.5*(RL+RW) -0.40% 3.90% 4.90% -5.30% 
t-stat -1.67 2.44 3.12 -4.54 
2 years 
 
RL -7.56% 5.73% 5.92% -13.49% 
t-stat -3.44 2.98 3.01 -10.45 
RW -4.74% 2.37% -0.42% -4.32% 
t-stat -2.06 1.18 -0.21 -5.08 
RL-RW -2.82% 3.36% 6.34% -9.16% 
t-stat -2.23 3.06 5.81 -6.64 
0.5*(RL+RW) -6.15% 4.05% 2.75% -8.90% 
t-stat -5.67 3.21 5.43 -3.56 
3 years 
 
RL -20.87% -3.96% 0.01% -20.88% 
t-stat -8.20 -1.76 0.01 -13.09 
RW -18.43% -7.92% -10.46% -7.96% 
t-stat -6.55 -3.28 -4.38 -7.10 
RL-RW -2.44% 3.96% 10.48% -12.91% 
t-stat -1.47 2.92 7.74 -6.98 
0.5*(RL+RW) -19.65% -5.94% -5.23% -14.43% 
t-stat -10.01 -11.21 -10.12 -4.53 
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4 years 
 
RL -33.94% -14.08% -5.54% -28.41% 
t-stat -12.67 -6.06 -2.67 -15.69 
RW -33.92% -18.39% -19.10% -14.83% 
t-stat -11.05 -7.27 -7.55 -11.27 
RL-RW -0.02% 4.31% 13.56% -13.58% 
t-stat -0.01 2.73 8.61 -6.08 
0.5*(RL+RW) -33.93% -16.24% -12.32% -21.61% 
t-stat -12.45 -21.11 -9.12 -6.54 
5 years 
 
RL -38.10% -14.90% -6.94% -31.16% 
t-stat -13.31 -6.32 -3.54 -14.65 
RW -41.04% -21.52% -21.23% -19.81% 
t-stat -13.05 -8.78 -8.46 -13.18 
RL-RW 2.94% 6.62% 14.29% -11.34% 
t-stat 1.19 3.95 8.12 -4.30 
0.5*(RL+RW) -39.57% -18.21% -14.09% -25.49% 
t-stat -13.12 -24.09 -10.87 -12.23 
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Appendix 6.4: Profitability Analysis for Portfolios Return 
 
This table presents average K-day estimation period returns for portfolios sorted by 
event day returns and past average monthly net profit for the period from November 
2001 to July 2012. RL represents the extreme-loser portfolios, and RW represents the 
extreme-winner portfolios. The contrarian strategy buys loser portfolios and sells 
winner portfolios (RL-RW). I report the findings of the formation period and a 
holding period for 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 3 month, 6 month, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 
4 years, and 5 years. The extreme portfolios are ranked on the accounting and finance 
variables, where L, M and H represents the lowest portfolios, medium portfolios and 
highest portfolios, respectively. 
 
 H M L H-L 
1 day 
 
RL 0.36% 0.39% 0.22% 0.15% 
t-stat 4.53 5.20 1.74 1.23  
RW -0.16% 0.03% -0.08% -0.08% 
t-stat -2.48 0.35 -0.71 -0.84  
RL-RW 0.52% 0.36% 0.29% 0.23% 
t-stat 7.76 4.44 1.91 1.47  
0.5*(RL+RW) 0.10% 0.21% 0.07% 0.03% 
t-stat 1.32 1.54 2.01 1.91 
1 week 
 
RL 0.76% 0.94% 0.50% 0.26% 
t-stat 5.19 5.79 2.11 1.18  
RW 0.05% 0.00% -0.51% 0.56% 
t-stat 0.39 0.01 -2.19 2.87  
RL-RW 0.71% 0.94% 1.01% -0.31% 
t-stat 6.31 5.98 3.56 -1.07  
0.5*(RL+RW) 0.41% 0.47% -0.01% 0.41% 
t-stat 1.56 2.14 -2.08 2.34 
1 month 
 
RL 1.58% 1.64% -0.84% 2.42% 
t-stat 4.34 5.06 -1.66 4.47  
RW 0.44% 0.35% -0.84% 1.28% 
t-stat 1.57 1.06 -1.83 3.83  
RL-RW 1.14% 1.28% 0.00% 1.14% 
t-stat 3.77 5.32 -0.01 1.83  
0.5*(RL+RW) 1.01% 1.00% -0.84% 1.85% 
t-stat 2.11 2.65 -2.13 2.17 
3 month 
 
RL 3.45% 2.35% -2.43% 5.88% 
t-stat 5.00 3.86 -2.85 6.42  
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RW 1.39% 1.14% -2.12% 3.51% 
t-stat 2.48 1.86 -2.70 7.58  
RL-RW 2.07% 1.20% -0.31% 2.38% 
t-stat 4.04 3.02 -0.40 2.40  
0.5*(RL+RW) 2.42% 1.75% -2.28% 4.70% 
t-stat 2.09 2.1 -1.09 1.98 
6 month RL 4.47% 2.82% -3.50% 7.97% 
t-stat 4.73 3.44 -3.20 7.53  
RW 2.29% 1.82% -2.39% 4.67% 
t-stat 2.95 2.19 -2.32 8.34  
RL-RW 2.18% 1.00% -1.12% 3.30% 
t-stat 3.32 2.26 -1.21 2.85  
0.5*(RL+RW) 3.38% 2.32% -2.95% 6.33% 
t-stat 3.12 3.15 -3.45 2.54 
1 year 
 
RL 7.57% 5.49% -9.32% 16.89% 
t-stat 4.75 3.59 -5.48 12.30  
RW 4.73% 3.88% -6.31% 11.05% 
t-stat 3.33 2.61 -3.71 11.86  
RL-RW 2.84% 1.61% -3.01% 5.85% 
t-stat 3.47 2.10 -2.23 3.64  
0.5*(RL+RW) 6.15% 4.69% -7.82% 13.97% 
t-stat 3.02 2.1 -2.45 4.54 
2 years 
 
RL 9.77% 6.64% -19.00% 28.76% 
t-stat 4.78 3.22 -8.31 17.79  
RW 7.15% 2.09% -16.18% 23.33% 
t-stat 3.82 0.99 -6.61 16.20  
RL-RW 2.62% 4.55% -2.81% 5.43% 
t-stat 2.55 4.05 -1.60 2.74  
0.5*(RL+RW) 8.46% 4.37% -17.59% 26.05% 
t-stat 4.54 2.31 -3.14 5.67 
3 years 
 
RL 3.84% -1.55% -33.43% 37.27% 
t-stat 1.68 -0.66 -13.30 20.32  
RW 0.75% -9.00% -32.42% 33.17% 
t-stat 0.34 -3.54 -11.35 21.77  
RL-RW 3.09% 7.45% -1.02% 4.10% 
t-stat 2.60 5.13 -0.51 1.85  
0.5*(RL+RW) 2.30% -5.28% -32.93% 35.22% 
t-stat 2.58 -2.35 -9.01 3.24 
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4 years 
 
RL -3.93% -10.94% -44.76% 40.84% 
t-stat -1.66 -4.65 -17.58 19.06  
RW -8.56% -19.40% -46.76% 38.20% 
t-stat -3.82 -7.28 -14.70 21.19  
RL-RW 4.64% 8.46% 2.00% 2.64% 
t-stat 3.60 4.94 0.84 1.04  
0.5*(RL+RW) -6.25% -15.17% -45.76% 39.52% 
t-stat -3.56 -5.34 -3.12 7.01 
5 years 
 
RL -4.78% -12.89% -48.64% 43.86% 
t-stat -2.18 -5.32 -18.20 19.54  
RW -11.15% -23.85% -52.04% 40.89% 
t-stat -5.11 -8.86 -16.37 20.37  
RL-RW 6.36% 10.96% 3.40% 2.97% 
t-stat 4.56 5.54 1.35 1.14  
0.5*(RL+RW) -7.97% -18.37% -50.34% 42.38% 
t-stat -5.61 -2.31 -9.01 10.21 
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Appendix 6.5: Sales Analysis for Portfolios Return 
 
This table presents average K-day estimation period returns for portfolios sorted by 
event day returns and past average monthly sales for the period from November 2001 
to July 2012. RL represents the extreme-loser portfolios, and RW represents the 
extreme-winner portfolios. The contrarian strategy buys loser portfolios and sells 
winner portfolios (RL-RW). I report the findings of the formation period and a 
holding period for 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 3 month, 6 month, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 
4 years, and 5 years. The extreme portfolios are ranked on the accounting and finance 
variables, where L, M and H represents the lowest portfolios, medium portfolios and 
highest portfolios, respectively.  
 
 H M L H-L 
1 day 
 
RL 0.63% 0.22% 0.51% 0.08% 
t-stat 2.09 1.53 0.04 2.88  
RW -0.20% -0.02% 0.00% -0.20% 
t-stat -2.78 -0.24 0.04 -2.13  
RL-RW 0.43% 0.24% 0.51% 0.28% 
t-stat 4.97 2.29 4.36 0.61  
0.5*(RL+RW) -0.20% -0.02% 0.00% -0.20% 
t-stat -1.09 -1.02 1.12 -1.41 
1 week 
 
RL 0.63% 0.38% 1.21% -0.58% 
t-stat 3.84 2.04 6.14 -3.02  
RW -0.14% -0.05% -0.27% 0.14% 
t-stat -0.96 -0.31 -1.14 0.65  
RL-RW 0.77% 0.43% 1.48% -0.72% 
t-stat 5.13 2.35 6.14 -2.74  
0.5*(RL+RW) 0.25% 0.17% 0.47% -0.23% 
t-stat 1.9 1.26 2.01 -1.24 
1 month 
 
RL 1.02% 0.48% 0.92% 0.11% 
t-stat 3.25 1.17 2.20 0.28  
RW 0.19% 0.04% -0.26% 0.45% 
t-stat 0.62 0.11 -0.58 1.34  
RL-RW 0.83% 0.45% 1.18% -0.35% 
t-stat 3.18 1.29 2.69 -0.73  
0.5*(RL+RW) 0.61% 0.26% 0.33% 0.28% 
t-stat 1.28 1.72 1.89 1.97 
3 month 
 
RL 1.99% 0.81% 0.62% 1.37% 
t-stat 3.40 1.12 0.86 2.21  
 212 
 
RW 1.07% 0.38% -1.03% 2.09% 
t-stat 1.83 0.61 -1.37 4.77  
RL-RW 0.92% 0.43% 1.65% -0.72% 
t-stat 2.12 0.77 2.76 -1.00  
 0.5*(RL+RW) 1.53% 0.60% -0.21% 1.74% 
t-stat 2.31 2.14 1.67 2.23 
6 month RL 2.78% 0.89% 0.17% 2.61% 
t-stat 3.39 0.91 0.18 3.53  
RW 2.13% 0.75% -1.14% 3.27% 
t-stat 2.66 0.88 -1.16 6.32  
RL-RW 0.65% 0.13% 1.31% -0.66% 
t-stat 1.24 0.19 1.82 -0.76  
0.5*(RL+RW) 2.46% 0.82% -0.49% 2.94% 
t-stat 3.14 1.79 -1.28 2.41 
1 year 
 
RL 4.82% 0.95% -1.91% 6.74% 
t-stat 3.29 0.59 -1.13 5.86  
RW 3.80% 1.98% -3.46% 7.26% 
t-stat 2.70 1.35 -1.95 7.12  
RL-RW 1.02% -1.03% 1.54% -0.52% 
t-stat 1.31 -1.07 1.34 -0.39  
0.5*(RL+RW) 4.31% 1.47% -2.69% 7.00% 
t-stat 2.19 32.19 -2.31 2.45 
2 years 
 
RL 3.90% 1.00% -7.32% 11.21% 
t-stat 2.11 0.49 -2.98 6.97  
RW 5.72% 0.18% -12.81% 18.53% 
t-stat 3.14 0.09 -4.95 11.72  
RL-RW -1.82% 0.82% 5.50% -7.32% 
t-stat -1.83 0.67 3.59 -4.47  
0.5*(RL+RW) 4.81% 0.59% -10.07% 14.88% 
t-stat 5.32 1.41 -2.61 9.18 
3 years 
 
RL -2.27% -8.15% -20.52% 18.24% 
t-stat -1.14 -3.56 -7.40 10.16  
RW -0.92% -9.61% -30.12% 29.20% 
t-stat -0.43 -3.95 -9.89 16.79  
RL-RW -1.35% 1.46% 9.60% -10.95% 
t-stat -1.18 0.99 5.13 -5.69  
0.5*(RL+RW) -1.60% -8.88% -25.32% 23.73% 
t-stat -2.14 -4.21 -5.31 7.14 
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4 years 
 
RL -9.84% -17.38% -32.24% 22.41% 
t-stat -5.27 -7.12 -11.35 10.35  
RW -9.39% -20.35% -44.95% 35.55% 
t-stat -4.39 -8.01 -13.14 17.10  
RL-RW -0.44% 2.97% 12.70% -13.15% 
t-stat -0.34 1.79 5.57 -5.78  
0.5*(RL+RW) -9.62% -18.87% -38.60% 28.98% 
t-stat -4.32 -5.67 -10.98 3.45 
5 years 
 
RL -10.74% -19.67% -35.74% 24.99% 
t-stat -6.44 -7.83 -12.17 10.75  
RW -11.36% -24.17% -51.51% 40.15% 
t-stat -5.68 -9.75 -14.47 17.11  
RL-RW 0.62% 4.50% 15.78% -15.15% 
t-stat 0.45 2.50 6.14 -4.47 
0.5*(RL+RW) -11.05% -21.92% -43.63% 32.58% 
t-stat -10.12 -8.18 -7.45 7.15 
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Appendix 6.6: Size Analysis for Portfolios Return 
 
This table presents average K-day estimation period returns for portfolios sorted by 
event day returns and past average monthly size for the period from November 2001 
to July 2012. RL represents the extreme-loser portfolios, and RW represents the 
extreme-winner portfolios. The contrarian strategy buys loser portfolios and sells 
winner portfolios (RL-RW). I report the findings of the formation period and a 
holding period for 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 3 month, 6 month, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 
4 years, and 5 years. The extreme portfolios are ranked on the accounting and finance 
variables, where L, M and H represents the lowest portfolios, medium portfolios and 
highest portfolios, respectively.  
 
 H M L H-L 
1 day 
 
RL 0.35% 0.54% 0.12% 0.23% 
t-stat 4.00 6.89 0.98 1.98  
RW 0.07% 0.06% -0.35% 0.43% 
t-stat 1.01 0.74 -3.88 5.25  
RL-RW 0.28% 0.48% 0.47% -0.20% 
t-stat 3.61 5.39 3.26 -1.28  
0.5*(RL+RW) 0.21% 0.30% -0.12% 0.33% 
t-stat 1.14 1.26 -1.34 1.76 
1 week 
 
RL 0.94% 1.04% 0.27% 0.67% 
t-stat 5.77 7.16 1.12 2.97  
RW 0.52% 0.10% -1.06% 1.58% 
t-stat 3.33 0.58 -5.62 10.54  
RL-RW 0.42% 0.95% 1.33% -0.91% 
t-stat 3.31 6.10 4.96 -3.42  
0.5*(RL+RW) 0.73% 0.57% -0.40% 1.13% 
t-stat 1.87 1.56 -1.87 2.01 
1 month 
 
RL 1.51% 1.47% -0.50% 2.01% 
t-stat 4.96 4.33 -0.98 4.15  
RW 0.69% 0.51% -1.16% 1.86% 
t-stat 2.16 1.45 -2.96 6.60  
RL-RW 0.81% 0.96% 0.66% 0.16% 
t-stat 3.72 3.20 1.28 0.29  
0.5*(RL+RW) 1.10% 0.99% -0.83% 1.93% 
t-stat 2.12 2.41 -1.27 1.09 
3 month 
 
RL 1.96% 1.42% 0.21% 1.75% 
t-stat 3.45 2.36 0.26 2.81  
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RW 0.83% 0.81% -0.94% 1.76% 
t-stat 1.36 1.31 -1.26 3.92  
RL-RW 1.13% 0.61% 1.14% -0.01% 
t-stat 3.32 1.45 1.62 -0.02  
0.5*(RL+RW) 1.40% 1.12% -0.37% 1.76% 
t-stat 1.56 1.78 -1.67 2.13 
6 month RL 2.52% 1.48% 0.23% 2.29% 
t-stat 3.06 1.82 0.22 2.96  
RW 1.45% 0.84% -0.31% 1.76% 
t-stat 1.77 1.00 -0.32 3.51  
RL-RW 1.07% 0.63% 0.54% 0.53% 
t-stat 2.42 1.26 0.65 0.61  
0.5*(RL+RW) 1.99% 1.16% -0.04% 2.03% 
t-stat 2.14 2.16 -1.17 2.09 
1 year 
 
RL 3.35% 0.49% -0.06% 3.41% 
t-stat 2.20 0.34 -0.04 3.15  
RW 1.91% 0.55% 0.08% 1.83% 
t-stat 1.32 0.37 0.05 2.16  
RL-RW 1.43% -0.06% -0.14% 1.58% 
t-stat 1.96 -0.08 -0.12 1.23  
0.5*(RL+RW) 2.63% 0.52% 0.01% 2.62% 
t-stat 2.14 3.09 1.07 2.65 
2 years 
 
RL 3.87% -2.96% -2.59% 6.45% 
t-stat 1.85 -1.46 -1.19 4.47  
RW 1.37% -4.09% -3.54% 4.91% 
t-stat 0.71 -1.94 -1.54 4.64  
RL-RW 2.50% 1.12% 0.96% 1.54% 
t-stat 2.36 1.00 0.63 0.91  
0.5*(RL+RW) 2.62% -3.53% -3.07% 5.69% 
t-stat 3.13 -2.31 -3.51 5.13 
3 years 
 
RL -4.84% -14.28% -11.09% 6.25% 
t-stat -1.99 -5.94 -5.25 3.77  
RW -8.87% -16.29% -14.54% 5.66% 
t-stat -3.67 -6.32 -5.72 5.01  
RL-RW 4.03% 2.01% 3.45% 0.59% 
t-stat 3.15 1.46 1.95 0.31  
0.5*(RL+RW) -6.86% -15.29% -12.82% 5.96% 
t-stat -10.09 -3.41 -7.71 4.52 
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4 years 
 
RL -14.13% -24.13% -19.80% 5.67% 
t-stat -5.88 -9.26 -9.50 2.78  
RW -19.66% -28.59% -25.37% 5.72% 
t-stat -7.79 -10.02 -9.64 4.35  
RL-RW 5.53% 4.46% 5.58% -0.05% 
t-stat 3.70 2.61 2.73 -0.02  
0.5*(RL+RW) -16.90% -26.36% -22.59% 5.69% 
t-stat -2.98 -2.43 -9.09 6.43 
5 years 
 
RL -16.71% -27.40% -20.97% 4.26% 
t-stat -7.17 -10.17 -9.39 1.88  
RW -23.97% -33.42% -28.46% 4.50% 
t-stat -9.56 -11.63 -11.12 3.13  
RL-RW 7.25% 6.02% 7.49% -0.23% 
t-stat 4.19 3.06 3.40 -0.10  
0.5*(RL+RW) -20.34% -30.41% -24.72% 4.38% 
t-stat -10.98 -7.67 -6.16 2.15 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: GREEN POLICIES AND THE CROSSHOLDING OF 
SHARES  
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
Crossholding is the percentage of total shares in issue held by one company in another. 
This has been discussed recently within corporate governance literature. Besides 
Germany, Japan is another leading country regarding the crossholding corporate 
structure. Unlike the UK and the US, in Japan the primary purpose for a crossholding is 
to (1) prevent hostile takeovers and (2) strengthen the relationship between companies 
and sometimes banks. Nevertheless, crossholding has proven to have negative aspects, 
such as poor performance, distorted corporate governance and emasculation of capital, 
according to Guo and Yakura (2009). After World War II, crossholding in Japan has 
been referred to as ‘Japanese main bank system’, but another type of cross holding 
exists—crossholding between manufactures and its suppliers. These two types of 
crossholding are known as keiretsu. Japan has a unique shareholding structure—the 
Keiretsu system. The literature argues that the large portion of crossholding across 
firms and industry affects returns. As this study looks at Japanese industrial 
portfolios’ return, it is important to control for the Keiretsu system.  
 
The literature about corporate governance and green effects is non-existent and this 
chapter aims to create this a link. In Chapter 5, green effects were calculated for each 
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firm after each announcement, but each of these firms falls under keiretsu. In this 
chapter, I explore whether keiretsu can explain green effects across the firms. This 
chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 introduces the keiretsu, Section 7.3 
describes the horizontal and vertical keiretsu, Section 7.4 illustrates the data and 
methodology used in this study, Section 7.5 explains green effects under the 
crossholding structure, Section 7.6 explains green effects under crossholding structure 
after controlling for firms’ voting rights and Section 7.7 concludes this chapter. 
 
7.2 KEIRETSU  
7.2.1 Definition 
Japan’s corporate governance system is known as keiretsu—which is a set of 
companies with interlocking business relationships and shareholdings. Keiretsu is a 
business network composed of manufacturers, supply chain partners, distributors and 
financiers who remain financially independent but work closely together to ensure each 
other’s success (Lincoln and Shimotani, 2009). In Japanese, the word keiretsu means 
‘group’. 
 
7.2.2 History of Keiretsu 
Keiretsu grew out of the post-war period (WWII). It was previously known as zaibatsu. 
As described by Guo and Yakura, following the Anti-Monopoly Act of 1953, zaibatsu 
groups such as Mitsubishi began to acquire the shares of other companies—leading to 
creation of the cross shareholding system, which is now known as the keiretsu. 
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The rapid growth of these crossholding occurred in the early 1960s during the share 
market downturn. To prevent hostile takeover from overseas markets, the Japanese 
government supported crossholding activities to secure the local market. Consequently, 
the keiretsu system developed with rapid speed in 1960s. 
 
During the 1970s, cross shareholding reached its peak point in Japan. This is explained 
by two main reasons. The first is due to market conditions (such as the development of 
the equity markets and the first oil shock of 1973), which resulted in an increased 
proportion of crossholdings by large financial institutions (including banks). Second, 
banks issued a large number of shares at that time; in turn, this induced more 
crossholding of companies. Although the crossholding rate cannot exceed 25% of the 
total issued shares (see Guo and Yakura 2009), it generated some corporate governance 
issues, such as conflict of interest for shareholders. 
 
The crossholding ratio decreased as the ‘bubbled’ economy burst during the 1990s. As 
the stock market slowed down (negative price shocks), companies liquidated their 
shares. This large sell-off led to the unwinding of crossholding. Further, Guo and 
Yakura (2009) note that the central bank of Japan purchased US$19 billion shares 
between 2002 and 2004, which had a significant impact on the unwinding of 
crossholding. 
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7.2.3 Keiretsu Reforms 
Following the 1990s downturn, Japan restructured its corporate governance system. 
This particularly related to unwinding the traditional crossholding structure. Facing a 
sharp decrease in share prices in the 1990s, as well as a depression of the Japanese 
economy, the ratio of crossholding began to decrease. Ahmadjian (2003) and Lincoin 
and Shimotani (2009) document how companies changed their crossholding structure 
by reducing their board members. 
 
7.3 HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL KEIRETSU 
The two principal “keiretsu” types that have gathered most attention from scholars are 
“horizontal” keiretsu and vertical keiretsu. They are both explained below in turn. 
 
7.3.1 Horizontal Keiretsu 
A number of independent but related companies are grouped and financed by a single 
bank and/or a joint stock company. A horizontal keiretsu is essentially a diversified 
corporation; that is, it may have companies in several unrelated industries to reduce the 
risk of loss if one industry has a bad year (diversification benefits). For instance, a 
typical horizontal keiretsu is Mitsubishi, where the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi sits at 
the top. Also part of the core group is Mitsubishi Motors and Mitsubishi Trust and 
Banking, followed by Meiji Mutual Life Insurance Company, which provides 
insurance to all members of the keiretsu. Mitsubishi Shoji is the trading company for 
the Mitsubishi keiretsu. 
 221 
 
Six major horizontal keiretsu have developed over a number of years. Three keiretsu 
(Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo) are descendants of pre-war zaibatsu, while the 
other three (Dai Ichi Kango, Fuyo, and Sanyo) developed around major banks during 
the post-war period (WWII). In 2000, Sumitomo and Mitsui merged to become the 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, while Sanwa became part of the Bank of 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi group in 2001. In essence, Japan has four horizontal keiretsu, a result 
of significant regulatory and economic change. 
 
A horizontal keiretsu is thought to promote sustainability over quick profits; however, 
critics of this system contend it is inefficient. According to McGuire and Dow (2009), 
the benefits of horizontal keiretsu include: (1) access to stable finance, (2) risk 
mitigation, (3) monitoring benefits and reducing information asymmetry, and (4) 
mutual assistance. The negative effects include: (1) higher borrowing costs, (2) over 
investment, and (3) poor performance. 
 
7.3.2 Vertical Keiretsu 
Vertical keiretsu comprises manufacturers and their supply chain groups (suppliers, 
subcontractors and distributors). Examples include Matsushita, Nippon Steel and 
Toyota. Shareholdings in vertical groupings are asymmetric, with suppliers holding 
small positions in primary firms. Vertical group membership provides suppliers with a 
stable market for their products and the possibility of technical, managerial or financial 
assistance from core firms. According to McGuire and Dow (2009), the benefits of 
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vertical keiretsu include: (1) innovation, (2) reduced governance problems, (3) lower 
transaction costs, and (4) stable output and export markets. The negative effects of 
vertical keiretsu include: (1) limited customer scope, and (2) limited innovation. 
 
7.4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This study’s data set includes 6616 firms (see Section 4.4 in Chapter 4). Firms’ 
shareholding information was hand collected from the ‘Osiris’ database. Firms’ 
shareholding information was searched manually by either entering the firm’s name or 
its ‘BvD ID’ number (identity number given by Osiris). I managed to collect 2537 
firms’ shareholding information; this number was due to data unavailability. The firms 
with shareholding information (crossholding) became another category of stock and 
their respective ARs were collected from the results of Chapter 5. The crossholding 
group was then subcategorised as either an environmentally friendly or a polluting firm. 
When the shareholding structure was considered, it initiated four options (O1 to O4): 
 O1.environmentally friendly firms with major environmentally friendly 
shareholders 
 O2. environmentally friendly firms with major polluting shareholders 
 O3. polluting firms with major environmentally friendly shareholders 
 O4. polluting firms with major polluting shareholders. 
 
According to Guo and Yakura (2009), voting rights affect firms’ performance. 
Shareholders with more than 3% of holdings are considered as shareholders with voting 
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rights, and shareholders with less than 3% of crossholding shares are considered as 
shareholders with no voting rights. When voting rights are considered, the four 
categories described above are split into eight groups: 
 O1A. environmentally friendly firms with major environmentally friendly 
shareholders who have no voting rights 
 O1B. environmentally friendly firms with major environmentally friendly 
shareholders who have voting rights 
 O2A. environmentally friendly firms with major polluting shareholders who have 
no voting rights 
 O2B. environmentally friendly firms with major polluting shareholders who have 
voting rights 
 O3A. polluting firms with major environmentally friendly shareholders who have 
no voting rights 
 O3B. polluting firms with major environmentally friendly shareholders who have 
voting rights 
 O4A. polluting firms with major polluting shareholders who have no voting rights 
 O4B. polluting firms with major polluting shareholders who have voting rights 
 
7.5 GREEN EFFECTS UNDER CROSSHOLDING STRUCTURE  
It should be noted that green effects are observed and presented in Chapter 5. In this 
chapter, I investigate how the keiretsu corporate structure affects the green effects. As 
is shown in Table 7.1, abnormal returns and t-statistics of the four options (O1, O2, 
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O3 and O4) are reported. 
Table 7.1: Green Effects under Crossholding Structure 
Four Options AR t-stat 
O1.Environmentally friendly firms with major environmentally 
friendly shareholders 
0.03% 4.70*** 
O2. Environmentally friendly firms with major polluting 
shareholders 
0.07% 2.72*** 
O3. Polluting firms with major environmentally friendly 
shareholders 
0.03% 4.90*** 
O4. Polluting firms with major polluting shareholders 0.24% 2.43*** 
 
As shown in Table 7.1, all four options produced statistically significant ARs. For instance, the 
AR of environmentally friendly firms with major environmentally friendly shareholders (O1) 
is 0.03% (t-statistic of 4.70); similarly, the other three categories’ ARs are 0.07%, 0.03% and 
0.24% respectively, with corresponding t-statistics of 2.72, 4.90 and 2.43 respectively. The 
biggest AR category is the polluting firms with major polluting shareholders (O4). This is 
consistent with the findings of previous chapters in that polluting firms are associated with 
large positive ARs. This implies that green effects persist even after controlling for the 
shareholding structure. 
 
7.6 GREEN EFFECTS UNDER CROSSHOLDING STRUCTURE WITH OR WITHOUT VOTING 
RIGHTS 
Table 7.2 reports the results of green effects and crossholding structure after considering 
corporate voting rights. As shown in Table 7.2, over the eight options (O1A, O1B, O2A, O2B, 
O3A, O3B, O4A and O4B), only one option is statistically significant, with an AR of 0.09% 
(t-statistic of 2.00). This is for environmental friendly firms with major polluting shareholders 
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who do not have any voting rights (O2A). The ARs of the other options are 0.03%, 0.02%, 
0.02%, 0.03%, -0.01%, 0.14% and -0.01% respectively, with corresponding t-statistics of 1.04, 
0.85, 0.89, 1.16, -0.23, 1.72 and -0.61 respectively. These statistically insignificant results can 
be interpreted as that the voting rights of shareholders do not matter in the area of green effect
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Table 7.2: Green Effects under Crossholding Structure after Controlling for Voting Rights 
Eight Options AR t-stat 
O1A. Environmentally friendly firms with major environmentally friendly shareholders with no voting rights 0.03% 1.04 
O1B. Environmentally friendly firms with major polluting shareholders with no voting rights 0.02% 0.85 
O2A. Environmentally friendly firms with major polluting shareholders with no voting rights  0.09% 2.00** 
O2B. Environmentally friendly firms with major polluting shareholders with voting rights  0.02% 0.89 
O3A. Polluting firms with major environmentally friendly shareholders with no voting rights  0.03% 1.16 
O3B. Polluting firms with major environmentally friendly shareholders with voting rights  -0.01% -0.23 
O4A. Polluting firms with major polluting shareholders with no voting rights  0.14% 1.72* 
O4B. Polluting firms with major polluting shareholders with voting rights  -0.01% -0.61 
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7.7 CONCLUSION 
The analysis of this chapter examined the relationship between crossholding structure 
(corporate governance) and environmental regulations. The results show that green 
effects persist under various crossholding options. Both environmentally friendly and 
polluting firms with environmentally or polluting major shareholders reacted positively 
to environmental regulations. In particular, polluting firms with major shareholders 
coming from polluting firms produced the highest green effects. I suspect this may be 
because major shareholders from the polluting industry are more aware of 
environmental regulations. 
 
The firms’ voting rights did not have a major influence on the green effects, as most 
results were statistically insignificant. The implication of this result is that the voting 
rights of shareholders are not a major factor regarding environmental regulations. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of environmental regulation is to reduce GHG emissions and prepare the 
world to move towards environmentally friendly production methods. Japan is a 
leading country for implementing green policies, with 424 environmental regulation 
announcements from 2002 to 2012. Therefore, Japan is fertile ground to conduct an 
experiment regarding how investors react to these announcements. Nonetheless, the 
Japanese market has not been tested prior to this study; this is the one of the major 
contribution of this thesis. Previous studies around environmental regulations in 
finance have examined countries such as Australia, China, the US, France and the UK. 
These countries are experiencing the first wave of environmental regulation and in that 
sense, the insight provided in this thesis is different (and innovative) in that Japan is 
undergoing a second round of environmental regulations that aim to fine tune those of 
the first generation. 
 
Within environmental finance, the first generation of studies focused on detecting 
green effects. This thesis contributes to the second generation of studies, whereby 
attempts have been made to explain why and how green effects occur. This thesis uses 
portfolio construction methodologies to explain whether investors over- or under-react 
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to environmental regulation announcements. The fundamental characteristics of firms, 
seasonality and crossholding features are used to explain green effects. 
 
This chapter concludes this thesis and is structured as follows: Section 8.2 summarises 
the thesis, Section 8.3 concludes the thesis’s key contributions and Section 8.4 suggests 
directions for future research on green effects. 
 
8.2 THESIS SUMMARY 
Chapter 2 reviewed the existing literature on environmental regulations in finance, 
economics and accounting. This review clarified that environmental finance is in its 
infancy, environmental accounting is more developed than environmental finance (but 
environmental accounting focuses on environmental disclosure) and environmental 
economics is the leading discipline among these three groups. The implications for 
finance are that it should adopt and adapt the concepts introduced in environmental 
economics and it should continue to monitor the progress on mandatory 
environmental disclosures. This will provide a rich data set for analysis. Another 
important conclusion from the environmental finance literature is the need to detect 
and explain green effects. 
 
Chapter 3 examined the policies introduced by Japan’s main environmental 
agency—the MoE. It examined and analysed the major enacted laws designed to 
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achieve environmental protection, restoration and preservation, and to protect human, 
flora and faunal health. Initiatives undertaken to reduce GHG emissions, global 
warming and climate change, protection of air and water quality, removal of toxins 
from the environment and recycling were discussed. This chapter has policy 
implications for other nations that are behind in terms of environmental regulations—in 
other words, countries who are about to embark on environmental regulations should 
study the Japanese insights, as there are valuable lessons to learn. 
 
Chapter 4 described the objectives, research questions, data and methodology of this 
study. This study aimed to assess the effects of environmental regulations on the 
Japanese stock markets empirically and investigate whether contrarian profits exist 
around these announcements. To achieve these goals, three research questions were 
developed: 
1. How do polluting industries and environmental friendly industries react to green 
policy announcements? 
2. Do investors over-react or under-react to green policies? 
3. Can green effects be explained by financial and seasonal factors? 
 
To answer these research questions, the event study methodology of Ramiah, Martin 
and Moosa (2013), Ramiah, Pichelli and Moosa (2015a, 2015b), Pham, Ramiah and 
Moosa (2015) and Ramiah et al. (2016) was used to investigate how the 424 
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environmental regulations affected the stock market in terms of firms’ AR. Further, 
Lee and Swaminathan’s (2000) portfolio construction methodology was adopted and 
adapted to construct portfolios (winners, losers, momentum, contrarian and 
buy-and-hold portfolio). The performance of these portfolios was then explained 
through size, profitability, leverage, volume, sales, CAPEX, seasonality and keiretsu. 
 
Chapter 5 used event study methodology to estimate the ARs associated with 
environmental regulations for each industry in the Japanese market, as the literature 
points to industry effects. After studying 424 announcements of environmental 
regulations, I concluded that green effects exist and can be either positive or negative, 
giving rise to winning and losing industrial portfolios. When industries were further 
classified into polluters and environmentally friendly categories, I gathered some 
evidence suggesting that environmental regulations were partially achieving their 
goals. To a certain degree, the regulations appeared successful around environmentally 
friendly businesses, but did not quite achieve their objectives regarding polluters. 
According to the results presented in Chapter 5, the winning environmental regulation 
was the eco-action point model, whereby consumers/citizens are rewarded with 
redeemable points when they select and consume environmentally friendly products. 
These points can be used later to purchase other products. Given the success of this 
policy, other countries should consider adopting the eco-action point model to decrease 
CO2 emissions. 
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Chapter 6 adpoted Lee and Swaminathan’s (2000) portfolio construction method to 
investigate portfolio returns (winners, losers, momentum, contrarian and buy-and-hold 
portfolio). These portfolios were then explained by size, profitability, leverage, 
volume, sales, CAPEX and seasonality. Based on the evidence provided in Chapter 6, 
I concluded the following: 
 investors have a tendency to under-react to winner portfolios 
 investors have a tendency to act in an unusual manner regarding loser portfolios 
 no momentum profit is observed 
 contrarian profits are detected 
 buy-and-hold profits are noticed 
 weak seasonality in the portfolios return 
 size factor plays a significant role in explaining returns 
 no clear patterns exist with the remaining fundamentals. 
 
Chapter 6 indicated that the ARs associated with environmental regulation 
announcements can be adopted to develop trading strategies such as the contrarian 
and buy-and-hold strategies. However, it is difficult to explain the portfolio returns by 
a consistent pattern of fundamental and seasonal factors. 
 
Chapter 7 studied the relationship between crossholding structure and environmental 
regulations. The results showed that green effects persisted under various crossholding 
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options. Regardless of whether a firm was environmentally friendly or polluting, the 
major shareholders had no explanatory power in explaining the AR. Additionally, the 
firms’ voting rights did not have a major influence on green effects. 
 
8.3 KEY CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS 
The key contributions of this study are listed as follows: 
 I adjusted the data biases before investigating green effects, which has not been 
done in any previous environmental finance studies. 
 ARs associated with 424 green policy announcements (green effects) have been 
documented in this study. 
 Industries are classified as either environmentally friendly or polluting—a 
categorisation that the literature fails to undertake. 
 I generate the reaction of environmentally friendly and polluting industries to 
environmental regulations in aggregate and at the industry level in the Japanese 
market. 
 I examine each industry’s reaction to environmental regulations and observe the 
significant policy announcements. 
 I reinforce the hypotheses of Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013), Ramiah, Pichelli 
and Moosa (2015a, 2015b), Pham, Ramiah and Moosa (2015) and Ramiah et al. 
(2016) with new evidence from the Japanese market. 
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 This is the first study that uses behavioural theories, such as over- and 
under-reaction, to explain green effects. 
 This is the first study to construct various portfolios (winner, loser, contrarian, 
momentum and buy-and-hold portfolios) around each environmental policy 
announcement date and then appraise the performance of these portfolios for 
various holding periods. 
 I find investors have a tendency to under-react to winner portfolios as the ARs of 
winner portfolios increase and persist in the long term. 
 I find investors have a tendency to act in an unusual manner regarding loser 
portfolios. 
 No momentum profit is observed in my study. 
 Short-run contrarian profits are detected and the contrarian returns are observed in 
the holding period of 1 day and 1 week is 0.37% and 0.76% (with statistically 
significant t-statistics). 
 Buy-and-hold profits are noticed, especially in long-run holding period. 
 I divide the contrarian portfolio into quintiles to review the robustness of the 
short-run contrarian profitability; the results confirm the existence of a short-run 
contrarian effect and this is not driven by outliers. 
 I analyse how environmentally friendly and polluting industries contribute to 
contrarian returns. The result indicates that contrarian returns are driven by 
polluting industries. 
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 This is the first study to investigate how business fundamentals (include volume, 
size, profitability, CAPEX and leverage) affect the portfolio (winner, loser, 
contrarian, momentum and buy-and-hold portfolios) returns following 
environmental regulation announcements. 
 I find stocks with large size, high profitability, high sales and high CAPEX have 
higher winner portfolio returns. There is no consistent pattern regarding volume 
and leverage in explaining the winner portfolios return. 
 The evidence shows that stocks with low volume, large size, high profitability, high 
sales, high CAPEX and low leverage tend to have higher loser portfolios return. 
 The evidence shows that stocks with low volume, high profitability, low sales, 
low-CAPEX and low leverage tend to have higher contrarian portfolios return. 
 I find that stocks with low volume, large size, high profitability, high sales, high 
CAPEX and low leverage tend to have higher buy-and-hold portfolios return. 
 This is the first study to investigate how seasonality affects the portfolios (winner, 
loser, contrarian, momentum and buy-and-hold portfolios) returns following 
environmental regulation announcements. 
 Seasonality (including the January-, April- and May-effect) influences loser 
portfolios. 
 A joint fundamental and seasonality analysis has also been investigated. 
 The joint analysis evidence shows that fundamental factors (particularly the size 
factor) play an important role in explaining the portfolio’s return. 
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 The winner, loser and contrarian portfolios are subcategorised into polluting and 
environmentally friendly portfolios. This analysis provides additional insights into 
green portfolio performance. 
 Seasonality (including April and May) and fundamentals (including volume, size, 
sales and CAPEX) influence environmentally friendly loser portfolios. 
 Fundamentals (including size and sales) influence environmentally friendly winner 
portfolios. 
 Size affects environmentally friendly contrarian portfolios. 
 Fundamentals (including size and leverage) and seasonality (including January and 
May) affect polluting loser portfolios. 
 Fundamentals (including volume and size) and seasonality (February, March, 
April, May, June, August, October and December) affect polluting winner 
portfolios. 
 Fundamentals (including volume and size) and seasonality (February, March, June, 
August and December) affect polluting contrarian portfolios. 
 This is the first study that explains the announcements of environmental regulations 
by firms’ crossholding (keiretsu) characteristics. 
 I hand-collected 2537 firms’ shareholding information from the ‘Osiris’ database; 
this database can be used by other researchers in this area. 
 The crossholding group is subcategorised into either environmentally friendly or 
polluting firms. 
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 Regardless of whether a firm is environmentally friendly or polluting, the major 
shareholders do not have explanatory power in terms of explaining AR. 
 This is the first study to explain the announcements of environmental regulations 
with shareholders’ voting rights; the results show voting rights are not effective in 
explaining green effects. 
 
8.4 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
8.4.1 Development of Environmental Finance 
Environmental finance is at its early stage and there is room for major improvement and 
discovery. In this thesis, I used a well-established finance methodology (Lee and 
Swaminathan, 2000) to draw new conclusions about environmental regulations. Other 
financial models should be adopted and adapted to tackle issues surrounding climate 
change. Further, the techniques used in environmental economics should be applied, 
using financial data series to generate new findings. 
 
The environmental disclosure progress in accounting should be explored by finance 
researchers. For instance, Gregoriou and Ramiah (2016) and Moosa and Ramiah 
(2014) discuss the disclosure requirements of US firms, whereby their emission levels 
are recorded/reported on a daily basis (and are publicly available). Research must be 
undertaken to show how these disclosures affect share prices. 
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8.4.2 Measuring the Effectiveness of Environmental Regulation 
Future research should aim at measuring the effectiveness of environmental 
regulations. When I considered the work of Ramiah, Martin and Moosa (2013), I find 
that they used anecdotal evidence to determine whether a policy had achieved its goal. 
For instance, they only used the anecdotal evidence of electricity providers not affected 
by stringent policies to conclude that Australian environmental policies were not 
effective. In doing so, they ignore other firms within the same industry. 
 
In contrast, Pham, Ramiah and Moosa (2015) have attempted to measure the 
effectiveness of environmental regulations, but their proposed methodology is 
restricted to measuring excessiveness. The effectiveness measure should be further 
developed to generate effectiveness scores for each industry, illustrating how each 
industry is affected following the announcement of environmental regulations. 
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